Weinberg v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.
Decision Date | 11 January 1977 |
Docket Number | C-76-869SW,C-76-1363SW and C-76-1429SW.,C-76-1110SW,No. C-76-867SW,C-76-867SW |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Parties | Donna Jean WEINBERG et al., Plaintiffs, v. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants. Eleanor EISENBERG et al., Plaintiffs, v. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants. Marilyn MOITIE, Plaintiff, v. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants. Sandra G. MUSSER, Plaintiff, v. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants. June MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
John W. Keker, Kipperman, Shawn & Keker, San Francisco, Cal., Baltaxe, Rutkin, Kaplan & Klein, Beverly Hills, Cal., Jerrold N. Offstein, Frederick P. Furth, Gary J. Near, Harvey Freed, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Steinhart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum & Ladar, San Francisco, Cal., Solinger & Gordon, New York City, McKenna & Fitting, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, Cal., Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
The defendants in these actions are Federated Department Stores, Inc., d/b/a I. Magnin & Co., and Saks & Company, d/b/a Saks Fifth Avenue. They are engaged in the business of selling merchandise, including women's clothing, to the general public at retail prices through retail stores located in Northern California and elsewhere. The plaintiffs in all of these cases are individual members of the general public who allege that they purchased women's clothing at retail from one or both of the defendants. The plaintiffs allege representation of overlapping classes of retail purchasers.1 These actions parallel an indictment and civil complaint filed in this court by the United States on April 28, 1976. (See United States v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., et al., Civil Number C-76-858-RHS, and CR-76-236-SAW.) The government antitrust action charged that I. Magnin and Saks had agreed to fix the retail prices of women's clothing sold by them to the general public in Northern California during the period from early 1963 until April 1974. The civil complaints in this action allege that the plaintiffs were the victims of prices artificially maintained at high levels in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, which would provide plaintiffs with their remedy in damages, reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
To maintain this action, plaintiffs must, under the language of section 4, have suffered an injury to their business or property interest. The parties in this action have briefed defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing, focusing on the issue of the nature of plaintiffs' business or property interest which has been allegedly injured.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Only by drawing a line at a business or property interest could the proliferation of lawsuits feared by the Congress be prevented. And the meaning of that phrase is the sole issue presented in this motion to dismiss. If the plaintiffs were injured in their business or property they have standing to sue for treble damages. If not, they don't.3
A review of the Congressional Record permits some illumination on congressional intent, but much room for disagreement persists. However, numerous references do indicate that in 1890 Congress was well aware of the fact that the new law would afford no remedy for the average consumer. See 21 Cong.Rec. 2569 (1890) (Sen. Sherman); Id. at 2610 (Sen. Morgan); Id. at 2615 (Sen. Coke); Id. at 3150 (Sen. George).
And the Senate was equally preoccupied with the need to enlist the injured businessmen in the attack on antitrust violations. Senator Reed noted:
It follows that the Argus eyes of thousands of business men now being injured will be upon the powerful concerns, and the thousand arms of the courts will be employed to prevent . . . evil practices. 51 Cong.Rec. 12939 (1914).
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
The courts that have addressed the question directly have uniformly interpreted congressional intent as requiring a commercial nexus. The ninth circuit has adopted a measured approach.
Courts have impressed a standing doctrine so as to confine the availability of section 4 relief only to those individuals whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws. Cf. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970); Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341-344 (9th Cir. 1972). Unfortunately, no "bright line" has yet emerged to divine this group, and courts have formulated varied definitions. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045, 94 S.Ct. 551, 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973), reh. denied, 414 U.S. 1148, 94 S.Ct. 905, 39 L.Ed.2d 104 (1974).
The Vehicle Air Pollution court then criticized the lower court's expansive reading of section 4's coverage. The language of section 4, and the judicial constructions of standing thereunder had, the circuit asserted, keyed on the phrases business or property and by reason of as indicating twin requisites for standing.4
The first of these twin requisites for standing, the phrase business or property, is "a term definitively limited to interests in commercial ventures or enterprises". Vehicle Air Pollution, supra, 481 F.2d at 126. The state of California, suing for individual injury to itself, as a class representative and also in parens patriae was held to lack standing since none of its claims alleged any injury to commercial ventures or enterprises. Id. The contrasting claims of farmers whose crop yield was diminished because of the failure to develop adequate pollution control devices were sufficient to allege injury to a commercial interest. These...
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