Weimin Chen v. Sur La Table Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-00370-RSM |
| Parties | WEIMIN CHEN, Plaintiff, v. SUR LA TABLE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants SLT Holdco, Inc. SLT Lending SPV, Inc., SLT IP Holdings, LP, and CSC Generation Holdings, Inc. (“SLT”)'s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. # 8. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS SLT's Motion and DISMISSES the case as to the four moving Defendants with leave to amend.
On February 24, 2021, Plaintiff Weimin Chen filed this two-count class action in King County Superior Court, alleging that Defendant Sur La Table, Inc., had violated the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“CEMA”) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) by transmitting at least 22 commercial emails with purportedly false or misleading information in their subject lines to Mr. Chen and other consumers. Dkt. # 1 ¶ 3.
On March 10, 2021, Mr. Chen filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which added five John Doe Defendants and the four moving Defendants: SLT Holdco, Inc., SLT Lending SPV Inc., SLT IP Holdings, LP, and CSC Generation Holdings, Inc. Dkt. #1-2. According to Mr. Chen, Sur La Table is a Washington-based kitchenware and dinnerware retailer that operates approximately 130 stores throughout North America (including at least two locations in Washington State) as well as an online store at www.surlatable.com. Id. ¶ 14. Mr. Chen alleges that Sur La Table conducts its business through various business entities, which include Sur La Table, Inc., SLT Holdco, Inc., SLT Lending SPV, Inc., SLT IP Holdings, LP, CSC Generation Holdings, Inc., and the John Doe Defendants (together, “Sur La Table”). Id. ¶ 8-9.
Mr. Chen's FAC alleges that Sur La Table sent, or participated in the sending of, marketing emails to consumers with subject lines that falsely or misleadingly indicated that the person could receive a specified percentage-off discount on their entire purchase or on one item of their choosing. Id. ¶ 16. The subject lines of the emails included language, such as: “xx% Off Your Purchase,” “xx% Off Your Order,” or “xx% Off One Item.” Id. An image of one such email purportedly transmitted by Sur La Table to Plaintiff on January 26, 2021, was included in the FAC:
From: Sur La Table
To: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2021, 06:07:23 AM PST
Subject: See what's new-and take 20% off your order!
Id. at 7. Mr. Chen's FAC alleges that Sur La Table's subject lines are false or misleading in that “[a]n ordinary consumer would understand these statements of ‘xx% Off Your Purchase,' ‘xx% Off Your Order,' or ‘xx% Off One Item' to mean that Sur La Table was offering a percentage-off discount from its regular selling prices for all of its products,” when, allegedly approximately 25% of its products-including its most popular products-were excluded from the advertised sale. Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis removed); see also id. ¶¶ 18, 20-22, 31-33, 36-40.
On March 18, 2021, SLT removed this action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, 1453 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c), asserting original federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and 1453(b). Dkt. #1.
On March 25, 2021, SLT moved to dismiss Mr. Chen's FAC for failure to state a claim (“Motion”). Dkt. #9. Mr. Chen filed a response opposing the Motion, SLT filed a reply, and subsequently Mr. Chen filed a sur-reply. Dkts. #10-12.
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). While considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The court is not required, however, to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This requirement is met when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint need not include detailed allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 557). Absent facial plausibility, a plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
RCW 19.190.020(1). Mr. Chen asserts that SLT violated subsection (b). Dkt. #1-1 ¶ 56. SLT contends that the subsection prohibits subject lines only when they are false or misleading as to the commercial nature of the email. If SLT's interpretating of subsection (b) is accepted, Mr. Chen fails to state a claim for CEMA.
SLT argues its interpretation is consistent with (i) the statutory text of CEMA and Washington's overall statutory scheme; (ii) the legislative history of CEMA; (iii) the interpretation afforded CEMA by Washington's Attorney General; (iv) caselaw interpreting CEMA and other similar statutes; and (v) the intent of anti-spam legislation nationwide. Mr. Chen responds that SLT's interpretation of CEMA artificially narrows the statute by inserting additional language such that the provision would read: “[c]ontains false or misleading information in the subject line regarding the commercial nature of the email.” Dkt. #10 at 12 (emphasis in original).
When interpreting a state statute, a federal court must interpret the law as would the state's highest court. See In re Kolb, 326 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir.2003). In Washington, the Court begins with the plain language of the statute, assuming that the legislature “meant exactly what it said.” Duke v. Boyd, 133 Wash.2d 80, 942 P.2d 351, 354 (1997). However, if the statute is ambiguous, the Court may consider legislative history and the “circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute.” Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 173 Wash.2d 296, 268 P.3d 892, 900 (2011). A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Id. Finally, “statutes should be construed to effect their purpose, and unlikely, absurd or strained consequences should be avoided.” Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittitas Cnty., 118 Wash.2d 852, 857, 827 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1992).
The Court first looks to the plain language of subsection (b): “Contains false or misleading information in the subject line.” RCW 19.190.020(1)(b). CEMA does not define the word “information,” so we begin with the word's plain meaning. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “information” is “knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or instruction.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/information. The parties do not dispute that the “information” at issue for purposes of CEMA analysis is conveyed via the subject line, but the parties do dispute the scope of what false or misleading information can trigger CEMA. SLT argues that CEMA only prohibits false or misleading information in email subject lines as to the “commercial nature” of the email, i.e., what is communicated via the header of the email which includes the “To:,” “From:,” “Sent:” or date, and “Subject:” lines. Dkt. #8 at 6. Mr. Chen argues that CEMA prohibits any false or misleading information in an email subject line, not only as to the commercial nature of the email, but also as to the content of the email. Dkt. #10 at 21. The Court finds both parties' interpretations of CEMA are reasonable-CEMA could apply to false and misleading “knowledge obtained from the investigation, study or instruction” of the header alone (nature of the email) or it could apple to false and misleading “knowledge obtained from the investigation, study or instruction” of the header and body of the email (contents of the email).
Since there is more than one reasonable interpretation of subsection (b), the Court turns to the context of the statute, caselaw, and the statute's legislative history.
First SLT argues that read as a whole, CEMA prohibits subject lines...
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