Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 37800.,37800. |
| Citation | 152 Idaho 519,272 P.3d 491 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Thomas WEISEL, a married man dealing in his sole and separate property, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. BEAVER SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant–Respondent. |
Haemmerle & Haemmerle, P.L.L.C., Hailey, for appellant. Fritz Haemmerle argued.
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC, Ketchum, for respondent. Erin F. Clark argued.
Thomas Weisel (Weisel) owned adjacent parcels, Lots 13 and 14, within the Beaver Springs Subdivision, now located in Ketchum, Idaho. In 1983, Weisel presented a development plan and request to unify his adjacent lots to the Beaver Springs Owners Association (Beaver Springs). At some point, Weisel's plan indicated that he intended that construction would occur within a setback zone that abutted the lots' shared border. Weisel and Beaver Springs executed an agreement (Agreement) whereby Beaver Springs approved the development plan and lot unification, removed the setback zone between the two lots, and mandated that the unified lot never be redivided or separately developed. When construction on Weisel's property was completed in 1985, all structures were located on what had been Lot 14. The former setback zone and the portion of the unified parcel that had been Lot 13 remained vacant.
In 2009, Weisel filed suit seeking to rescind or reform the Agreement. The district court granted Beaver Springs' motion for summary judgment. Weisel appealed and we now affirm.
At all times pertinent to this litigation, Weisel owned adjacent Lots 13 and 14, located within the Beaver Springs Subdivision. The Subdivision is in a rural setting, and the Subdivision's Declaration of Restrictions imposed restrictions intended to protect and maintain the Subdivision's rural appearance. Written approval of the Beaver Springs Subdivision Design Committee (Design Committee) was required to make any change to property within the Subdivision, including construction of buildings and fences and landscaping. The Design Committee was vested with absolute discretion to deny any request for a change. Setback zones prohibited construction along the borders of each lot. The setback zones between adjacent lots could be removed if (1) the lots had a common owner, (2) the Design Committee consented in writing and found "that any improvements to be constructed within these setback lines will not cause unreasonable diminution of the view from other property," and (3) the lots were combined and thence forward deemed one lot that "may not thereafter be split and developed as two parcels." The Declaration defined "Lot" as "any tract described in a recorded instrument or shown on a recorded plat," and stated that ownership of each Lot carried with it one membership, and each membership was entitled to one vote on Subdivision matters.
In 1983, there were existing structures on Lot 14 and Lot 13 was undeveloped. Weisel wished to construct additional structures and entered negotiations with both Beaver Springs and Blaine County in regard to his development plan.1 Through architect James McLaughlin, Weisel sought a variance from the County necessary to construct servants' quarters larger than those permitted by county ordinance. In exchange for the variance, the County required Weisel to record a commitment to never construct a residence on Lot 13. Weisel contends that the Design Committee, which consisted of Bob Smith, Jean Smith, and Phil Ottley, required him to unify the adjacent lots and remove the setback lines because his development plan placed a portion of the proposed development within the Lot 14 setback zone that abutted the border shared by Lots 13 and 14. Other than development within the setback zone, it appears that Weisel's development plan otherwise complied with the limitations imposed by the Declaration. Nonetheless, there is evidence in the record that the Design Committee expressed concerns regarding the density of development on Weisel's property.
Weisel entered into an Agreement with Beaver Springs on October 12, 1983, whereby Beaver Springs provided written consent to his development plan, unified Lots 13 and 14, and removed the setback zones between the Lots. The Agreement stated that the Design Committee had "determined that the improvements to be constructed in the setback lines along the common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 will not cause unreasonable diminution of the view from other lots" and that "the setback lines along the common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 are hereby removed and are of no further force and effect." The Agreement also stated that "upon execution of this Agreement, Lot 13 and Lot 14 shall be deemed one parcel and that such single parcel shall not hereafter be split and/or developed as two separate parcels." Weisel proceeded with development, and when construction was ultimately completed in 1985, all structures were located within Lot 14 and did not infringe upon the former setback zone. In 2004, Weisel again expanded the development on Lot 14. To this day, no development on Lot 14 infringes upon what was once the setback zone between Lots 13 and 14.
In 1986, Beaver Springs enacted a First Amendment to the Declaration of Restrictions (Amended Declaration) that expressly stated that the owner of a unified lot was entitled to only one vote in regard to Subdivision matters. Despite this amendment, for twenty-two years following the parties' execution of the Agreement, Weisel continued to exercise, and Beaver Springs continued to recognize Weisel as holding, two voting rights as to Subdivision matters. During that period, Weisel also annually paid assessments for two lots to Beaver Springs.
In 2005, Weisel sought rescission of the Agreement, and the parties' relationship began to deteriorate. According to Weisel, development of other lots within the Subdivision had far extended beyond the rural, natural aesthetic that had guided the parties when they entered into the Agreement in 1983. Weisel argued that neither the County nor the City of Ketchum, which has since obtained jurisdiction over the Subdivision, intended to enforce the restriction on Lot 13's development. Beaver Springs nonetheless refused to grant Weisel permission to redivide his property. This dispute prompted Beaver Springs to reassess Weisel's voting rights and to rescind one of those rights.
Weisel ultimately brought suit against Beaver Springs, asserting several claims. These include the claims that (1) the Agreement is void because it was fundamentally based upon the mutual mistake that Weisel would develop within the setback zone; (2) since Weisel's development plan did not violate any Declaration provision, Beaver Springs provided no consideration to support the Agreement and the Agreement is therefore void; (3) since Weisel never constructed within the setback zone, Beaver Springs' consideration—in the form of permission to unify the lots and develop within the setback zone—failed, rendering the Agreement unenforceable; and (4) the Agreement never became binding because development within the setback zone was a condition precedent to adhesion of the terms of the Agreement. Weisel additionally argued that he was entitled to two votes under the Declaration of Restrictions, and alternatively that Beaver Springs was estopped from denying him a second voting right under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. Weisel also asserted that he was entitled to reimbursement for the double assessments he had paid over the years.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Beaver Springs' motion on the following grounds: (1) the mutual mistake claim was barred by expiration of the statute of limitations; (2) there was no mutual mistake because development within the setback zone was not the fundamental reason the parties entered into the Agreement; (3) the Agreement was supported by consideration; (4) development within the setback zone was not a condition precedent to the terms of the Agreement; (5) under the plain language of the Declaration, Weisel owned one lot and therefore (6) was entitled to only one vote and (7) also was entitled to reimbursement and setoff for the excess assessments he had paid. Weisel appeals each of these holdings except for the district court's determination that he was entitled to reimbursement and setoff for the Subdivision assessments. Each party requests attorney fees on appeal.
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard used by the district court. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005). We construe all disputed facts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 695–96, 85 P.3d 667, 671–72 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine issues which will preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely.
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362, 368 (1969) (quoting 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1234 (Rules ed. 1958) ).
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