Weingartner v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1887
• Citation: 32 F. 314
• Parties: WEINGARTNER and others v. CHARTER OAK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

32 F. 314

WEINGARTNER and others v. CHARTER OAK LIFE INS. CO.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

October 8, 1887

Geo. D Reynolds, for plaintiffs.

J. S Fullerton, for defendant.

THAYER J., (orally.)

In the case of J. Weingartner v. Charter Oak Life Insurance Company the only question is whether the case is controlled by the decision in the case of Fry v. Insurance Co., 31 F 197, which was decided at the last term of this court. In the Fry Case, the holder of a running policy had brought suit by attachment in this jurisdiction against the Charter Oak Life Insurance Company, to recover the reserve value of his policy, upon the theory that the insolvency of the company worked a breach of the contract of insurance, and entitled him to sue for the present value of the same. In that case, we held that the Missouri policy-holder was presumed to be acquainted with the charter of the company in which he was insured, and with the insurance laws of the state of Connecticut, that regulated and determined its existence, and to have assented thereto when he became a member of the company by taking out a policy therein; and we further held that under the charter of the company, and the insurance laws of Connecticut, that determined and regulated its existence, an action by attachment could not be maintained in this jurisdiction by the holder of a running policy to recover its present value, so long as there was a proceeding pending in the name of the superintendent of insurance of the state of Connecticut against the company, in the courts of that state, to annul its charter, and to liquidate its affairs. We held, in substance, that when the company became insolvent, and proceedings were taken against it, in the statutory form, by the insurance commissioner of Connecticut, to liquidate its affairs, that proceeding, so long as it was pending, operated to preclude policy-holders from maintaining a suit against the company in this jurisdiction of the kind above described.

In the present case the suit is by the holder of a death claim, and the fact is supposed to make a distinction between the two cases, and to entitle this particular plaintiff to sue by attachment in this jurisdiction. We think, however, that that view of the case is erroneous. We think that a death claimant occupies the same position as the holder of a running policy that both claims are claims preferred by persons...