Wehrly v. American Motors Sales Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. F 86-248.
• Citation: 678 F. Supp. 1366
• Parties: David L. WEHRLY, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORP., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

678 F. Supp. 1366

David L. WEHRLY, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORP., Defendant.

Civ. No. F 86-248.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

February 12, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Perry D. Shilts, Snouffer, Haller & Colvin, Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff.

Vincent J. Backs, Beers, Mallers, Backs, Salin & Larmore, Fort Wayne, Ind., Susan B. Tabler, S.R. Born, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

American Motors Sales Corporation has filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for a ruling. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 2512; Valentine v. Joliet Tp. High School Dist. No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

The plaintiff cites Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir.1985), for the proposition that summary judgment is generally an inappropriate tool for resolving claims of employment discrimination, which deal with issues of motivation and intent. It is true, as this court has noted in the past, that the application of summary judgment standards must be approached with special caution in intentional discrimination cases. Beard v. Whitley Co. REMC, 656 F.Supp. 1461, 1464 (N.D.Ind.1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 405, 411 (7th Cir.1988). That is not because there is something mystical about intentional discrimination cases, which somehow makes summary judgment inappropriate, but rather, because questions of motivation and intent are difficult to resolve short of trial. But, even when motive or intent are at stake summary judgment is proper "where the plaintiff presents no indications of motive and intent supportive of his position." Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir.1986). "The court should `neither look the other way' to ignore genuine issues of material fact, nor `strain to find' material fact issues where there are none...." Beard, 840 F.2d 405, 410.

Beyond these general observations the court would note that Thornbrough was decided before the Supreme Court decided Celotex, Anderson and Matsushita, supra. Indeed, in Anderson, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the defendant should seldom if ever be granted summary judgment where his state of mind is at issue and the jury might disbelieve him or his witnesses as to this issue. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Even before the Supreme Court decided Celotex, Anderson and Matsushita, the Seventh Circuit had recognized that summary judgment could appropriately be granted in intentional discrimination cases, including age discrimination cases. See Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (7th Cir. 1985). Indeed, in Allis-Chalmers, the court held that it was "not required to evaluate every conceivable inference which can be drawn from evidentiary matters, but only reasonable ones." Id. at 1218, quoting Parker v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n., 741 F.2d 975, 980 (7th Cir.1984). See also Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239 (7th Cir.1983); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit has continued to apply summary judgment standards to intentional discrimination cases (in the same way) since the Supreme Court's decisions in Celotex, Anderson and Matsushita. See, e.g., Henn v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.1987); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.1986). The Fifth Circuit's decision in Thornbrough notwithstanding, American Motors will be entitled to summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact.

II. Factual Background

A. The Parties

American Motors hired the plaintiff as a district sales manager on January 3, 1972. The plaintiff was 42 years old. (Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 7). Before being hired by American Motors, the plaintiff had worked at his father's Dodge-Chrysler dealership in Portland, Indiana. (Pf.Dep., pp. 6-7; Pf. Dep.Ex. 1). In 1962, the plaintiff was hired by Chrysler as a corporate auditor. (Pf. Dep., pp. 6-7; Pf.Dep.Ex. 1). Thereafter, the plaintiff worked as a district sales manager for Chrysler, living in Fort Wayne and handling a 50 mile area surrounding Fort Wayne, Indiana. (Pf.Dep., pp. 7, 8). In 1969, the plaintiff began working as a general sales manager for a Chrysler dealership in Fort Wayne, Indiana, where he had complete control over the profit and loss of the dealership and where he supervised 30 to 35 people in sales and service. (Pf.Dep., pp. 9, 10).

During his employment with American Motors, the plaintiff worked as a district sales manager in the territory surrounding Fort Wayne, Indiana. (Pf.Dep., pp. 13, 20-21, 23, 74-75, 111; Levy Dep., pp. 8-9). The boundaries of sales areas are constantly in flux because existing dealerships close and new dealerships open. (Pf.Dep., pp. 19-20; Polan Dep., p. 7). During plaintiff's employment with the defendant, he served as a district sales manager for the Kalamazoo region, and for approximately one year he managed both the Fort Wayne territory and the Kalamazoo territory. (Pf.Dep., pp. 19-20).

Defendant American Motors Sales Corporation (American Motors) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Motors Corporation. The defendant markets and sells, throughout the United States and Canada, American Motors Corporation vehicles. (Noles Dep., pp. 3-4; Wilhelm Dep., p. 7). American Motors sells its vehicles through dealerships, most of which are independently owned, but some of which are owned and operated directly by American Motors. (Pf.Dep., p. 144; Storm Dep., p. 22). Sales managers are responsible for servicing dealerships and are assigned a number of dealerships in a geographical area. These sales managers are responsible for securing new car orders, insuring that dealers follow factory policies and practices, and assisting dealers in promoting and selling cars. (Pf.Dep., pp. 21-23; Storm Dep., pp. 53-54; Levy Dep., p. 9; First Prod.Exs. O and P).

B. Sales Structure of Defendant's Business

American Motors has district sales managers, who service areas with small to medium size dealerships and city sales managers, who service major metropolitan areas with large dealerships. A district sales manager's job is classified as labor grade 10 (Wilhelm Dep., p. 9; First Prod.Ex. D). Since city sales managers are entrusted with larger volumes of the defendant's business and since they must be adept at marketing techniques unique to large, metropolitan dealerships, their position is rated at a labor grade of 11, a higher grade than the district sales manager's grade. (Noles Dep., pp. 18, 34; Wilhelm Dep., pp. 9, 22-23; Storm Dep., pp. 37-38, 48; Levy Dep., pp. 7-8, 21-23; Lovitt Dep., p. 13; First Interr. No. 2).¹

C. Gradual Decline of the Defendant's Business

It is an undisputed fact (and a very important fact if this case is not to be decided in a vacuum) that ...