Weihrauch v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, R. & M. WKRS.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 776-67.
• Citation: 272 F. Supp. 472
• Parties: Milton WEIHRAUCH, Individually and as President of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, District Number Three, AFL-CIO, and as Vice-President of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, CLC, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, CLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

272 F. Supp. 472

Milton WEIHRAUCH, Individually and as President of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, District Number Three, AFL-CIO, and as Vice-President of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, CLC, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, CLC, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 776-67.

United States District Court D. New Jersey.

August 1, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas E. Durkin, Jr., Newark, N. J., for plaintiff.

Hannoch, Weisman, Stern & Besser, Newark, N. J., and Irving Abramson, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

OPINION

COOLAHAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Milton Weihrauch seeks a preliminary injunction, pending the outcome of this suit to enjoin further action of administrator trustees appointed by the defendant, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (hereafter "the IUE" or "the International") over one of its subordinate bodies. In addition to opposing preliminary relief, the IUE moves to dismiss the Complaint on several grounds. For the reasons discussed below both the request for a preliminary injunction and the motion to dismiss the Complaint are denied.

Even more than usual, understanding the issues presented requires at least a brief summary of the conflict's genesis in a series of extraordinary events, alleged by defendant and which are unrefuted by affidavit or testimony at this time.

The IUE is a national labor organization comprising hundreds of locals throughout the United States and Canada. Its Constitution provides for subdivision of this territory into several subordinate Districts, each presided over by a District Counsel, a set of officers, and a group of District Trustees. Plaintiff is president of District 3, the largest, which has its own District Constitution subordinate to the International Constitution. As such, he also is ex officio a vice president of the IUE and on its Executive Board. Plaintiff's grievance stems from the IUE's appointment of two administrators to oversee the District's affairs, which he claims was in violation of the International constitution, and, therefore, also in violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 462,¹ and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.²

The appointment was allegedly made in response to a request from the District Council, which arose from serious charges of union fund mismanagement and embezzlement against plaintiff and the District Treasurer. These charges in turn stemmed from inquiries by the Chairman of the District Trustees and by the International after Labor Department investigations of the District indicated some unusual occurrences.³

Plaintiff concedes the International constitution provides for such appointment of administrators over a local in appropriate circumstances, but he denies any parallel power of the Board, express or implied, to appoint administrators for a District. Hence, he contends the present trusteeship violates Section 462, supra, since it is neither authorized by nor made pursuant to procedures of the IUE constitution.

Moreover, he claims the appointment is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent provisions in that constitution which limit the method of removing District officers to recall. This is deemed a breach of the IUE's contractual obligation under the constitution to the District, the locals, and the plaintiff himself.⁴ See note 2, supra. Similarly, plaintiff challenges the concomitant institution of charges against the District itself, rather than an individual, as an unauthorized ad hoc attempt to bring charges indirectly against the conduct of District officers— again in violation of the constitution.

This Court's jurisdiction to issue temporary and permanent injunctive relief is based on Section 185, supra for the contractual claim, and on 29 U.S.C. § 464,⁵ for the claim under Section 462.

The IUE opposes temporary relief on the ground plaintiff has shown neither irreparable injury nor likelihood of success at trial. Its motion to dismiss is based on failure to join indispensable parties; failure to exhaust administrative remedies; unclean hands precluding equitable relief; lack of jurisdiction to grant the relief sought; and existence of adequate legal remedies if a cause of action lies.

All these defenses must be weighed in the context of the two opposed characterizations of the appointment. Defendant claims it was within the Executive Board's constitutional powers and did not violate the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 462, because it was in response to an urgent justified request of the District Council, rather than being imposed from above by the IUE.⁶ Plaintiff replies that regardless of who suggested or requested the trusteeship, it was the Board of the IUE, not the District, which appointed the administrators, and that such unconstitutional action cannot be authorized by the Council.

