Wehrhane v. Peyton.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1948
• Citation: 58 A.2d 698,134 Conn. 486
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WEHRHANE et al. v. PEYTON.

134 Conn. 486

58 A.2d 698

WEHRHANE et al.

v.PEYTON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 1, 1948.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Quinlan, Judge.

Action by Henry H. Wehrhane and others, individually and as executors of the estate of William C. Peyton, deceased, against Bernard Peyton, individually and as executor of the estate of Anne duPont Peyton, deceased, to enjoin defendant from prosecuting a suit against plaintiffs in New York for accounting and transfer to defendant, as plaintiff in such suit of principal and income of all property coming into plaintiffs' hands from their testator's residuary estate. From a judgment for defendant after trial to the court, plaintiffs appeal.

Error in part, judgment set aside, and case remanded with direction to enter judgment for defendant in part, but ordering a new trial between plaintiffs as executors and defendant as executor.

See also 133 Conn. 478, 52 A.2d 711.

Walter B. Lockwood and Raymond E. Hackett, both of Stamford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Philo C. Calhoun, of Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant executor).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The question involved in this case, presented upon an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment in favor of the defendant, is whether the Superior Court should have enjoined the latter from further prosecution of an action he has begun in the Supreme Court of the state of New York. The issues concern the ultimate disposition of property owned by William C. Peyton, deceased, who died a resident of Greenwich in this state and whose estate is in process of settlement in the courts of this state. In the action in New York the defendants are the four surviving executors of the estate of William C. Peyton, individually and as such executors and trustees under his will, and the plaintiff is Bernard Peyton, individually and as executor of the estate of Anne duPont Peyton, the widow of William C. Peyton, who survived him but has since died, who was a resident of Greenwich and whose estate is also in process of settlement in the courts of this state. In the action before us the parties are reversed; the four executors individually and as executors are plaintiffs and Bernard Peyton, individually and as executor of the estate of Anne duPont Peyton, is defendant. None of the parties is a resident of this state, and the defendant in this action is a resident of the state of New Jersey. Service was made on him as executor under General Statues, Cum.Sup.1935, § 1649c, but no personal service was made on him.

The trial court reached the following conclusions: The relief asked is not available to the plaintiffs in this action in their individual capacities because they are nonresidents of this state; no basis remains for considering the question whether the court had jurisdiction to grant relief in their favor as executors of the estate of William C. Peyton because the action in New York had been dismissed as to them; the plaintiffs can fully assert their claims in the New York action and adequate remedy is open to them there; the action in New York was not actuated by malice or improper motive; and there is no basis in fact or law for restraining Bernard Peyton as executor of the estate of Anne duPont Peyton from prosecuting the action in New York.

Before considering whether the plaintiffs as executors have a right in equity to the relief they claim, we take note of the conclusion of the trial court that there is now no basis for according them that relief because the action in the New York Supreme Court has been dismissed as to them. It is found that the defendant has appealed from that ruling, and that appeal is still pending. Statements in the brief of the defendant before us make it evident that he has not abandoned the appeal but proposes to press it. The plaintiffs as executors have not been so definitely removed from the New York litigation that no basis remains for according them relief.

William C. Peyton provided in his will that the residue of his estate should be held by the executors he named, as trustees, and that the income should be paid to his wife, Annne duPont Peyton, so long as she lived; and the will directed that at her death the trustees should transfer the principal to themselves as individuals. The will stated that the testator intended to prepare or cause to be prepared a letter outlining certain dispositions of the principal and income of the estate after the death of his wife which would meet with his approval, but he expressly disavowed any intent to limit or restrain the absolute estate and ownership of the property given to the executors or their freedom of disposition of it. At his death no such letter was found. Bernard Peyton, only son of the testator, brought an action for a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of this state against the executors and the widow; and in that action he claimed that at the death of Anne duPont Peyton they took no beneficial interest in the estate as residuary legatees, that the property was intestate estate and vested in Anne dePont Peyton, who was then alive, and in him as the only son and heir-at-law of William C. Peyton. The widow joined him in this claim. The Superior Court rendered judgment declaring that the residue vested beneficially and absolutely in the executors individually. The case came before us on appeal and we sustained the judgment of the Superior Court. Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 6 A. 2d 313. In the Superior Court the plaintiff in the New York case and Anne duPont Payton claimed, among other things, that the executors took the property for the purpose of carrying out after the death of the widow certain undisclosed purposes which, if stated at all, could only be found in a document not within the Statute of Wills, and that the testator had attempted to establish invalid secret trusts; and in the Superior Court and upon the appeal they claimed that in such a situation there would be a resulting trust for those entitled to take as next of kin of the testator. A-133 Rec. & Briefs, back of p. 327 et seq., back of p. 332, p. 373. We held, however, that the will expressed an intention that the executors should take the property by absolute title and 125 Conn. at page 433, 6 A.2d at page 318, that the testator did not intend to establish a trust.

The complaint in the action in New York is in three counts. In the first, the substance of the judgment of the Superior Court is set forth, and the complaint then alleges: The judgment in Connecticut related solely to the construction of the will of William C. Peyton and did not ‘determine the equitable duties or obligations arising by virtue of facts extrinsic to the will, subject to which’ the executors took the residuary estate; the executors claim to hold the property as their own and solely for their own benefit; William C. Peyton was not a lawyer; one of the executors, Coulson, was his legal and confidential adviser and counseled him in the drafting of the will; Peyton did not in fact intend that the executors should receive the property as their own but did intend that they should take it only to accomplish the purposes he would indicate by letter or other communication extrinsic to the will; Coulson knew that he intended this and, on behalf of himself and the other executors, expressly or impliedly agreed that, if Peyton made such a will as he did, they would use and apply the property only in accordance with his intention; and the property in the hands of the executors is specific personal property within the state of New York. In the second count these allegations are incorporated, and it is further alleged that William C. Peyton desired to devote all the residue of his estate to charitable purposes, that he was advised by Coulson that his purpose would contravene the limitations upon charitable bequests under the laws of New York, that these limitations could be avoided by bequeathing the property upon a secret trust, and that the will was drawn for that purpose. The third count alleged that the property was bequeathed to the defendants upon a promise by Coulson in his own behalf and that of the other executors to effect certain secret purposes not disclosed on the face of the will, in evasion of the Statute of Wills of the state of New York and against its public policy. In each count it is alleged that the executors hold the property charged with a trust for the ‘plaintiffs.’ The principal claims for relief are that the defendants be ordered to account to the plaintiffs for the principal and income of all property coming into their hands from the residuary estate of William C. Peyton or to which they claim to be entitled in whatever capacity under the dispositive provisions of his will after the death of Anne duPont Peyton and that the defendants be ordered to transfer to the plaintiffs that property, similarly described, or, as stated in another claim for relief, the property which they were entitled to receive from the Peyton estate in their fiduciary capacities.

In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bernblum, 122 Conn. 583, at page 589, 191 A. 542, at page 545, we discussed the rights of the courts of one state to enjoin the prosecution of an action in another, and we said: ‘One of the most usual grounds for such action is the fact that the party enjoined has sought by resort to the courts of another jurisdiction to deprive a fellow citizen of some benefit which should rightfully be accorded him under the law of the state of their common residence’; and in 122 Conn. at page 590, 191 A. at page 545: ‘In other words, underlying the cases in which relief by injunction has been granted is the fact that the proper forum for the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties is the state of their common residence.’ Implied in these statements and inherent in the ground upon...