Weil v. Travelers' Ins. Co.

• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BROWN, J. PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Weil v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 16 Ala. App. 641, 80 So. 348 (Ala. App. 1916)
• Decision Date: 11 January 1916
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 182
• Parties: WEIL v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.

80 So. 348

16 Ala.App. 641

WEIL v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.

3 Div. 182

Court of Appeals of Alabama

January 11, 1916

On Rehearing, April 2, 1918

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; W.W. Pearson, Judge.

Action by Pauline Weil against the Travelers' Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Originally affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but reversed and remanded in obedience to the ruling of the Supreme Court in 78 So 528.

The action was based on the policy of life insurance issued by appellee on January 21, 1898, on the life of Charles W Jones, whereby it agreed to pay to the executors administrators, or assigns of said Jones $1,000 on proof of his death. The policy contained the following clause:

"It is hereby further agreed that after two years from the date hereof, the only conditions which shall be binding upon the holder of this policy are that he shall pay the premiums at the time and place, and in the manner stipulated in said policy. In all other respects, if this policy matures after the expiration of two years, the payment of the same shall not be disputed."

Jones after having been duly tried and convicted for murder, some years subsequent to the issuance of the policy, was executed on the 4th of April, 1913. The complaint was in Code form, and to this complaint the defendant pleaded that insured had been tried and legally convicted and executed under said conviction. Demurrer was overruled to this plea, and plaintiff filed the following replication:

(2) The policy sued on contains the following provision: (Here follows the provision of the above policy as set out in the above quotation.) And plaintiff says that the premiums on said policy were paid as provided in said policy up to the time of the death of the insured.

(3) That said policy sued on was originally made payable to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the said Charles W. Jones, the insured. That subsequently, to wit, on April 14, 1898, the said Charles W. Jones for value transferred or assigned in writing said policy to Abraham Weil, of Montgomery, Ala., his executors, administrators, or assigns, a copy of which assignment was furnished to defendant in this case, as provided by the terms of the policy sued on. That subsequently, to wit, during the year 1908, said Abraham Weil was adjudicated a bankrupt by an order of the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Middle District of Alabama. That subsequently George Stuart, as trustee in bankrupt of the estate of said Abraham, transferred and sold the assets of said Abraham Weil, including the said policy, to the New Farley National Bank of Montgomery, Ala., and subsequently, to wit, during the said year 1908, said New Farley National Bank sold and transferred all of the assets of the said Abraham Weil, including the said policy of insurance, to plaintiff in this case. That from the time of the transfer of the said policy by said Charles W. Jones to said Abraham Weil, up to and including the time of the death of said Charles W. Jones, all premiums accruing under the provisions of said policy were paid by said Abraham Weil and plaintiff in this case to defendant in this case, or its agents, and said premiums were accepted by defendant, through its agents, knowing that the same were paid by said Abraham Weil and plaintiff and receipts given therefor. And plaintiff says that said policy contained no provision or condition forfeiting or making the same void in the event said Charles W. Jones was legally executed.

(4) At the time of the alleged legal execution of said Charles W. Jones, as averred in said plea, plaintiff was the owner of said policy sued on, and the beneficiary thereunder, and had a vested interest in said policy, and plaintiff says that said policy contained no provision or condition forfeiting or making the same void in the event said Charles W. Jones was legally executed.

(5) That said policy sued on was transferred by the insured therein to Abraham Weil during, to wit, the year 1898. That said transfer was in writing, and a copy thereof furnished to defendant in this case, as provided by the terms of the policy sued on. That subsequently, during the year 1908, said Abraham Weil was adjudicated a bankrupt by an order of the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Middle District of Alabama. That the assets of the said Abraham Weil were sold and transferred by George Stuart, as trustee of the estate in bankruptcy of said Abraham Weil, to the New Farley National Bank of Montgomery, Ala., included in which was the policy sued on. That subsequently the said New Farley National Bank transferred said assets, including said policy, to plaintiff in this case. That at the time of the death of the insured, as alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was the owner of said policy, and had a vested interest therein, and all premiums accruing on said policy from the time of the first premium until the death of the insured were paid by the said Abraham Weil and plaintiff, by and with the knowledge and consent of the authorized local agents of defendant. And plaintiff says that the said policy sued on contains no condition or provision exempting defendant from liability thereunder in the event the insured was legally executed.

