Wegner v. Pella Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-mn-01993-DCN,No. 2:14-mn-00001-DCN,2:14-mn-00001-DCN,2:14-mn-01993-DCN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | CRAIG WEGNER, RONALD L. SIEMENS, and BRENT GEETINGS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PELLA CORPORATION, Defendants. |
This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss brought by defendant Pella Corporation ("Pella"). The court grants in part and denies in part Pella's motion as set forth below.
Plaintiff Craig Wegner ("Wegner") purchased Pella Architect and Designer Series windows when his home was constructed in the fall of 2000. Am. Compl. ¶ 55. In or about 2012, Wegner discovered problems with his windows, including that the windows "allowed water to intrude into [his] home resulting in other property damage to his home," such as the home's structure, wall cavity, adjoining finishes and walls, and "other personal property within his home." Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff Brent Geetings ("Geetings") purchased Pella Architect and Designer Series windows directly from Pella in or about October 2003. Id. ¶ 60. Between 2010 and 2013, Geetings noticed that his windows were leaking and contacted Pella. Id. ¶ 67. Pella replaced some of the windows, but required Geetings to pay for the installationhimself. Id. Geetings alleges that several of his windows currently show signs of damage. Id. ¶ 68.
Plaintiff Ronald L. Siemens ("Siemens") built his home with a general contractor and a certificate of occupancy was issued for the home in 2005. Id. ¶ 69. Siemens purchased Pella Designer Series windows from a Pella store in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Id. ¶ 70. Siemens contacted Pella "several times throughout the years due to problems with the Windows in his home." Id. ¶ 75. While Pella has sent service people to inspect his home, it has not replaced any of his windows, despite the fact that water allegedly continues to intrude. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that the windows are defective because water permeates the window unit through four leakage paths: (1) the glazing pocket; (2) the aluminum cladding and wood; (3) the crank hardware and fasteners; and (4) the frame-to-sash joint. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege that these defects cause the windows' wood to rot and water to leak into the interior of the home. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Plaintiffs further allege that Pella was aware, or but for its negligence should have been aware, of the defect and when questioned about wood rot, claimed faulty installation or excessive moisture in the homes. Id. ¶¶ 21-26.
On January 7, 2014, Wegner filed a class action complaint against Pella in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging jurisdiction based on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Wegner amended his complaint on July 2, 2014, adding Siemens and Geetings as plaintiffs and bringing the following eleven causes of action: (1) violation of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA"); (2) negligence; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) breach of implied warrantyof merchantability; (5) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; (6) breach of express warranty; (7) fraudulent misrepresentation; (8) fraudulent concealment; (9) unjust enrichment; (10) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"); and (11) declaratory relief.
On May 20, 2014, the United States Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to this court as part of the consolidated multidistrict litigation. Pella filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 1, 2014. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on August 25, 2014, and Pella replied on September 8, 2014. Pella's motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and is ripe for the court's review.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 679. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Facts pled that are 'merely consistent with' liability are not sufficient." A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
This case is predicated on diversity jurisdiction and was filed in federal court, so it is governed by state substantive law and federal procedural law. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416 (2010) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)). "In multidistrict litigation, the law of the transferee circuit governs questions of federal law." In re KBR, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957 (D. Md. 2010) modified on reh'g sub nom. In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 925 F. Supp. 2d 752 (D. Md. 2013) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 744 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2014); see also In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2004); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (). Therefore, this court must apply Iowa substantive law and Fourth Circuit procedural law.
Pella asserts that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. The court will first determine whether the applicable statutes of limitation are tolled by equitable tolling or class action tolling. The court will then consider Pella's arguments about each claim individually.
Pella argues that some of plaintiffs' claims are barred by their respective statutes of limitation. While the specific statutes of limitation applicable those claims will be discussed below, the parties disagree about the application of two tolling doctrines to the statutes of limitation: equitable tolling/fraudulent concealment and class action tolling. The court considers these doctrines in turn.
Plaintiffs first argue that Pella is estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense because it fraudulently concealed that its windows were defective. Am. Compl. ¶ 822; Pls.' Resp. 13.
Under Iowa law, "the doctrine of fraudulent concealment [is] a form of equitable estoppel." See Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 701 (Iowa 2005). "[F]raudulent concealment does not affect the running of the statutory limitations period; rather, it estops a defendant from raising a statute-of-limitations defense." Id. (citing 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 380 (2000)). Fraudulent concealment is "intended to prevent a party from benefiting from the protection of a limitations statute when by his own fraud he has prevented the other party from seeking redress within the period of limitations." Id. at 702 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances justifying equitable estoppel end when "'[the] plaintiff [becomes] aware of the fraud, or by the use of ordinary care and diligence should have discovered it.'" Id. (quoting Faust v. Hosford, 93 N.W. 58, 59 (Iowa 1903)). To establish entitlement to equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must show:
(1) The defendant has made a false representation or has concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act upon such representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact rely upon such representations to his prejudice.
Id. (citing Meier v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Iowa 1990)). The Iowa Supreme Court has noted that with the first element requires "some affirmative act to conceal the plaintiff's cause of action independent of and subsequent to the liability-producing conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
Because fraudulent concealment invokes fraud, the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) apply. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 492 F.3d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 2007); Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570, 573-74 (4th Cir. 1976).1 As discussed in more detail below, plaintiffs fail to plead any affirmative act on the part of Pella with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Therefore, the statutes of limitation applicable to plaintiffs' claims are not equitably tolled.
Plaintiffs also contend that the filing of a previous class action in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois, Saltzman v. Pella, tolled the statutes of limitation for their claims. Pls.' Resp. 11.
The doctrine of class action tolling was first announced in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). In American Pipe, the Supreme Court held that an applicable statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of a class action forputative class members who intervene after the denial of class certification—at least where certification is denied for failure to meet the numerosity requirement of Federal Rule of...
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