Weidman v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14–552
• Citation: 164 F.Supp.3d 650
• Parties: Teresa Weidman, Plaintiff v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

164 F.Supp.3d 650

Teresa Weidman, Plaintiff

v.Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14–552

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed September 30, 2015

Katherine L. Niven, Law Office of Katherine L. Niven & Associates, PC, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

G. Michael Thiel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Scranton, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION, United States District Judge

Pending before the court is the report of Judge Cohn, the magistrate judge to whom the above matter was referred,¹ (Doc. 18), which recommends that the Court enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration and against Plaintiff Teresa Weidman. More specifically, the report recommends that the Court affirm the Commissioner's final decision denying the plaintiff's application for benefits under the Social Security Act, as the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Based upon the court's review of the record, the court will ADOPT Judge Cohn's Report and Recommendation.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; Brown v. Astrue , 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir.2011). Although the standard is de novo, the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel , 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa.2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz , 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) ).

For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc. , 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D.Pa.2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson , 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir.1987) (explaining judges should give some review to every report and recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or not, the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; Local Rule 72.31.

When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, the court must determine whether the denial is supported by substantial evidence. Brown v. Bowen , 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.1988) ; Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec. , 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir.2008). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) ; Hartranft v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.1999), Johnson , 529 F.3d at 200. It is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). If the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court is “bound by those findings.” Fargnoli v. Massanari , 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Furthermore, in determining if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court may not parse the record but rather must scrutinize the record as a whole. Smith v. Califano , 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir.1981).

To receive disability benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(1)(A). Furthermore,

[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which [she] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or whether [she] would be hired if [she] applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), ‘work which exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The Commissioner of Social Security must follow a five-step process to determine if an applicant is disabled under the Act. This legal framework requires the Commissioner to sequentially determine: (1) whether the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the applicant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the applicant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the applicant's impairment prevents the applicant from doing past relevant work, and; (5) whether the applicant's impairment prevents the applicant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Since the five-step legal framework for addressing a disability claim was properly stated in the R & R, (Doc. 18, at 55–56), this portion of the R & R is incorporated by reference.

II. RELEVANT MEDICAL BACKGROUND

Judge Cohn's report and recommendation (“R & R”) contains a thorough review of the plaintiff's medical history. (Doc. 18, at 9–54). The plaintiff did not file any objection to Judge Cohn's factual determinations regarding her medical history, so they will be adopted. See Butterfield v. Astrue , 2010 WL 4027768, *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 14, 2010) (“To obtain de novo determination of a magistrate[ ] [Judge's] findings by a district court, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires both timely and specific objections to the report.”) (quoting Goney v. Clark , 749 F.2d 5, 6 (3d Cir.1984) ). The court will restrict its discussion below to the relevant medical background as it pertains to the plaintiff's objections.

III. DISCUSSION

On March 24, 2014, Plaintiff Teresa Weidman filed her Complaint in the instant action, (Doc. 1), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (“Commissioner”) denial of her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The Commissioner filed an answer as well as an administrative transcript of the relevant proceedings on April 30, 2014 (Doc. 7, 8). And, on August 4, 2014, the Court referred this case to Judge Cohn. Plaintiff filed a brief in support of her appeal on August 4, 2014, (Doc. 12), and on September 5, 2014, the Commissioner filed a response brief. (Doc. 13). Finally, on September 16, 2014, the plaintiff filed a reply brief. (Doc. 14).

Judge Cohn issued a comprehensive R & R on August 7, 2015 recommending that the plaintiff's appeal be denied and the action dismissed. On August 23, 2015, the plaintiff filed objections to the report recommending dismissal of her action, on three bases: that Judge Cohn erred in finding that substantial evidence supports (1) the ALJ's credibility assessment; (2) the ALJ's Step Three Findings; and (3) the ALJ's RFC Assessment. The defendant Commissioner waived its opportunity to respond to the plaintiff's objections on September 4, 2015. This court will review each of the plaintiff's objections in turn.

A. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ's Credibility Assessment

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ's credibility assessment, finding the plaintiff, Weidman, not credible, was not supported by substantial evidence. The plaintiff points to four specific findings by the Commissioner, and affirmed by the Magistrate Judge's R & R, regarding her credibility and the severity of her symptoms. Upon review, the court finds that the ALJ's credibility determination was proper and supported by substantial evidence.

1. Somatoform Disorder Is Consistent with a Finding of Adverse Credibility

The plaintiff first contends that Judge Cohn erred in affirming the ALJ's finding that the plaintiff had “a severe impairment of undifferentiated somatoform disorder and ... that she was not entirely credible and feigned or exaggerated the severity of her symptoms.” (Doc. 18, at 61–62); (Doc. 19, at 2). The plaintiff's argument is based upon the ALJ's failure to conduct the “legally correct analysis” in light of the plaintiff's diagnosis of a somatoform disorder.

The issue of credibility in this case, as Judge Cohn accurately noted in the R & R, presents an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit, namely, “whether it is error for an ALJ to make an adverse credibility finding when a claimant has been diagnosed with a somatoform disorder (a diagnosis which requires a determination regarding malingering) and when the ALJ determines that the somatoform disorder was a severe impairment under step two.” (Doc. 18, at 57–58). Judge Cohn's R & R notes the importance of credibility determinations with respect to “somatization and undifferentiated somatoform disorders where their diagnostic criteria explicitly require a finding that the reported symptoms are ‘not intentionally produced or feigned (as in Factitious Disorder or Malingering).’ ” (Doc. 18, at 58). Ultimately, Judge Cohn determined, “[w]hile the diagnostic criteria require a finding that the symptoms were not produced by malingering, it is possible [ ] for a mixed diagnosis of both undifferentiated somatoform disorder symptoms and malingering to coexist.” Id. at 59.² Thus, this court adopts in full Judge Cohn's...