Weisenberger v. State

• Decision Date: 04 March 1931
• Docket Number: No. 24656.,24656.
• Citation: 202 Ind. 424,175 N.E. 238
• Parties: WEISENBERGER v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

202 Ind. 424

175 N.E. 238

WEISENBERGER

v.STATE.

No. 24656.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 4, 1931.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; Frank S. Roby, Special Judge.

Frank Weisenberger was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing bed mattresses from material known as “shoddy,” and of unlawfully offering to sell and selling such mattresses and he appeals.

Reversed, with instructions.

Little & Little, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Arthur L. Gilliom, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MYERS, C. J.

Appellant, by an indictment in two counts, was charged, tried, and convicted (count 1) of unlawfully manufacturing bed mattresses from material known as “shoddy,” and (count 2) of unlawfully selling, and offering to sell, bed mattresses manufactured out of material known as “shoddy.” Section 8250, Burns' Ann. St. 1926; Acts 1917, c. 136, p. 435, § 1.

Appellant assigns as errors the overruling of his motion to quash the indictment and the overruling of his motion for a new trial. In support of both of these assignments he asserts that the statute upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it is inhibited by article 1, §§ 1, 23, of the Constitution of Indiana.

The challenged enactment, in so far as the same is pertinent to the counts of the indictment, provides that: “No person *** shall employ or use in the making, remaking or renovating of any mattresses: *** (b) Any material known as ‘shoddy,’ and made in whole or in part from old or worn clothing, carpets, or other fabric or material previously used, or any other fabric or material from which ‘shoddy’ is constructed. (2) No person *** shall sell, offer to sell *** any mattress made, remade or renovated in violation of subsection one of this section.”

The indictment, count 1, charges that appellant did “unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly manufacture bed mattresses made from material known as ‘shoddy’ which mattresses were then and there made from old and worn clothing, carpets, old mattresses and other fabrics and material which had been previously used from which said fabric and material shoddy is constructed.” Count 2, that he did “unlawfully and knowingly sell and offer to sell, deliver and have in his possession with intent to sell, deliver and consign, bed mattresses which had then and there been made and manufactured from old worn clothing, old mattresses, carpets and other fabrics and material which had been previously used known as shoddy.” It will be noticed that the indictment is limited to shoddy, made from old or worn or previously used articles.

As we understand appellant, he is not claiming that the statute is unreasonable or that it unjustly deprives him of any of his natural rights. If such a claim were made, it could not be sustained, for the reason that we would be compelled in that respect to abide the implied or expressed determination of the legislature. Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. 564, 1 N. E. 47, 51 Am. Rep. 768.

[1] Generally speaking, either the federal or state Constitution supplies the only standard for determining the validity or invalidity of a statute. In this case, as we have seen, appellant relies upon section 1, supra, as giving him the “unalienable” right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and section 23, supra: “The general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

[2] A constitutional personal liberty clause, or the right to pursue any proper vocation, is regarded as an inalienable right, and a privilege not to be restricted except for good cause. In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N. E. 641, 21 L. R. A. 701;Wyeth v. Board of Health of City of Cambridge, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439;Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446.

[3][4][5][6] The authority of the Legislature to enact the statute here in question must be sustained, if at all, as a proper exercise of police power for the promotion of peace, safety, health, or welfare of the public. Courts are not concerned in the wisdom or expediency of such legislation, where it is apparent that it tends toward the preservation of the public health or welfare evidently intended by the Legislature, but that body is not the sole arbiter of what constitutes proper exercise of the police power. For, as said in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402, 409, 46 S. Ct. 320, 321, 79 L. Ed. 654, “Legislative determinations express or implied are entitled to great weight; but it is always open to interested parties to show that the Legislature has transgressed the limits of its power.” While the state, in the exercise of this power, may subject persons and property to all kinds of restraints and burdens, even to an encroachment upon the natural rights of the citizen, yet, where it manifestly appears that the action of the Legislature is not supported by any reason, and is purely arbitrary, thereby invading property rights of an individual, or unnecessarily and unreasonably restraining a lawful business or trade under the guise of police regulation, courts may look to the character and reasonableness of the limitation for the purpose of determining whether or not it reaches beyond the scope of necessary protection and prevention. In other words, “they will pass upon the question whether such act has a substantial relation to the police power.” People v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74, 78, 110 N. E. 870, 872, L. R. A. 1916C, 775, Ann. Cas., 1917C, 1065.

The Attorney General has called our attention to the title of the original act (Acts 1913, c. 224, p. 644) as being helpful in determining the intention of the Legislature. It is not claimed that the title of the act in question is insufficient or that the subject in the body of the act is not indicated by the title. Hence the question, What beneficial purpose did the Legislature intend to accomplish? Giving the legislative language a reasonable and liberal view, the answer must be, to protect health and public welfare.

[7][8][9][10] We are at present only concerned with the two provisions of the statute upon which the counts of the indictment are predicated. These statutory prohibitions are not expressly made to depend upon the use of unsanitary or germ-infected materials. Provision (b) is the authority for count 1 charging appellant with using “shoddy” made from old, worn, and secondhand materials in the “making, remaking or renovating of mattresses,” regardless of whether such materials, through a process of disinfection, sterilization, and fumigation, may be sanitary and fit for use without danger to health or peril to the public. It is apparent that appellant was engaged in the production of articles for which there is a general public demand and in which the public generally is interested. His occupation was lawful, but of a character to justify proper regulation, a question for the Legislature. The statutory provision in question does not assume to regulate, but to prohibit. This the state, under its sovereign power, may do, providing, as applied to the instant case, the character of the shoddy used by appellant in conducting his business is injurious to the health, safety, or public welfare. The general rule is, the state, in the exercise of its police power, cannot absolutely prohibit the use of a commercial commodity, when, by proper regulatory provisions, it may be rendered harmless to health, safety, public welfare, or individual third persons; or, in other words, the power to regulate a lawful business does not necessarily carry with it the power to destroy such...