(6) That said defendant, acting through its authorized agents, after said Charles W. Jones was convicted and sentenced to death by an order of the city court of Montgomery, and pending a stay of the execution of said sentence by reason of an appeal from said final judgment to the Supreme Court of Alabama, received from this plaintiff the annual premium on said policy of insurance becoming due and payable on, to wit, January 31, 1913, and plaintiff further says

that defendant had previously received from her and said Abraham Weil, the husband of plaintiff, through whom plaintiff acquired said policy, all of the premiums on said policy which had previously accrued from the time of the issuance of said policy.

The demurrers to these replications being overruled, plaintiff takes nonsuit.

Steiner, Crum & Weil, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Rushton, Williams & Crenshaw, of Montgomery, for appellee.

BROWN J.

The law is settled that a contract of life insurance issued to one who has an insurable interest in the life insured is a valid and enforceable contract. Helmetag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 52 Am.Rep. 316; Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mobile Mutual Ins. Co., 81 Ala. 329, 1 So. 561; Troy v. London, 145 Ala. 280, 39 So. 713. As observed by Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court:

"Life insurance has become in our day one of the best recognized forms of investment and self-compelled saving." Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 32 Sup.Ct. 58, 56 L.Ed. 133, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 642.

Assuming, therefore, for the sake of argument, that the beneficiary named in the policy had an insurable interest in the life of the insured, the contract was not void as contravening public policy, but valid, and, after its maturity, enforceable. The legal effect of the defense asserted by the defendant's plea, to wit, the conviction and legal execution of the insured for murder, is not that the policy is void, but that it has not matured. Otherwise stated, "death at the hands of the law" is not a contingency within the contemplation of the parties that operated to mature the contract so as to authorize an action thereon.

While the policy does not in terms exclude this cause of death as a risk assumed, the law on grounds of public policy, according to the contracting parties innocent and legitimate intentions, excepts this risk and excludes this contingency, as one not within the contract operating to mature it. Amicable Society v. Boland, 4 Bligh, N.R. 194; Supreme Commandery, etc., v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am.Rep. 322; Ritter v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 18 Sup.Ct. 300, 42 L.Ed. 693; Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362, 23 Sup.Ct. 139, 47 L.Ed. 216; Id., 105 F. 419, 44 C.C.A. 548; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U.S. 234, 32 Sup.Ct. 220, 56 L.Ed. 419, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 57; Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Pa.Super.Ct.

353; Sophia Davis v. Supreme Council, Royal Arcanum, 195 Mass. 402, 81 N.E. 294, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 722, 11 Ann.Cas. 777.

If the policy in terms insured the life against the contingency of the insured committing murder and being convicted and executed therefor, the contract would be void:

"Death, the risk of life insurance, the event upon which the insurance money is payable, is certain of occurrence; the uncertainty of the time of its occurrence is the material element and consideration of the contract. It cannot be in the contemplation of the parties that the assured, by his own criminal act, shall deprive the contract of its material element; shall vary and enlarge the risk and hasten the day of payment of the insurance money." Supreme Commandery, etc., v. Ainsworth, supra; Ritter v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra; Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra; Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550, 21 Am.Rep. 541.

The appellant insists that the doctrine announced in the Ainsworth Case, supra, cannot be applied to this case because suicide by the insured is the voluntary and intentional taking of his own life, while the execution of the insured for crime is involuntary. The principle on which the defense is allowed is the same in both cases; the act committed by the insured resulting in his death, whether suicide or murder, is felo de se (McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89), and to allow either as a risk within the contract--the contingency operating to mature it--would have a tendency to remove one of the...