Weinberger v Rossi

• Date: 31 March 1982
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

United States Supreme Court.

(Burger, Chief Justice; Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor, Justices)

Weinberger, Secretary of Defense and Others

and

Rossi and Others

Relationship of international law and municipal law Interpretation of legislation Presumption that Congress did not intend to legislate in manner contrary to international law Legislation concerning employment discrimination at United States military bases Treaty exception Whether including Executive agreements

Treaties Form Executive agreement Effect in municipal law Whether constituting a treaty The law of the United States

Summary: The facts:In 1968, the President of the United States entered into an Executive Agreement with the Republic of Philippines which provided for the preferential employment of Filipino citizens at United States military bases in the Philippines. In 1971, Congress enacted a Public Act,1 Section 106 of which prohibited employment discrimination against United States citizens working at United States military bases overseas unless permitted by treaty. In 1978, a number of United States citizens working in the Philippines (the Respondents) were notified that their jobs at a United States naval facility were being converted into local national positions in accordance with the provisions of the Executive Agreement and that they would be discharged from their employment in the Navy. The Respondents filed suit in the District Court against the Secretary of State (the Petitioner) alleging that the preferential employment provision of the Executive Agreement violated Section 106 of the Act.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the Petitioner which was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held:The appeal was allowed.

(1) The question before the Court was whether the word treaty in the context of Section 106 was limited to those treaties provided for in Article II(2)(2) of the Constitution (Article II treaties), namely, international agreements concluded by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or whether it included other international agreements such as Executive agreements (p. 563).

(2) Congress had not been consistent, when enacting legislation, in distinguishing between Article II treaties and other forms of international agreements. However, if the treaty exception contained in Section 106 of the

Act was construed so as to include only Article II treaties this would imply that Congress had intended to repudiate the thirteen other Executive agreements in force at the time that the Act was enacted. It had long been a maxim of statutory construction that Acts of Congress should never be given a construction by the courts that would constitute a violation of international law, if another possible construction was possible. Accordingly, taking into account the absence of any affirmative expression by Congress abrogating the United States international obligations contained in the various Executive agreements and the legislative history of the Act, the word treaty was to be construed so as to include Executive agreements (pp. 5649)

The following is the text of the opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist:

Section 106 of Pub L 92129, 85 Stat 355, note following 5 USC 7201 (1976 ed, Supp IV) [5 USCS 7201], prohibits employment discrimination against United States citizens on military bases overseas unless permitted by treaty. The question in this case is whether treaty includes executive agreements concluded by the President with the host country, or whether the term is limited to those international agreements entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to Art II, 2, cl 2, of the United States Constitution. This issue is solely one of statutory interpretation.

I

[456 US 27]

In 1944, Congress authorized the President, by such means as he finds appropriate to acquire after negotiation with the President of the Philippines, military bases he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. 58 Stat 626, 22 USC 1392 [22 USCS 1392]. Pursuant to this statute, the United States and the Republic of the Philippines in 1947 entered into a 99-year Military Bases Agreement (MBA), Mar. 14, 1947, 61 Stat 4019, TIAS No. 1775.1 The MBA grants the United States the use of various military facilities in the Philippines. It does not, however, contain any provisions regarding the employment of local nationals on the base. In 1968, the two nations negotiated a Base Labor Agreement (BLA), May 27, 1968, [1968] 19 UST 5892, TIAS No. 6542, as a supplement to the MBA. The BLA, inter alia, provides for the preferential employment of Filipino citizens at United States military facilities in the Philippines.2

In 1971, Congress enacted 106 of Pub L 92129, the employment discrimination statute at issue in this

case.3 At the time 106 was enacted, 12 agreements in addition to the BLA were in effect providing for preferential hiring of local nationals on United States military bases overseas. Since 106 was enacted, four more such agreements have been concluded.4 None of these agreements were submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent pursuant to Art II, 2, cl 2, of the Constitution.

[456 US 28]

In 1978 respondents, all United States citizens residing in the Philippines, were notified that their jobs at the United States Naval Facility at Subic Bay were being converted into local national positions in accordance with the BLA, and that they would be discharged from their employment with the Navy. After unsuccessfully pursuing an administrative remedy, respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the preferential employment provisions of the BLA violated, interalia, 106. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, Rossi v BrownUNK, 467 F Supp 960 (1979), but the Court of Appeals reversed. Rossi v Brown, 206 US App DC 148, 642 F2d 553 (1980). We in turn reverse the Court of Appeals.

II

Simply because the question presented is entirely one of statutory construction does not mean that the question necessarily admits of an easy answer. Chief Justice Marshall long ago observed that [w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived .United States v FisherUNK, 2 Cranch 358, 386, 2 L Ed 304 (1805). More recently, the Court has stated:

Generalities about statutory construction help us little. They are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience. They do not solve the special difficulties in construing a particular statute. The variables render every problem of statutory construction unique.United States v Universal Corp.UNK, 344 US 218...