Weible v. Ronan State Bank
| Decision Date | 19 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-526,88-526 |
| Citation | 238 Mont. 235,776 P.2d 837 |
| Parties | Roy WEIBLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RONAN STATE BANK, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Michael F. Bailey, Joseph M. Goldman Law Offices, Missoula, for plaintiff and appellant.
Sam E. Haddon, Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Ingraham Law Office, Ronan, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff Roy Weible appeals from an order of the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, dismissing his complaint against defendant Ronan State Bank. We affirm.
The dispositive issue raised on appeal is as follows:
Were the claims asserted by Weible in his complaint based solely on a tort action for injury to or trespass on property, and, as such, barred by a two-year statute of limitations?
Beginning in 1973, Roy Weible and his wife, Alta Weible, executed several new and renewal promissory notes to Ronan State Bank. As collateral securing the performance of the notes, the Weibles executed and delivered to the Bank an assignment of their buyers' interest in certain real property, a mortgage upon that property and a security agreement covering personal property.
As of September 9, 1985, the promissory notes were in default. The Bank initiated an action to obtain judgment upon the notes and a decree of foreclosure of the real property. On May 28, 1986, a hearing on the Bank's motion for summary judgment was held, at which time counsel for the Weibles stipulated to the summary judgment and agreed no defenses could be raised. The formal judgment and decree of foreclosure was entered on August 4, 1986.
On June 3, 1986, after the hearing on summary judgment but prior to the entry of judgment, agents of the Bank entered onto Roy Weible's real property and removed farm machinery used as collateral in the personal property security agreement. On August 3, 1988, more than two years after the removal of the machinery, Weible filed a complaint against the Bank and Stedje Brothers, Inc., alleging that the Bank breached the security agreement by failing to give ten days notice prior to seizure of the farm machinery as required by the agreement, trespassing upon his property and wrongfully removing the equipment. On August 5, 1988, Weible filed an amended complaint, dropping Stedje Brothers as a defendant.
In response to the complaint, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the District Court granted the Bank's motion on the grounds that Weible's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrine of res judicata and the compulsory counterclaim rule.
On appeal, Weible contests each of the grounds upon which the District Court based its determination. We will not discuss the res judicata and compulsory counterclaim questions, however, because the statute of limitations issue is dispositive of the appeal.
Weible argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the action against the Bank was barred by the statute of limitations. The District Court held that Weible's complaint rested solely on the tort theories of trespass on and injury to real and personal property, and, therefore, the complaint was barred by Sec. 27-2-207, MCA, the two-year statute of limitations pertaining to actions involving injury to property. Weible argues that his complaint was also based on breach of the security agreement, and, therefore, the action was governed by Sec. 27-2-202(1), MCA, the eight-year statute of limitations pertaining to actions involving breach of a written contract.
In determining which statute of limitations applies, the court will look to the substance of the complaint. If the gravamen of the action rests strictly on tort theories, the statute of limitations pertaining to torts will apply. Likewise, if the gravamen of the action rests strictly on contract theories, the statute of limitations pertaining to contracts will apply. Castillo v. Franks (1984), 213 Mont. 232, 239, 690 P.2d 425, 428; Quitmeyer v. Theroux (1964), 144 Mont. 302, 311, 395 P.2d 965, 969. If the gravamen...
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...doubt should be resolved in favor of the statute containing the longest limitation. We reaffirmed that rule in Weibel v. Ronan State Bank (1989), 238 Mont. 235, 776 P.2d 837, 838, ... If the gravamen of the action is such that it may rest in either a tort or contract, the injured party may ......
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