Weiss v. Burr
Decision Date | 18 September 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1933.,71-1933. |
Parties | Horton C. WEISS, Appellant, v. Waldon C. BURR, Sheriff of Pima County, Arizona, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
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John F. Molloy (argued) of Robertson, Molloy, Fickett & Jones, P.C., Tucson, Ariz., for appellant.
John P. Frank, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., (argued); Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz. for appellee.
Before ELY and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.*
Weiss appeals from the District Court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus. He contends that the court erred in denying his relief from a jail sentence and a fine levied against him, for criminal contempt, by an Arizona trial court.
During the prosecution of a murder trial, Weiss, the prosecuting attorney, was cited for five separate acts of criminal contempt. The first arose out of an in-court discussion, during the jury's absence, concerning the right of a prosecution witness, the mother of the accused, to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. After an acrimonious exchange between Weiss and the defense attorney, the court decided to allow the witness to claim the privilege. Thereupon Weiss complained:
The court responded:
The second citation was sparked by an exchange between Weiss and the court over the use of prior testimony of the same witness. She had previously been separately tried for the same alleged murder, and she had testified in her own defense. At her son's trial, however, she found is physically and emotionally difficult, if not impossible, to complete her testimony. As a substitute for her continued appearance, the defense counsel urged that the entire transcript of her testimony at the prior trial be read into evidence. Weiss argued that only selected portions should be read. The court, agreeing with the defense, said to Weiss:
Weiss responded: "No, I am not going to do that." The court then stated:
The third citation also revolved around the court's treatment of the defendant's mother. In response to a defense motion, the court said:
Immediately thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:
The fourth citation was imposed when Weiss revealed to the jury portions of a statement by the defendant which the court had previously ordered suppressed. After the defense counsel asked the court to admonish Weiss for introducing the excluded evidence, the court said:
Under the statutes involved, murder was defined as a killing "with malice aforethought."1 First degree murder involved, in addition, the element of premeditation.2
In his argument to the jury, the defense counsel argued that the accused had no malice aforethought and explained his conception of the phrase:
During his closing presentation, Weiss attempted to convince the jury that the defendant had, in the words of the defense counsel, "thought of it before he did it." In doing so, he pointed out the suspicious nature of a number of the defendant's actions and statements prior to the killing. At one point, the following colloquy occurred:
After Weiss completed his argument, and the jury was instructed and sent out for its deliberations, the judge again addressed Weiss. He said:
At the end of the trial, the court imposed sentence upon Weiss in a summary proceeding. For the first citation, he was fined $150. For the subsequent infractions, he was given 1, 2, 4, and 8 days in jail, respectively. Before the sentences were executed, Weiss sought review in the Arizona appellate courts. The Arizona Court of Appeals found the contempt judgment void on all counts "for a lack of the requisite factual findings . . . ." Weiss v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz.App. 527, 529, 472 P.2d 950, 952 (1970). The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed. It rejected the views of the Court of Appeals, stating:
"We do not believe a judgment which omits requisite facts is fatally defective if a transcript or...
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Buckley, In re
...statutory rule, which 'does not, however, reflect the constitutional limits of the states' contempt powers.' (Weiss v. Burr (9th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 973, 982, fn. 13.)23 'Where, however, he does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance,......
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Dodson, In re
...right of allocution. See id., at 500, 94 S.Ct. at 2704; Groppi v. Leslie, supra, 404 U.S. at 504, 92 S.Ct. at 587; Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 987 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161, 94 S.Ct. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 115 (1974). Under due process concepts, it is appropriate not only to all......
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Boardman v. Estelle
...prior to sentencing, not an affirmative denial of the defendant's personal right of allocution.We also grazed this issue in Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161, 94 S.Ct. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 115 (1974), holding that a contemnor's right to be heard in his own d......
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U.S. v. Alvarez
...of the relationship....33 Of course, the district court may exclude persons who attempt to disrupt the trial. See Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 984 n. 21 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161, 94 S.Ct. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 115 (1974). The court also may exclude, if necessary, persons whose ......