Wehle v. Bradley
Decision Date | 14 March 2014 |
Docket Number | 1101290 |
Parties | Bonnie Wehle et al. v. Thomas H. Bradley III, as co-personal representative of the estate of Robert G. Wehle, deceased, et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
Appeal from Bullock Circuit Court
Bonnie Wehle, Penny Martin, and Sharon Ann Wehle ("the daughters") appeal from the Bullock Circuit Court's order on final settlement of the estate of their father, Robert G.Wehle ("the estate"). In this "final order," the circuit court denied the daughters' claims against Thomas H. Bradley III, James H. McGowan, and Grady Hartzog, as the co-personal representatives of the estate ("the personal representatives"); the order also denied the daughters' request that McGowan be removed as a cotrustee of the family trust created under Robert G. Wehle's will. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This is the second time this case has come before us. In the previous appeal, Wehle v. Bradley, 49 So. 3d 1203 (Ala. 2010) ("Wehle I"), this Court summarized the facts as follows:
In Wehle I, this Court concluded that "[b]ecause the payment of compensation to the personal representatives without prior court approval was not expressly authorized by Robert G. Wehle's will, the circuit court erred in entering its partial summary judgment in favor of the personal representatives." 49 So. 3d at 1209; see also Ala. Code 1975, § 43-2-844(7). This Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case on that basis and did not decide the issue whether the daughters' "claim as to the excessiveness of the compensation is barred by the statute of limitations." Id.
On remand, the circuit court held a proceeding at which evidence was presented ore tenus as to the petition for final settlement of the estate. Thereafter, the circuit court entered its final order approving the compensation thepersonal representatives had paid themselves, i.e., $1,964,367.82, as "reasonable compensation" under § 43-2-848(a), Ala. Code 1975. The order denied the daughters' claim that the personal representatives should pay interest on the compensation because they had paid it without prior court approval. Also, in regard to other issues raised by the daughters, the order denied the daughters' petition to remove McGowan as a cotrustee of the family trust, denied the daughters' request to tax costs pertaining to Wehle I against the personal representatives, and awarded attorney fees and costs to the personal representatives in the amount of $383,437.31 as to their defense against the daughters' claims on final settlement.1 The daughters appeal.
To the extent the circuit court made factual findings based on oral testimony, those factual findings are entitled to deference by this Court under the ore tenus standard ofreview. Under that standard, "'we must accept as true the facts found by the trial court if there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings.'" Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 959 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Beasley v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp., 569 So. 2d 389, 393 (Ala. 1990)). This standard is based on a recognition of the trial court's unique position of being able to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony. See, e.g., Justice v. Arab Lumber & Supply, Inc., 533 So. 2d 538, 543 (Ala. 1988). The deference owed a trial court under the ore tenus standard of review, however, does not extend to the trial court's decisions on questions of law. Appellate review of questions of law, as well as whether the trial court has properly applied that law to a given set of facts, is de novo. See, e.g., Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997).
Ala. Code 1975, § 43-2-848(a). Although the allowance of compensation for the personal representative and the amount of that compensation are mixed questions of law and fact, our cases state that decisions as to these issues are largely within the discretion of the trial judge. See Armstrong v. Alabama Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 404 So. 2d 675, 676 (Ala. 1981). The amount of compensation to be allowed under § 43-2-848(a) "'below or up to the maximum limit prescribed [thereby] is to be determined according to the circumstances of each particular case.'" Armstrong, 404 So. 2d at 676 (quoting Smith v. McNaughton, 378 So. 2d 703, 704-05 (Ala. 1979)). In determining whether the trial court exceeded its discretion as to a compensation award under § 43-2-848(a), we must considerthe amount of the award "in view of all the circumstances" of the administration of the estate. Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97 So. 3d 114, 122 (Ala. 2012); see also, e.g., Armstrong, 404 So. 2d at 676 ( ).
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