Weick v. Lander

• Decision Date: 30 September 1874
• Citation: 75 Ill. 93,1874 WL 9196
• Parties: LOUIS WEICKv.GEORGE LANDER, Administrator.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

75 Ill. 93

1874 WL 9196 (Ill.)

LOUIS WEICK

v.GEORGE LANDER, Administrator.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1874.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. SAMUEL M. MOORE, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. UPTON, BOUTELL & WATERMAN, for the appellant.

Messrs. HERVEY, ANTHONY & GALT and Messrs. BRANDT & HOFFMAN, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action brought by George Lander, father, and administrator of the estate of George T. Lander, against Louis Weick, to recover damages for an injury received by the son which resulted in his death.

A trial of the cause was had before a jury, which resulted in a verdict of $2,000 in favor of the plaintiff.

The defendant, Weick, brings the record here by appeal, and relies, in his argument, upon a reversal of the judgment upon the following grounds:

1st. That the obstruction of the street by the brick pile was not the proximate cause of the accident.

2d. That the accident was not the natural and probable result of the obstruction of the street by the brick pile.

3d. That the deceased was not in the exercise of such a degree of care as will entitle the plaintiff to recover.

4th. That the driver in whose custody the boy was, did not exercise ordinary care in allowing the boy to ride where he did, or in the management of his team at the time of the accident.

At the time the accident occurred certain buildings were in process of erection by appellant upon the west side of North Wells street in Chicago, for the estate of Walter L. Newbury, deceased.

Appellant had the sole control of the mason work and all material to be used in the construction of the buildings. The street was eighty feet wide, the sidewalk on each side of the street was sixteen feet wide, which left forty-eight feet for the roadway.

The street, although paved, and a thoroughfare much used, was obstructed by a large pile of brick extending from the sidewalk on the west, east about thirty-three feet. Opposite this, on the east side of the street, was a pile of lumber; there were also lime, sand and mortar in the street.

On the east side of the street, nearly opposite the brick pile, was a scale hole eight feet wide, and twelve feet long, which had been filled to near the surface of the street with dirt and brickbats.

The obstruction was so great that it was difficult for teams to pass each other; some of the witnesses testified that owing to the obstructions, teams were frequently stopped.

The ordinances of the city prohibited, under a penalty, the obstructing of any street with building material without a permit from the board of public works; no permit had been obtained by appellant.

On the day of the accident the father of the deceased had two teams hauling sand from Lake View to the central part of the city. In the afternoon, when the teamsters started for sand, the deceased, a boy twelve years old, went with them. When they obtained their loads and started, the deceased rode upon the rear wagon until within about a half mile of where the accident occurred; he then got down and walked several blocks, and then got upon the rear part of the front wagon and occupied a seat formed by the projection of the plank forming the bottom of the wagon-box beyond the tail-board.

The deceased sat with his back to the tail-board, and his face to the north. The teams were going south; as the front sand team came near the pile of brick, a wagon passed going north; following this was an express wagon; one hub of the express wagon struck the hub of the sand wagon, the other hub struck the pile of lumber, while the west hub of the sand wagon encountered the pile of brick, and the team was suddenly stopped. The driver of the rear wagon was watching the wagon going north, in order to avoid a collision, and did not notice that the front team had been stopped until he was near it; he then attempted to stop his team, but he had gone too far; the tongue of his wagon struck the deceased in the abdomen and inflicted a wound, which in a few days caused his death.

It is difficult in many cases to determine when the cause of an accident is to be considered proximate, and when merely remote.

There is, however, one feature in this case which will necessarily have an important bearing in the determination of the liability of appellant. In obstructing the street he did an unlawful act--an act prohibited by positive law. An act of an individual done to a public street or highway, if it detract from the safety of travelers, is a nuisance, and special damage arising from it furnishes ground for a private action. Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446.

We understand the rule to be, that where an act done is unlawful in itself, the wrong-doer will be held responsible, although other causes may have subsequently arisen and contributed in producing the injury; that where an act unlawful in itself is done, from which an injury may reasonably and naturally be expected to result, the injury, when it occurs, will be traced back and visited upon the original wrong-doer.

This arises from the principle, so clearly stated by Parsons in his work on Contracts, vol. 2, page 456: “That every defendant shall be held liable for all those consequences which might have been foreseen and expected as the results of his conduct, but not for those which he could not have foreseen, and was therefore under no moral obligation to take into consideration.”

It will not be necessary to enter upon an extended review of the many authorities on what may be regarded as the proximate or remote cause of an injury. The citation of a few, leading in their character, will be sufficient to settle the principle involved in this record.

The familiar case of Scott v. Shepard, 2 Black. Rep. 892, is a strong one illustrating the responsibility of the first wrongdoer, although others contributed in...