Weis v. The State

• Decision Date: 09 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. S09A1951.,S09A1951.
• Parties: WEISv.The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

287 Ga. 46
694 S.E.2d 350

WEIS
v.
The STATE.

No. S09A1951.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 25, 2010.
Reconsideration Denied April 9, 2010.

694 S.E.2d 351

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

694 S.E.2d 352

Robert H. Citronberg, Thomas M. West, Stephen B. Bright, Atlanta, for appellant.

Scott L. Ballard, Dist. Atty., Robert W. Smith, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

MELTON, Justice.

In this death penalty case, Jamie Ryan Weis appeals from the denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal based on an alleged violation of his constitutional rights to counsel and a speedy trial. As explained more fully below, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Weis' motion, we affirm.

694 S.E.2d 353

The record reveals that Weis was arrested on February 2, 2006 for the robbery, beating, and shooting death of Catherine King, a senior citizen. Weis has never retained counsel at his own expense. The trial court originally appointed lawyers from the Griffin Judicial Circuit Public Defender's Office to represent him. Several months later, however, attorneys Robert H. Citronberg and Thomas M. West were appointed to represent Weis pursuant to an agreement with the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (the “Standards Council”), and these attorneys entered an appearance on Weis' behalf on October 12, 2006.

During the first six months of their representation of Weis, Citronberg and West were being paid, and they filed several motions on Weis' behalf and conducted an investigation of his case. By mid-March 2007, however, counsel became concerned that the lack of funding available to the Standards Council would result in counsel being unable to pay for the services of experts and for counsel themselves to continue to be paid for their services. Counsel filed several motions for continuance and for additional funds to hire experts and to investigate the case. However, despite these motions, and consistent with counsels' concerns, the defense did not obtain funds for experts and investigators, and by September 2007, the Standards Council stopped making payments to the defense lawyers altogether. The Standards Council believed that additional funds would not be available to pay for the case until approximately June 2008, and was uncertain if, even at that time, sufficient funds would be available to move the case forward.

Citronberg and West filed an emergency motion to obtain funding, and at a November 26, 2007 hearing on the motion, it became clear that additional funding was not available. In light of the funding problem facing the Standards Council, the State moved to have Weis' counsel removed from the case so that they could be replaced with paid counsel from the Griffin Judicial Circuit Public Defender's Office-the office whose lawyers had represented Weis until being replaced by Citronberg and West. These public defenders would receive their stipulated salaries during the course of their representation of Weis, and the Standards Council would not be responsible for paying them. The trial court granted the State's motion, and counsel from the local public defender's office was appointed to replace Citronberg and West.

Weis refused to cooperate with his replacement attorneys from the public defender's office. He even stated in writing that, on the advice of counsel, ¹ he did not want to speak with anyone from the public defender's office about his case. Although the public defenders were experienced attorneys who had tried death penalty cases in the past, and despite the fact that they acknowledged that they would represent Weis as their first priority, on December 10, 2007, they moved to withdraw from the case. Their stated reasons for the withdrawal included, primarily, (1) replacement counsels' concern that they would not be able to competently represent Weis in light of his refusal to cooperate with them and in light of the approaching February 2008 trial date; and (2) replacement counsels' inability to replicate the working relationship that Weis had developed with his prior attorneys and the work that the prior attorneys had done up to that point in the case. Replacement counsel renewed their motion to withdraw on January 17, 2008, again citing Weis' refusal to work with them. In this renewed motion, however, replacement counsel cited additional reasons for the withdrawal that included a lack of funding for experts, investigation, and travel; the fact that replacement counsel had not yet had an opportunity to review the extensive files in the case; and the public defender's office's lack of “time and expertise to conduct the extensive investigation that [was] necessary” in the case.

In February 2008, Weis brought a mandamus action against the trial judge in an attempt to force the judge to reinstate Citronberg and West as his attorneys. However, before an order was entered in the mandamus action, on April 25, 2008, the parties agreed by stipulation that Citronberg and

694 S.E.2d 354

West would be reinstated as Weis' attorneys; that the case would not be set for trial any earlier than January 2009; and that Weis would “irrevocably waive[ ] the right to seek any further continuances in the [case] based upon any alleged or actual lack of funds or manpower or time to prepare said case for trial.” Based on this stipulation, on February 11, 2009, the trial court reinstated Citronberg and West as Weis' counsel.

On June 1, 2009, the trial court ordered that an evidentiary hearing take place on July 8, 2009, and that trial would commence on August 3, 2009. However, Citronberg and West still were not being paid by the Standards Council, and on June 24, 2009, counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and for discharge and acquittal based on an alleged violation of Weis' right to a speedy trial.

At the July 8, 2009 evidentiary hearing, the Standards Council agreed to provide funding for Weis' defense, but at a significantly reduced amount from the amount that counsel believed was necessary in order to provide an adequate defense. The trial court denied Weis' motion for discharge and acquittal, prompting this appeal.

1. In evaluating Weis' constitutional speedy trial claim, we must consider the four-part balancing test outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Under this test, the Court must examine:

(1) the length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of the right [to speedy trial]; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Standing alone, none of these factors are a necessary, or sufficient condition to a finding of deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, but rather should be considered as part of a balancing test Washington v. State, 243 Ga. 329, 330, 253 S.E.2d 719 (1979). Thus, we must apply and weigh these factors together to determine if [Weis'] constitutional right to a speedy trial has been abridged Treadwell v. State, 233 Ga. 468, 211 S.E.2d 760 (1975).

(Citation omitted.) Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83, 84, 663 S.E.2d 169 (2008). On appeal, a trial court's decision to deny a motion for discharge based on an alleged speedy trial violation is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Burns v. State, 265 Ga. 763, 462 S.E.2d 622 (1995).

(a) Length of delay: This factor is

to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. To trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation or arrest and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from “presumptively prejudicial” delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a “speedy” trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. The assumption that a delay is presumptively prejudicial is improper as it can result in unnecessary judicial constitutional analysis.

(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Wimberly v. State, 279 Ga. 65, 66, 608 S.E.2d 625 (2005). As the State concedes, the three-and-a-half year period from the date of Weis' arrest to the date that his case was put on a trial calendar is presumptively prejudicial. See Brannen v. State, 274 Ga. 454, 553 S.E.2d 813 (2001) (52-month delay is presumptively prejudicial). Therefore, we consider the remaining Barker factors in conjunction with this factor. See Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008).

(b) Reason for delay: Weis claims that the lack of funding for Citronberg and West to mount his defense is the primary reason for the delay in bringing his case to trial, and that, therefore, this factor should be weighed against the State. The record, however, reveals that Weis' assertion is incorrect. While a delay caused by “a systemic ‘breakdown in the public defender system’ could be charged to the State” ( Vermont v. Brillon, ---U.S. ---- (III)(C), 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted)), there was no such “breakdown” of the entire “public defender system” here such that the reason for the delay could solely be weighed against the State. As explained more fully below, although

694 S.E.2d 355

the lack of funding contributed to some of the delay in this case, it was not the sole factor contributing to the delay. Weis' own behavior, and the behavior of his attorneys, also contributed to the delay, and we must “appropriately ... take into account [Weis'] role during the ... delay.” Id. at (III)(B).

Here, Citronberg and West were being paid by the Standards Council for approximately the first six months of their service to Weis. Over the course of the next several months, payments to counsel became more sporadic, and eventually, eleven months into their representation, non-existent. At the November 26, 2007 hearing on counsels' emergency motion to obtain funding, it...