Weinberger v. Maplewood Review

• Decision Date: 11 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. C7-01-2021.,C7-01-2021.
• Citation: Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003)
• Parties: Richard WEINBERGER, petitioner, Appellant, and Independent School District No. 622, et. al., Defendants, v. MAPLEWOOD REVIEW, et. al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

668 N.W.2d 667

Richard WEINBERGER, petitioner, Appellant, andIndependent School District No. 622, et. al., Defendants, v.MAPLEWOOD REVIEW, et. al., Respondents.

No. C7-01-2021.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

September 11, 2003.

Stephen W. Cooper, Stacey R. Everson, The Cooper Law Firm, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Mark A. Anfinson, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.

John Borger, Eric E. Jorstad, Patricia R. Stembridge, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Minnesota Society of Professional Journalists.

Lucy A. Dalglish, Arlington, VA, for Amicus Curiae for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; Society of Professional Journalists; The Newspaper Guild-CWA; and The Minnesota Newspaper Guild Typographical Union in Support of Respondents.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

This appeal arises from appellantRichard Weinberger's motion to compel the Maplewood Review and two of its reporters, Jason Tarasek and Wally Wakefield,¹ to disclose the identity of certain sources quoted in an article published by the Maplewood Review in January of 1997.Weinberger sought the identity of the sources in connection with a lawsuit he brought against Independent School DistrictNo. 622, Barbara Hallbrehder, Tim Hickey, Cletus Lipetzky, and Mark Klingsporn(collectively, "the Tartan Defendants") for defamation.In July 2000, Weinberger served Wakefield with a subpoena requesting a deposition and the identities of the sources quoted in the January 1997article, but Wakefield refused to comply.Weinberger then filed a motion to compel disclosure, which the trial court granted.Wakefield appealed and the court of appeals reversed and remanded for additional findings.

On remand, the district court granted Weinberger's motion to compel.Wakefield appealed and again the court of appeals reversed, this time concluding that a nonparty newspaper reporter could not be required to disclose the source of allegedly defamatory information published about a public official when "the primary purpose of disclosure is not relevant to obtaining evidence of actual malice but rather to make the reporter a witness against defendants, and there is no prima facie showing that the statements are false or were made with actual malice."Weinberger v. Maplewood Review,648 N.W.2d 249, 260(Minn. App.2002).We granted Weinberger's petition for further review and now reverse.

Weinberger sued the Tartan Defendants for defamation, alleging that they collaborated to remove him from his position as head football coach at Tartan High School by destroying his reputation through spreading false rumors and publishing false information in the Maplewood Review.The January 1997article at the heart of this appeal discussed Weinberger's unexpected termination as head football coach and contained a number of quotes from alleged "sources" in the school district discussing why Weinberger was terminated.Although there were several quotes directly attributed to Lipetzky, Tartan's principal, the majority of the information in the article was attributed to unnamed sources.Of these statements, Weinberger identified at least 11 statements from the January 27, 1997, article that he contends are untrue and defamatory.²Although he maintains that Lipetzky, Klingsporn, and Hickey made these allegedly defamatory statements, he does not know which of these individuals, if any, actually made any of the statements in question.

In July 2000, Weinberger served Wakefield with a subpoena requiring that he submit to a deposition and provide all documents concerning or related to Weinberger.When Wakefield refused to comply, Weinberger filed a motion to compel.The district court denied Weinberger's motion because Weinberger had not exhausted all alternative sources for the information sought.After completing depositions of Lipetzky, Klingsporn, Hickey, and Hallbrehder, each of whom failed to identify who made the alleged defamatory statements noted above, Weinberger renewed his motion to compel.³The district court granted this motion, requiring that Wakefield provide by interrogatory answer the name of the original source of each statement identified by Weinberger as defamatory.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for further fact-finding consistent with Bauer v. Gannett Co. (KARE 11),557 N.W.2d 608(Minn.App.1997).⁴On remand, the district court applied Bauer and concluded that on the facts of this case disclosure was appropriate and granted Weinberger's motion.In its order, the district court limited the required disclosure to the identification by written interrogatory as to "which defendant, if any, is the original source for each of the following statements."

Again, on appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Weinberger had: (a) failed to establish a prima facie case that the statements at issue are false or made with actual malice; (b) failed to demonstrate that the disclosure ordered will clearly lead to relevant evidence of actual malice; and (c) failed to demonstrate how his interest in disclosure is more significant than the chilling effect that will result from making a reporter a witness against sources to whom he promised confidentiality.

Resolution of this case requires us to interpret the defamation exception found in the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act,⁵Minn.Stat. §§ 525.021 through 525.025.⁶We review the construction of statutes de novo.SeeRyan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Invs., Inc.,634 N.W.2d 176, 181(Minn.2001)("Statutory construction is * * * a question of law which we review de novo.").When interpreting a statutory provision, we first look at whether the words of the statute are clear or ambiguous.Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl,616 N.W.2d 273, 277(Minn.2000).If the words of the statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, we will not ignore the clear meaning "under the pretext of pursuing the spirit."Minn. Stat. § 645.16(2002).In doing so, we construe the words and phrases of the statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning and only find the language ambiguous when it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.Id.

The act was designed to "protect the public interest and the free flow of information" by giving the news media "a substantial privilege not to reveal sources of information or to disclose unpublished information."Minn.Stat. § 595.022.This privilege protects any person "who is or has been directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public."Minn.Stat. § 595.023.While recognizing and designing a substantial privilege for the news media, the legislature created two exceptions to that privilege that require disclosure of unnamed sources under certain limited circumstances.The first exception, one not relevant here, is applicable in criminal cases; the second is applicable in "any defamation actions."⁷Minn.Stat. §§ 595.024(criminal), 595.025 (defamation).The exception found in section 595.025 requires disclosure when "the person seeking disclosure can demonstrate that the identity of the source will lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice."Minn.Stat. § 595.025, subd. 1.The person seeking disclosure must also show that "there is probable cause to believe that the source has information clearly relevant to the issue of defamation" and that "the information cannot be obtained by any alternative means or remedy less destructive of first amendment rights" before disclosure will be required.Minn. Stat. § 595.025, subd. 2(a) and (b).

In Minnesota, a plaintiff pursuing a defamation claim must prove that the defendant made: (a) a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; (b) in unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) that harmed the plaintiff's reputation in the community.Britton v. Koep,470 N.W.2d 518, 520(Minn.1991).When the plaintiff is a public official and the statement relates to the individual's official conduct, the plaintiff must prove not only that the statement was false, but also that the statement was made with actual malice.Id.A statement is made with actual malice when it is made with the "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."New York Times v. Sullivan,376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686(1964);see alsoBritton,470 N.W.2d at 520.The district court determined that for the purposes of this action Weinberger is a public official and therefore must prove defamation with actual malice to successfully pursue his claim against the Tartan Defendants.

We begin our analysis by addressing whether Weinberger "can demonstrate that the identity of the source will lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice."Minn.Stat. § 595.025, subd. 1.Under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."Minn. R. Evid. 401(emphasis added);see, e.g., Boland v. Morrill,270 Minn. 86, 98-99, 132 N.W.2d 711, 719(1965)(stating that "any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue").To prove actual malice, the plaintiff has to show that the declarants spoke with the knowledge that their statements were false or with reckless disregard as to whether the statements were false or not.SeeSullivan,376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710;Britton,470 N.W.2d at 520.Therefore, under the language of section 595.025, the defamation exception applies when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the identity of the source will lead to evidence having any tendency to prove or disprove that the defendants spoke with the knowledge that...