Weiss v. City of L.A.

Citation206 Cal.Rptr.3d 213,2 Cal.App.5th 194
Decision Date08 August 2016
Docket NumberB259868
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesCody WEISS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Thomas S. Peters, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Ronald S. Whitaker, Assistant City Attorney and Gerald Masahiro Sato, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant, City of Los Angeles.

Manatt, Phelps & Philips and Michael M. Berger, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant Xerox Business Services, LLC.

Ahdoot & Wolfson and Theodore Walter Maya, West Hollywood; Zimmerman Reed, Caleb Lucas–Hansen Marker, Manhattan Beach, and Bradley Christopher Buhrow for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WILLHITE

, J.

When a person challenges a parking citation, the Vehicle Code provides three potential levels of review: initial review, administrative hearing, and de novo appeal to the superior court. (Veh. Code, §§ 40215, subds. (a)

-(c), 40230, subds. (a),

(d)

.)1 As to the initial review, section 40215, subdivision (a)

provides, in substance, that the request for initial review is made to “the issuing agency,” that the “issuing agency shall cancel” the citation if certain specified circumstances are satisfied, and that [t]he issuing agency shall advise the processing agency, if any, of the cancellation.”

In this appeal by the City of Los Angeles (City) and Xerox Business Services, Inc. (Xerox) from the trial court's grant of petitioner Cody Weiss' petition for a writ of mandate, we consider whether the City, as the “issuing agency” for notice of parking violations in the City (see § 40202), must conduct the “initial review” of challenged citations (§ 40215, subd. (a)

), or whether it may delegate that duty to Xerox, its “processing agency” (§ 40200.6, subd. (a)) with which it contracts “for the processing of notices of parking violations” (§ 40200.5, subd. (a)).2 Based on the language of section 40215, subdivision (a) and relevant legislative history, we hold, as did the trial court, that the City is required to conduct the initial review, and cannot contract with Xerox to perform that duty. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate. We also affirm the trial court's award of approximately $722,000 in attorney fees to Weiss pursuant to the California private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

BACKGROUND3

I. Weiss' Citation and Petition

In March 2012, Weiss received a parking citation for a violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 80.69(c), for exceeding a two-hour posted time limit on La Jolla Avenue in Los Angeles. Weiss timely contested the citation by filing an online statement claiming his vehicle “was not parked ... in excess of two hours.” He provided no evidence to support his statement; he simply “decline[d] responsibility” for the parking violation, and “request[ed] that this citation be dismissed immediately.” In April 2012, after an initial review performed by Xerox, Weiss received a letter advising him that an initial review had been performed and the citation would not be cancelled. Although Weiss could have sought administrative review of this denial, he did not. Instead, he paid the $55 citation.

In January 2013, Weiss filed the instant petition seeking a writ of mandate directing the City and Xerox to provide a legally sufficient initial review, in compliance with section 40215, subdivision (a)

, once an alleged violator exercises his or her right to challenge a parking citation under that statute.4

II. First Trial Phase

The trial court bifurcated the trial on the issues raised by Weiss' petition. In the first phase of the trial, the trial court deferred the question whether Xerox, a processing agency, was authorized by section 40215

to perform initial reviews. Rather, the court first considered only Weiss' claim that the initial review process, as currently constituted, did not comply with the statutory obligations of the initial review under the Vehicle Code, in that (among other assertions) it was too rigid and did not provide sufficient discretion to dismiss citations. As most of the evidence presented in this phase of the trial is largely immaterial to the issues on appeal, we summarize only certain portions.

Since 1985, the City has contracted with Xerox to act as its processing agency. As part of Xerox's processing duties, the City delegates the duty under section 40215, subdivision (a)

to conduct the initial review of contested citations. Xerox is paid based on the number of parking citations processed per month, but does not receive additional compensation to conduct initial reviews.

Xerox performs the initial reviews through its Parking Violations Bureau (Bureau), which is staffed by a subcontractor. About five percent of parking citations issued by the City result in a request for an initial review. In fiscal year 2013, Xerox conducted 135,291 initial reviews.

The initial review is conducted by Bureau clerks, who must adhere to 46 Business Processing Rules (BPR), drafted by the City (or by Xerox and approved by the City). Each BPR contains scenarios regarding common complaints and specific types of citations (e.g., citations involving parking meters, disabled person placards and license plates, and residential parking permits). Clerks receive training on the BPRs when hired, when BPRs are changed, and at weekly meetings. The City also issues memoranda to provide guidance.

When considering a contested citation, the Bureau clerk refers to the applicable BPR, if any; if that BPR permits dismissal of a citation, the clerk dismisses it. If no BPR addresses the particular challenge, but a motorist has presented sufficient evidence to overcome a citation, clerks are instructed to refer the matter to a supervisor for a decision. The motorist learns the result of the initial review through one of 97 form letters drafted and approved by the City, on City letterhead, sent to the motorist by Xerox.

Considering this (and other) evidence, the court concluded that, setting aside the issue whether Xerox was authorized to conduct the initial review, the City's system of initial review complied with the Vehicle Code requirements in the scope of the review, in the fairness of its procedure to the motorist, and in the fairness of its substantive decision-making process.

III. Second Trial Phase

In the second phase of the trial, the trial court considered the question at issue in this appeal: whether section 40215, subdivision (a)

requires that the City, as the issuing agency, conduct the initial review, rather than its processing agency, Xerox. At the court's request, the parties briefed the issue extensively. In its ruling, the court reviewed the statutory framework, its legislative history (including pertinent existing, amended and repealed Vehicle Code sections), and case law. Conceding that the question was close, the court concluded that changes to the statutory scheme in 1995 reflected the Legislature's intent to place a nondelegable duty to perform the initial review under section 40215, subdivision (a) on the City, the public agency that issues parking citations.

In September 2014, after Weiss dismissed his remaining claims, the court entered judgment in Weiss' favor.5 The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, ordering the City, as the issuing agency, to conduct the initial review of contested parking citations, pursuant to section 40215, subdivision (a)

, and “not to contract, subcontract, or otherwise delegate [its] duty to make such initial review decisions to any other entity or ‘processing agency’....” Xerox was permanently enjoined from making initial review decisions as described in section 40215, subdivision (a).

IV. Attorney Fees

After extensive post-trial briefing, Weiss was awarded $721,994.81 in attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general fee statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5

. The City and Xerox timely appealed from the judgment and order awarding attorney fees. We consolidated the appeals.

DISCUSSION6

I. The Writ of Mandate
A. Standing

Before considering the principal issue in this case—whether section 40215, subdivision (a)

requires the City, as the issuing agency, to perform the initial review of contested parking citations—we must first consider Xerox's contention that Weiss lacks standing to seek a writ of mandate.7

A traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085

is a way to compel a public entity to perform a legal, typically ministerial, duty. Under this statute, the trial court reviews an administrative action to determine if an agency's action “was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy, unlawful [or] procedurally unfair.... [Citations.] ‘Although mandate will not lie to control a public agency's discretion, that is to say, force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion. [Citation.] (Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 987, 995, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, fn. omitted.)

“As a general rule, a party must be ‘beneficially interested’ to seek a writ of mandate. [Citation.] ‘The requirement that a petitioner be “beneficially interested” has been generally interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the person has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.... [Citations.] (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 165, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 254 P.3d 1005

(Save the Plastic Bag ).) “The beneficial interest must be direct and substantial. [Citations.] (Ibid . )

In the instant case, Weiss unsuccessfully challenged his own parking citation at the initial review, then elected to pay the fine rather than pursue further appeal. Given his choice to pay the...

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