Weiland v. Ruppel

Decision Date30 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 27840.,27840.
Citation75 P.3d 176,139 Idaho 122
PartiesKim WEILAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eric RUPPEL, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Bauer & French, Boise, for appellant. Charles B. Bauer argued.

Shepard Law Offices, PLLC, Boise, for respondent. Ann K. Shepard argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

Kim Weiland (Weiland) asks this Court to reverse a custody decree in a filiation order which awarded her primary custody over her four-year-old son on the condition that she not leave Idaho. Eric Ruppel (Ruppel) is the child's father. It is Weiland's desire to move to Oregon with their son, contrary to the limitation imposed in the custody order.

I. BACKGROUND

Weiland and Ruppel were married in 1995. Ruppel lived in Idaho. Weiland was residing in Oregon with her four children from three previous relationships. She had one child with her first husband and a second child from a relationship following her divorce. She married a second time. The parental rights to her second child were terminated so her second husband could adopt the child. She and her second husband eventually divorced. She married a third time and had two more children from that marriage. That relationship terminated in divorce in 1995, and she moved to Idaho to be with Ruppel.

Weiland and Ruppel divorced in 1997, but they resumed their relationship soon after and the child in issue was born in 1998. That year Weiland enrolled in court reporter school in Idaho to improve her earning ability. The reconciliation between Weiland and Ruppel failed. Weiland filed a Petition for Filiation. Ruppel answered and the case proceeded to trial. Ruppel is the father of the child. The issue in this case arises from the custody order.

Weiland revealed that she wanted to move to Oregon because her parents and some of the other children's fathers live there. Additionally, she believes court reporters can earn more in Oregon than in Idaho. Weiland is not on good terms with Ruppel's family, and she owns real property in Oregon. Aside from the dispute about moving to Oregon, Weiland acknowledges Ruppel's connection with the child.

Ruppel recognized and accepted Weiland as the primary caretaker of their child and only challenged her desire to take the child out of Idaho, maintaining that this would put a prohibitive strain on his ability to see and interact with his son. Ruppel is an apprentice electrician, earning $9 an hour. Also, Ruppel stated his concern about Weiland's conduct in the past in which she married and divorced several times, eventually moving her other children away from their fathers, effectively ending their relationship with their children. Ruppel expressed concern that Weiland would not actively promote his relationship with his son. Consequently, he feels the need for some degree of proximity to maintain his parental relationship.

After a failed attempt at mediation, the trial court appointed Dr. Robert Engle, a clinical psychologist, to conduct a comprehensive parenting evaluation. Dr. Engle testified that Weiland should be the primary custodian of the child given that the child is bonded with his siblings and the stable environment Weiland supplies. But he also testified that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be moved out of the State and to be away from his father. Lack of continuous contact with both parents can effect cognitive abilities and lead to gender identification issues and self-consciousness, he testified. Dr. Engle surmised that a visiting schedule sufficient to maintain the type of contact with Ruppel required for the child's age would not be possible if Weiland moved to Oregon. Her desire to move, Dr. Engle opined, was to improve her own quality of life and not in consideration of Ruppel's needs and in conflict with the child's best interests. He recommended that continuing the current schedule of visitation was in the child's best interest, which consisted of Ruppel visiting the child four times a week with some overnight visits.

The trial court entered an order of filiation under Idaho Code section 7-1120 identifying Ruppel as the child's father, and the court proceeded to enter a support and custody order pursuant to I.C. § 7-1102. The court noted that no specific criteria for granting a custody order between non-married parents, other than "what is in the best interests of the child," has been statutorily identified, but that this Court has applied the factors from I.C. § 32-717 concerning custody determinations in divorce proceedings. These factors include the wishes of the parents as to custody, the wishes of the child, the relationship between the child and his parents and/or siblings, the child's adjustment to home, community and school, the mental and physical integrity of the child and parents, the need to promote continuity and stability, and any domestic violence around or toward the child. See I.C. § 32-717. The trial court noted Weiland's desire to move as another factor in his determination. In light of Ziegler v. Ziegler, 107 Idaho 527, 691 P.2d 773 (Ct.App. 1985), the court decided Weiland's right to travel was countered by the State's compelling interest in the health and welfare of the child and that the court could impose restrictions on her as long as they were reasonable. The court adopted the findings of Dr. Engle and found that a move to Oregon was not in the child's best interest. The trial court ruled that Weiland's custody of the child was dependant on her adhering to a visitation schedule that placed the child in Idaho. Any deviation from the schedule would not automatically result in Ruppel gaining custody but would result in contempt proceedings.

Weiland appealed the custody order to this Court, which granted permissive appeal from the magistrate division of the district court.

II. ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Weiland's appeal raises the following issues:

A. Did the trial court proceed properly under I.C. § 32-717 and weigh all the factors in determining what was in the best interest of the child? B. Is the custody order that prevents Weiland from leaving Idaho in the best interests of the child?

C. Does the trial court's decision to order Weiland to stay in Idaho intrude upon legislative prerogative to set the criteria under which such an order may be granted?

D. Does the trial court's order violate Weiland's fundamental right to travel?

In Jensen v. Jensen, 128 Idaho 600, 602, 917 P.2d 757, 759 (1996) this Court stated that:

When reviewing decisions of a magistrate, the Court will uphold the magistrate's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 958, 855 P.2d 40, 43 (1993). The Court exercises free review over questions of law. Downey Chiropractic Clinic v. Nampa Restaurant Corp., 127 Idaho 283, 285, 900 P.2d 191, 193 (1995). This Court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the magistrate, and is free to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented. Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432, 435, 901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995); Cluff v. Bonner County, 126 Idaho 950, 952, 895 P.2d 551, 553 (1995).
III. THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED RELEVANT FACTORS AND THE DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE

The trial court's decision does not reflect an error in its findings and in the custody order. The trial judge reviewed each element cited in I.C. § 32-717, listing and weighing the relevant facts. The trial court found two factors concerning the wishes of the parents and of the child were to be less factually relevant since the parent's were at odds and the child was too young to express a preference. There was no record of domestic violence, negating that factor, and the parents mental and physical health was found by Dr. Engle to be sound and of no concern to the proceedings. The trial court found any concern for the child's adjustment to his home or community was minimal given his age and tended to favor staying in Idaho inasmuch as any move is disruptive. The trial court emphasized factor three: the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents. See I.C. § 32-717(A)(3). The trial court stated the problem:

This is one of the most significant factors in the instant case. Clearly, [the child] is primarily attached or bonded with his mother and she has been his primary caretaker since birth. The evidence is clear that it would be in [the child's] best interest for her to continue in the role as primary caretaker. However, as Dr. Engle observed, [the child] is also bonded and attached with his father, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, and obtains additional benefits from that relationship which differ from that his mother provides. [The child] will clearly benefit from continuing to have frequent and continuous quality contact with his father, especially at this age and the few years which follow while he is going through his early developmental stages.
It is in connection with this factor that Kim's desire to relocate became a significant consideration. While the court does not question her right to make personal choices with her own life such as where she will live or work, it does appear that she may not be considering the impact those choices might have on her children, or in this case, upon [the child]. The court finds it incongruous that she would mention as a positive aspect of the move, the fact that her other two children would be closer to their father if she lived in Portland, apparently recognizing this would foster more contact and be in their best interest, while at the same time being unable to see the impact such a move would have on [the child's] relationship with his father.

The trial court listed in detail the benefits Weiland would incur by living in Oregon, how they would improve the child's life, and weighed them against what Dr....

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