Weik v. State
| Decision Date | 23 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 27421.,27421. |
| Citation | 409 S.C. 214,761 S.E.2d 757 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | John Edward WEIK, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2007–060700. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia, for the Respondent.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the denial of John Edward Weik's (Weik or Petitioner) application for capital post-conviction relief (PCR). Weik argues the PCR court erred in denying relief on a number of grounds. We reach only the challenge concerning the complete lack of social history mitigation evidence in the sentencing phase. Because of the lack of social history mitigation evidence, we are constrained to reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Weik was convicted of murdering his former girlfriend following an argument over the couple's child. Weik confessed to the shooting and cooperated with law enforcement. There was never any dispute regarding guilt.
During the sentencing phase, the State proceeded on two aggravating circumstances—burglary and torture.1 Regarding Weik's mental status, the defense relied on three mental health experts, who all of whom testified that Weik suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, including auditory and visual hallucinations, suicidal ideations, and paranoid delusions.2 THE DEFENSE, HOWEVER, FAILED TO PRESENT READILY AVAILABLE evidence concerning Weik's chaotic upbringing and dysfunctional family. It is the absence of the social history mitigation evidence that compels us, under controlling United States Supreme Court precedents, to grant Weik a new sentencing hearing.
Pre-trial interviews conducted with Weik's relatives, coworkers, and other acquaintances revealed Weik's childhood was traumatic, filled with emotional and physical abuse at the hands of his psychotic father, Russell Weik. Indeed, one mitigation specialist with forty years of investigative experience described Weik's family as the most dysfunctional family she had ever encountered.
Despite the wealth of social mitigating information defense investigators discovered about Weik's troubled background, during the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel called only one witness, Weik's youngest sister, Amy, to testify very briefly about Petitioner's abusive upbringing. This part of Amy's testimony comprises three pages out of a multi-thousand page record. This limited and general testimony offered nothing in terms of specifics, as Weik's childhood was described as merely “rough.” When Amy was asked to be “more specific” about Weik, she replied, “the abuse that we suffered, all of us.” Cursory and nonspecific reference was made to Weik's father's “military flashbacks.” Amy concluded her scant testimony as to Weik's upbringing and childhood by stating that our
No other family members or coworkers were called to testify on Weik's behalf during the sentencing phase.3
The State countered with expert testimony from two mental health experts who both testified Weik did not have schizophrenia, but rather, he suffered from schizotypal personality disorder. The State's forensic psychologist also testified that Weik: (1) was the product of an “intact” family; (2) developed normally; (3) did not experience any childhood behavioral problems; (4) quit high school in eleventh grade; (5) had an average IQ; and (6) did not suffer from any alcohol or drug abuse issues.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court imposed. Weik's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Weik, 356 S.C. 76, 587 S.E.2d 683 (2002).
Thereafter, Weik filed a PCR application claiming, among other things, that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence relating to his family and social history that was available at the time of his trial. The testimony elicited during the PCR hearing revealed trial counsel's troubling inattention towards preparing for the mitigation phase of trial, despite Petitioner's admission of guilt from the outset of the case.
After the State served notice of intent to seek the death penalty, attorneys Percy Beauford 4 and Marva Ann Hardee–Thomas 5 were appointed to represent Weik in July of 1998. However, it was not until March 1999—a mere eleven weeks prior to trial—that counsel hired investigator Patti Rickborn 6 to begin a mitigation investigation. Rickborn testified that she met with Beauford and Hardee–Thomas only once, and during that one meeting, it was “absolutely clear” that Hardee–Thomas was to be her contact person. According to Rickborn, she made repeated requests for Hardee–Thomas to provide her investigative leads, names and contact information for the defense mental health experts, and assistance in obtaining a court order for Weik's father's military mental health records; however, despite Rickborn's persistence, Hardee–Thomas gave only evasive replies, promising to respond in the future, or failed to acknowledge Rickborn's requests altogether.
Despite receiving virtually no guidance from defense counsel, Rickborn, an experienced mitigation specialist, began the investigation and was able to provide Hardee–Thomas with a potential witness list for the penalty phase, which included contact information for Weik's parents, siblings, and other family members, a list of places from which to obtain records, as well as detailed investigative interviews with Weik's family members that revealed pervasive mental health issues throughout the Weik family and that Weik endured severe emotional, psychological, and physical abuse during his childhood. Rickborn provided all of this information to Hardee–Thomas but received no response.7
Approximately six or seven weeks after being hired, an exasperated Rickborn resignedfrom the defense team. In her resignation letter,8 RICKBORN EXPLAINEd she was no longer WILLING TO ASSIst counsel with Petitioner's case because counsel failed to provide her with investigative leads, repeatedly failed to answer her direct questions or otherwise cooperate with her, and failed to provide her a copy of an order approving payment for her services.9 In her PCR testimony, Rickborn stated she was “completely frustrated” because
About a week later, counsel contacted a different mitigation investigator, Scott Parker, to complete the investigation Rickborn had begun. Due to the incomplete status of the investigation, Parker requested two months' additional time to prepare, and as a result the defense team moved for a continuance.
During the pre-trial hearing on the continuance motion, Beauford explained that Rickborn left the defense team and requested that the trial be continued for a period of two weeks to allow a substitute investigator time to obtain certain medical records.10 Beauford was not candid with the trial judge about the true reason for Rickborn's departure, opting to invoke “communication problems” as the reason for her departure. When the trial judge directly asked counsel to explain why Rickborn quit, counsel stated, “I would think communication problems is a broad area we could use on the record.”
The trial judge then stated:
If she's got a good reason to leave, I need to know it really on the record. In other words, if it's prejudicial to your client that she has jumped ship on you at the last second, you had to get somebody else, then I need to know what it is and I need to know what specifically your new fellow is going to do, how much time he needs, what it is he needs to do so I can say, all right, this is how it's going to be or isn't.
Despite this lifeline from the judge, counsel did not budge and reiterated, Counsel failed to disclose Rickborn's resignation letter, or otherwise reveal the true reasons for Rickborn's departure. Not knowing counsel's complete lack of preparation regarding Weik's social history, the trial judge denied the motion for a continuance but offered to issue an order or make telephone calls to expedite the process of obtaining the records.
Thereafter, Parker conducted interviews with Weik's mother and father, brother Chris, sister Maggie, and brother-in-law Bill in an effort to uncover mitigating evidence for use at trial. Parker testified that he provided all of his interview reports to Beauford within two days of conducting each interview, but counsel never asked to meet with him to discuss or review any of the reports or instructed Parker to take any follow-up steps.11 Parker testified that he was willing to offer counsel suggestions on how to integrate the information he discovered into the mitigation phase of trial, but counsel never asked him about any of the interviews he conducted or information he discovered, either before or during trial.
In short, some mitigating evidence of Weik's social history was developed and available to trial counsel for the sentencing phase. There is no evidence in the record to suggest trial counsel made any effort to obtain and review this mitigation evidence. What is clear is that the jury heard from only Petitioner's sister Amy, whose testimony revealed virtually nothing about Weik's abusive upbringing.12
At the PCR hearing, Weik presented the extensive mitigating evidence that was...
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