In addition, plaintiff now defends his failure to answer the charges made by the special committee's report on the ground that the Executive Board's demand for response to such charges violated the aforementioned Article 24 of the IUE constitution. This is pertinent to several of the defenses.

Finally, one must keep in mind the separate standards for a preliminary injunction on the one hand, and dismissal of the entire complaint, on the other.

Nonjoinder of Parties

Plaintiff's failure to join "indispensable parties", to wit, the two administrators, is urged as fatal to the complaint. I disagree. To be sure, plaintiff seeks prevention of certain activity by the administrators, but the primary relief sought would direct the defendant International to discontinue the trusteeship, now existing under its appointment. I see no reason why relief would be ineffective merely because the administrators are not joined, since further action by them would be void once the source of their authority, namely their designation by the IUE, is terminated. Additionally, as agents of the International, who I trust will receive notice of any decree, they will be bound not to interfere with that termination under long established principles of the breach of equity. Citation of cases by the IUE on this point are inapposite and misleading.⁷ The Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendment of Rule 19, F.R.Civ.P. makes clear the intent to emphasize pragmatic analysis of the Court's ability to render effective judgment "by the shaping of relief * * *." Even if a party appears indispensable, moreover, the remedy is Court direction he be joined unless, as is not the case here, it has already been shown that he is not subject to its jurisdiction.

Preliminary Relief

The prospective damage claimed by plaintiff is threefold: (1) that the plaintiff and unspecified others will lose pension and hospitalization rights and other unspecified benefits: (2) that the administrators have instructed banks not to honor checks drawn by plaintiff on District fund accounts and have, thereby, deprived employees of earned compensation; and (3) that the District membership has been deprived of union political rights through loss of its duly elected leader.

The vague allegation of precarious benefits falls hopelessly short of the specification required under Rule 65, F.R.Civ.P. especially in view of defendant's unopposed affidavit that the trusteeship will not affect his hospitalization or pension rights. Vars v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 204 F.Supp. 241 (D.Conn.1962). Nor is there any indication plaintiff lacks an adequate legal remedy in this regard.

Considering the grave charges of theft which precipitated this dispute, the effort to stop checks drawn by the plaintiff is hardly surprising, and, on the showing thus far, I will not halt this precaution. Any immediate need for District 3 disbursements can be handled by checks drawn on District accounts by the administrators and paid pursuant to Court order, which may be submitted by the banks concerned.

Similarly, in light of the materials before me, the claim that plaintiff's removal thwarts the District membership's "popular will" is patently an inadequate basis for the extraordinary remedy of preliminary relief. See Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, 268 F.2d 569 (3 Cir. 1959). Since plaintiff has shown no irreparable injury on any of these grounds, and, in addition, because there is insufficient indication he will prevail to warrant preliminary relief, the motion for a temporary injunction is denied.

Unclean Hands

The defense of unclean hands is applicable, but, at this posture, not dispositive. While an injunction is sought here pursuant to Federal statute, the Court's jurisdiction is a traditional equitable one, subject to the elementary maxim that one who seeks equity must not be guilty of inequity himself. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960); Local Union No. 1055, IBEW v. Gulf Power Co., 182 F.Supp. 950 (N.D.Fla.1960); Schauffler v. Brewery and Beer Distributor, etc., Local 830, 162 F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa., 1958). See 2 U.S.Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 2235, 2437 (1959).

It goes without saying that if the charges against Weihrauch are true, it would be both inequitable and an insult to the integrity of the Court to put the fox back in the chicken coop. Cf. Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3 Cir., 1959) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902.

Although plaintiff's affidavit does not deny the charges, the present motion is for dismissal, not summary judgment, and dismissal on this ground would be premature before he has an orderly opportunity to be heard. Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3 Cir., 1942). The defendant urges that Weihrauch's failure to answer the Executive Board's charges at their meeting amply indicates his soiled hands; but to accept this theory is to assume defendant's view of the merits in deciding a threshold question. As...