Weisenberger v. State , No. 24656.

• Docket Nº: No. 24656.
• Citation: 202 Ind. 424, 175 N.E. 238
• Case Date: March 04, 1931
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

202 Ind. 424
175 N.E. 238

WEISENBERGER
v.
STATE.

No. 24656.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 4, 1931.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; Frank S. Roby, Special Judge.

Frank Weisenberger was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing bed mattresses from material known as “shoddy,” and of unlawfully offering to sell and selling such mattresses and he appeals.

Reversed, with instructions.

[175 N.E. 239]

Little & Little, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Arthur L. Gilliom, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MYERS, C. J.

Appellant, by an indictment in two counts, was charged, tried, and convicted (count 1) of unlawfully manufacturing bed mattresses from material known as “shoddy,” and (count 2) of unlawfully selling, and offering to sell, bed mattresses manufactured out of material known as “shoddy.” Section 8250, Burns' Ann. St. 1926; Acts 1917, c. 136, p. 435, § 1.

Appellant assigns as errors the overruling of his motion to quash the indictment and the overruling of his motion for a new trial. In support of both of these assignments he asserts that the statute upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it is inhibited by article 1, §§ 1, 23, of the Constitution of Indiana.

The challenged enactment, in so far as the same is pertinent to the counts of the indictment, provides that: “No person *** shall employ or use in the making, remaking or renovating of any mattresses: *** (b) Any material known as ‘shoddy,’ and made in whole or in part from old or worn clothing, carpets, or other fabric or material previously used, or any other fabric or material from which ‘shoddy’ is constructed. (2) No person

[175 N.E. 240]

*** shall sell, offer to sell *** any mattress made, remade or renovated in violation of subsection one of this section.”

The indictment, count 1, charges that appellant did “unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly manufacture bed mattresses made from material known as ‘shoddy’ which mattresses were then and there made from old and worn clothing, carpets, old mattresses and other fabrics and material which had been previously used from which said fabric and material shoddy is constructed.” Count 2, that he did “unlawfully and knowingly sell and offer to sell, deliver and have in his possession with intent to sell, deliver and consign, bed mattresses which had then and there been made and manufactured from old worn clothing, old mattresses, carpets and other fabrics and material which had been previously used known as shoddy.” It will be noticed that the indictment is limited to shoddy, made from old or worn or previously used articles.

As we understand appellant, he is not claiming that the statute is unreasonable or that it unjustly deprives him of any of his natural rights. If such a claim were made, it could not be sustained, for the reason that we would be compelled in that respect to abide the implied or expressed determination of the legislature. Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. 564, 1 N. E. 47, 51 Am. Rep. 768.

[1] Generally speaking, either the federal or state Constitution supplies the only standard for determining the validity or invalidity of a statute. In this case, as we have seen, appellant relies upon section 1, supra, as giving him the “unalienable” right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and section 23, supra: “The general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

[2] A constitutional personal liberty clause, or the right to pursue any proper vocation, is regarded as an inalienable right, and a privilege not to be restricted except for good cause. In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N. E. 641, 21 L. R. A. 701;Wyeth v. Board of Health of City of Cambridge, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439;Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446.

[3][4][5][6] The authority of the Legislature to enact the statute here in question must be sustained, if at all, as a proper exercise of police power for the promotion of peace, safety, health, or welfare of the public. Courts are not concerned in the wisdom or expediency of such legislation, where it is apparent that it tends toward the preservation of the public health or welfare evidently intended by the Legislature, but that body is not the sole arbiter of what constitutes proper exercise of the police power. For, as said in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402, 409, 46 S. Ct. 320, 321, 79 L. Ed. 654, “Legislative determinations express or implied are entitled to great weight; but it is always open to interested parties to show that the Legislature has transgressed the limits of its power.” While the state, in the exercise of this power, may subject persons and property to all kinds of restraints and burdens, even to an encroachment upon the natural rights of the citizen, yet, where it manifestly appears that the action of the Legislature is not supported by any reason, and...