Weinhauer v. State
Decision Date | 01 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 24909.,24909. |
Citation | 513 S.E.2d 840,334 S.C. 327 |
Parties | Raymond WEINHAUER, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Assistant Appellate Defender M. Anne Pearce, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for petitioner.
Attorney General Charles Molony Condon; Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh; and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Teresa A. Knox, all of Columbia; Assistant Attorney General Barbara M. Tiffin, of Greenville, for respondent.
In this application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), the PCR court dismissed petitioner's case. We reverse.
On January 4, 1994, a Sumter County grand jury indicted petitioner Raymond Weinhauer, Jr., for numerous criminal offenses including first and second degree burglary. On January 28, 1994, petitioner pleaded guilty to several counts in the indictment including two counts of second degree burglary.
Count six of the indictment, as presented to the grand jury, stated:
At the guilty plea proceeding, the solicitor orally amended the indictment, stating: Petitioner's attorney made no objection. Petitioner did not appeal.
On July 18, 1994, petitioner filed an application for PCR. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court dismissed petitioner's application. In February 1997, petitioner sought from this Court a writ of certiorari to consider the following issue:
Whether the trial judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence petitioner for second degree burglary, violent, where the indictment failed to state an aggravating circumstance under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-312(B) (Supp. 1997)? 1
Petitioner argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for second degree burglary, violent, where the elements of such offense were not included in count eight of the indictment to the grand jury. We agree.
The offense of second degree burglary is codified at S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-312 (Supp.1998), which provides two definitions of the offense, subsections (A) and (B). Subsection (A) defines second degree burglary as entering a dwelling 2 without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-312(A). Under subsection (B), a person is also guilty of second degree burglary if he enters a building 3 without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein, and where the burglary involves one of several enumerated aggravating circumstances, one of which is "nighttime" burglary. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-312(B).
Second degree burglary, as defined in subsection (B), is specifically listed as a violent offense under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp.1998). Conversely, second degree burglary under subsection (A) is classified as a nonviolent offense. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-70 (Supp.1998). Petitioner argues that when the solicitor orally amended count eight of the indictment, she changed the nature of the offense by including the aggravating circumstance of "nighttime" burglary. This, in turn, changed the classification of the offense from the nonviolent form of second degree burglary to the violent form, i.e., second degree burglary as defined under subsection (B). Petitioner further notes that by changing the offense from nonviolent to violent, he will have to serve one-third of his sentence before being eligible for parole, as opposed to one-fourth of the sentence under the nonviolent form.4
Pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-100 (1985), "If (a) there be any defect in form in any indictments or (b) on the trial of any case there shall appear to be any variance between the allegations of the indictment and the evidence offered in proof thereof, the court before which the trial shall be had may amend the indictment (according to the proof, if the amendment be because of a variance) if such amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged." (emphasis added). Thus, the question presented on this appeal is whether the amendment changed the nature of the offense charged.
In State v. Sowell, 85 S.C. 278, 67 S.E. 316 (1910), the defendant was indicted under section 145 of the South Carolina Criminal Code of 1902, which provided:
In the instant case, count eight of the indictment properly set out the elements for second degree burglary under section 16-11-312(A) (). The solicitor amended count eight to state that the offense was committed at "nighttime." According to the solicitor, petitioner pleaded guilty to second degree burglary, violent, as defined under section 16-11-312(B) ().
We hold that by amending the indictment, the solicitor changed the nature of the offense charged because the circumstance of "nighttime" burglary was material to charging Defendant with second degree burglary under subsection (B). See Sowell, supra; 41 Am.Jur.2d Indictments and Informations § 184 at 792 (1995) (). Thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept petitioner's guilty plea of second degree burglary under count eight, as amended. See Murdock v. State, 308 S.C....
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