Weinhouse v. Cronin

• Decision Date: 25 June 1896
• Citation: 68 Conn. 250,36 A. 45
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WEINHOUSE v. CRONIN.

36 A. 45

68 Conn. 250

WEINHOUSE

v. CRONIN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 25, 1896.

Appeal from city court of New Haven; Dow, Judge.

Action by Hyman Weinhouse against Thomas J. Cronin to recover a real-estate commission for the sale of land of the defendant. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Henry P. Hall and Richard H. Tyner, for appellant.

David Strouse, for appellee.

ANDREWS, C. J. The finding that there was an implied contract to pay a commission shows that there was no express one. An implied contract respecting any matter can exist only where there is no express one. 1 Chit. Cont. (11th Am. Ed.) 89; King v. Kilbride, 58 Conn. 109, 19 Atl. 519; Brown v. Fales, 139 Mass. 21, 29 N. E. 211. What is often termed an implied contract, though it is more properly denominated a quasi contract, is matter of law. 1 Swift, Dig. 175. Such a contract rests merely on construction of law. It is one which the law, from the existence of facts, presumes the party has made. Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 524. A true "implied contract" on the other hand, is one which may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, though not expressed in words. In the case at bar the finding is so drawn as to indicate that the court was of opinion that from the facts proved the law implied a contract or quasi contract. If the facts which the court finds to exist are such that the law presumes from them that the defendant had made the contract which the plaintiff has alleged in the complaint, then the judgment is correct; but, if otherwise, there is error. There are two conditions, upon either of which, if shown to exist, the law would imply a contract by the defendant to pay a commission to the plaintiff. If the defendant has so conducted himself that the plaintiff, acting fairly, had the honest belief that a lawful request had been made to him by the defendant to render services as a broker in the sale of the defendant's said real astate, and if the plaintiff, acting on such request, rendered such services, then the law would imply a promise by the defendant to pay to the plaintiff what the services were reasonably worth. Or if the plaintiff, without having been requested so to do, rendered services as a broker in the sale of the defendant's real estate, under circumstances indicating that he expected to be paid therefor, and the defendant, knowing such circumstances, availed himself of the benefit of those services, then the law would imply a promise by the defendant to pay to the plaintiff what those services were reasonably worth. The facts from which the contract of the defendant to pay a commission to the plaintiff is to be inferred are brief. The plaintiff is a real-estate broker living in New Haven. The defendant is a Catholic priest, living in Wallingford. He owned certain real estate situated in New Haven, which he wished to sell. He had put up a sign on it. advertising it for sale, and, so far as appears, in his own name, as though he desired to avoid the expense of a broker. The plaintiff knew that this property was for sale, and had certain customers who wished to buy it. Three interviews between the plaintiff and the defendant in respect to this property are mentioned. The substance of the first one is this: The plaintiff called on the defendant at his home in Wallingford, and said to him: "I have a customer who desires to buy your property in New Haven. For what price will you sell it?" The defendant named the price. A customer is a person with whom a business house or a business man has regular or repeated dealings. The plaintiff being a real-estate broker, his customer would be one for whom he had acted in the buying or selling of real estate. Putting,...