Weil v. Longyear

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CLARK
• Citation: Weil v. Longyear, 263 Mich. 22, 248 N.W. 536 (Mich. 1933)
• Decision Date: 16 May 1933
• Docket Number: No. 144,Oct. Term, 1932.,144
• Parties: WEIL v. LONGYEAR. DETROIT TRUST CO. v. SLONIM et al. GOTTFRIED v. LONGYEAR.

263 Mich. 22

248 N.W. 536

WEIL

v.LONGYEAR.

DETROIT TRUST CO.

v.SLONIM et al.

GOTTFRIED

v.LONGYEAR.

No. 144, Oct. Term, 1932.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 16, 1933.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Russell R. McPeek, Judge.

Separate suits by Jule Weil, by Rose Gottfried, and by the Detroit Trust Company, administrator and as successor to Jule Weil, as administrator of the estate of Rae Weil, deceased, against J. Frere Longyear and another, were tried together. Judgment for each plaintiff, and in the first two cases defendant named appeals, and, in the third case, plaintiff appeals.

Judgments in the two cases appealed by defendant named reversed as to him, and judgment for plaintiff in the third case affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except FEAD, J.Frederick J. Ward, of Detroit, for appellant J. Frere Longyear.

David I. Hubar, of Detroit (Milton M. Maddin, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellees.

CLARK, Justice.

An automobile driven by defendant Longyear and a truck driven by defendant Slonim collided at the intersection of Clairmount avenue and Fourteenth street, Detroit. The automobile was thrown upon the southwest corner of the intersection where Rose Gottfried and her sister Mrs. Jule (Rae) Weil were standing, both of whom were injured, Mrs. Weil so seriously that she died later. Jule Weil, Rose Gottfried, and the administrator of the estate of Rae Weil, deceased, each commenced a suit against both defendants. Tried together, without a jury, each plaintiff had judgment. Defendant Longyear has appealed in the case of Jule Weil and in the case of Rose Gottfried, contending that on the record he should not be found guilty of actionable negligence.

At the place Fourteenth was a through street, there being stop signs on Clairmount, although there were also street car tracks on Clairmount. Longyear was driving south on Fourteenth at what we find to be a moderate, or, as one witness said, a normal, speed. He slowed somewhat for the intersection, but not quite enough to comply with the city ordinance. When he was near the center of the intersection the truck crashed into the side of his car with the result stated. Slonim drove the truck past another moving truck, past a moving street car, and to the left of another truck waiting on Clairmont at the northeast corner of the intersection, without noticing the stop sign, without stopping, and at high speed into the intersection and into the side of the Longyear car.

Longyear was not required to stop at the intersection. He was required by the ordinance to proceed there at reduced speed, that he might be prepared to stop quickly. Had he observed the truck as it approached Fourteenth street he would have had the right to assume that it would come to a full stop. Townsend v. Reader, 252 Mich. 465, 233 N. W. 381,Haynes v. Clark, 252 Mich. 295, 233 N. W. 321. he had no opportunity to stop in time. The truck crashed suddenly into the side of his car. His driving through the intersection at a slightly higher speed than the ordinance commanded had, as we see, no causal relation to the accident. We find against Longyear no actionable negligence. The negligence of Slonim was the proximate cause of the accident. Reed v. Ogden & Moffett, 252 Mich. 362, 233 N. W. 345. As to Longyear, the judgments in the cases which he appealed are reversed, with costs and without new trial.

The plaintiff administrator of the estate of Rae Weil, deceased, has also appealed, complaining of damages, denial of compensation for loss of earnings of the deceased. The action is under the Survival Act, 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14040, to recover the damages as if the deceased were living and prosecuting the action in person. Love v. Detroit, etc., Railroad Co., 170 Mich. 1, 135 N. W. 963. It appears the deceased wife rendered services as such in the household of the husband. It does not appear that she earned anything or was engaged in any other employment or business of her own. The services rendered belonged to the husband, and no action survived to the administrator for their loss. See Gorton v. Harmon, 152 Mich. 473, 116 N. W. 443,15 Ann. Cas. 461,Lincoln v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 179 Mich. 189, at page 205, 146 N. W. 405, 409,51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 710. The respective rights of husband and wife in...