Weidenbacher v. Duclos

• Decision Date: 04 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 14942,14942
• Citation: 661 A.2d 988,234 Conn. 51
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Kevin Jon WEIDENBACHER v. Donna J. DUCLOS et al.

Page 988

661 A.2d 988

234 Conn. 51

Kevin Jon WEIDENBACHER v. Donna J. DUCLOS et al.

No. 14942.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 10, 1995.

Decided July 4, 1995.

Richard G. Kent, with whom, on the brief, was Stuart M. Katz, Bridgeport, for appellant (petitioner).

Louis RisCassi, West Hartford, for appellees (respondents).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

BERDON, Justice.

This appeal raises an issue of first impression for this court: Whether a man who alleges that he is the biological father of a minor child has standing to establish his paternity when the mother, at the time of the child's birth, was married to another man. ¹

In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner, Kevin Jon Weidenbacher, seeks custody of, or, in the alternative, visitation with, a minor child, Grant Duclos. ² In his application for the writ, the petitioner alleges that he is Grant's biological father. The respondents, Grant's mother, Donna Duclos, and her former husband, Edward Duclos, deny that the petitioner is Grant's biological father. The matter was referred to a state trial referee, Spallone, J., who appointed an attorney for the minor child. ³ The trial court then raised, sua sponte, the question of whether the petitioner had standing to pursue his claim, ⁴ and the respondents subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on this ground. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issue, ⁵ the trial court concluded that the petitioner lacked standing and dismissed the action. The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, ⁶ and we granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal. ⁷ We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

For the sole purpose of determining whether the petitioner had standing, the following evidence was submitted to the trial court. In 1988, the petitioner and Donna (Antonson) Duclos were living together in New York City. In January or February of that year, Donna became pregnant. She was not dating anyone other than the petitioner at the time. In March or April, Donna told the petitioner that she was pregnant, and that he was the father of her unborn child.

That summer, in August, 1988, the petitioner and Donna ceased living together, although they continued to talk on the phone virtually every day. On October 14, 1988, unbeknown to the petitioner, Donna married Edward Duclos. Two weeks later, on October 31, 1988, Donna gave birth to Grant. Donna informed the petitioner a few days later that she had had the baby. She did not tell him, however, that she had gotten married.

Although Donna moved to Connecticut from New York, she and the petitioner kept in contact during the next few months. At some point, she told him that she had married Edward Duclos. In February, 1989, when Grant was four months old, Donna telephoned the petitioner and arranged a visit. Shortly thereafter, Donna and Grant traveled to New York to meet the petitioner. It was the first time that the petitioner met Grant.

Donna and Grant continued to visit the petitioner an average of twice a month, staying for "long weekends," or three days at a time. They also talked on the phone almost daily. At some point, Donna told the petitioner that she had gotten divorced. In fact, however, she and Edward Duclos were only separated. The petitioner thereafter asked Donna on several occasions to marry him, but each time she refused. In June, 1990, Edward Duclos filed for divorce, and the petitioner became aware that the dissolution of the Duclos marriage had not yet taken place. On November 14, 1990, the marriage was dissolved. The decree of dissolution found that the couple "have one minor child, issue of the marriage of the parties, Grant E. Duclos," and ordered Edward Duclos to pay $135 weekly in child support and to maintain health insurance for the child.

Beginning in early 1989, when Donna first visited the petitioner in New York after Grant's birth, the relationship between the petitioner, Donna and Grant became more involved. The three took several vacations together, traveling to Montauk, New York; Newport, Rhode Island; Tucson, Arizona; Mexico; and Hawaii. ⁸ Grant called the petitioner "Dad" and "Kevin," and Donna told everyone they knew that the petitioner was Grant's father. The petitioner paid more than $20,000 for day care, schooling and support of Grant. He also added Grant's name to his own $6500 certificate of deposit.

On July 14, 1992, however, the relationship between the petitioner and Donna broke down, and she terminated his visitation with Grant. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a paternity action in Probate Court, seeking to be declared Grant's father. ⁹ The Probate Court, however, determined that it had no jurisdiction over the matter. Concluding that General Statutes § 46b-172a ¹⁰ limited the class of people who could file a paternity claim to " 'any person claiming to be the father of a child born out of wedlock,' " and further concluding that Grant "was not born out of wedlock"; (emphasis in original); the Probate Court dismissed the petitioner's claim on October 14, 1992. ¹¹

The petitioner thereafter brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. The trial court, however, concluded that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue his claim. Citing that section of the second edition of American Jurisprudence entitled "Bastards," ¹² the trial court concluded that allowing the petitioner "to bring the present action would be contrary to the strong public policy interest in protecting a minor child from the effects of illegitimacy, and in protecting the integrity of family relationships." ¹³ The trial court consequently dismissed the action, ¹⁴ and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, but on different grounds. Rather than focusing on the public policy ramifications of allowing the petitioner to contest the paternity of the child, as the trial court had done, the Appellate Court looked to the statutory scheme pertaining to paternity claims. After surveying these statutes, the Appellate Court determined that "[t]his state does not have a statute that authorizes an outsider to a marriage to initiate proceedings to establish his paternity of a child born during that marriage." Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 34 Conn.App. 129, 137, 640 A.2d 147 (1994). ¹⁵ Apparently deciding that the absence of such a statute was dispositive of the petitioner's claim, the Appellate Court concluded that "[t]he petitioner's interest in establishing his paternity of a child born during wedlock is not one that is protected by the statutes or caselaw of this state." Id. The court held, therefore, that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue his claim. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

It is well settled in Connecticut law that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a proper procedural vehicle with which to challenge the custody of a child. ¹⁶ As early as 1796, this court considered the merits of a habeas corpus petition brought by a father who sought custody of his daughter, who was living with her mother and grandfather. See Nickols v. Giles, 2 Root (Conn.) 461, 461-62 (1796). In 1822, Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift wrote that "[w]here a wife is wrongfully detained from her husband, children from their parents, wards from their guardians, and servants from their masters, their restoration may be obtained by this writ...." (Emphasis added.) 1 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1822) p. 568. ¹⁷ This court continues to sanction the use of habeas corpus petitions in child custody cases. See, e.g., Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 141, 502 A.2d 869 (1985); McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 403, 479 A.2d 176 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1747, 84 L.Ed.2d 813 (1985); Pi v. Delta, 175 Conn. 527, 530, 400 A.2d 709 (1978); Kearney v. State, 174 Conn. 244, 249, 386 A.2d 223 (1978). "A habeas corpus petition concerning a minor child's custody is an equitable proceeding in which the trial court is called upon to decide, in the exercise of its sound discretion, the custodial placement which will be best for the child. Nye v. Marcus, [supra, at 141, 502 A.2d 869]; McGaffin v. Roberts, [supra, 403]." Evans v. Santoro, 6 Conn.App. 707, 709, 507 A.2d 1007 (1986); see Doe v. Doe, 163 Conn. 340, 342, 307 A.2d 166 (1972) (habeas relief provides "a means by which the Superior Court may determine what is best for the welfare of the child").

Nevertheless, although the best interests of the child are paramount, we are required, in the first instance, to determine whether the person seeking the equitable remedy of habeas corpus has standing to initiate the action. "Standing focuses on whether a party is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues, rather than on the substantive rights of the aggrieved parties." Nye v. Marcus, supra, 198 Conn. at 141, 502 A.2d 869. "It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983), quoting Hiland v. Ives, 28 Conn.Sup. 243, 245, 257 A.2d 822 (1966). Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable...