Weiss v. City Univ. of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | 17-CV-3557 (VSB) |
| Parties | FAIGY RACHEL WEISS, Plaintiff, v. CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Faigy Rachel Weiss
Brooklyn, NY
Pro se Plaintiff
Erin Patricia Kandel
Steven Leon Banks
Office of the New York State Attorney General
New York, NY
Plaintiff Faigy Rachel Weiss brings this action against the City University of New York ("CUNY"), the members of the CUNY Board of Trustees, Hunter College, the Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College (the "Silberman School"), James Milliken, Nireata D. Seals, John Rose, Jennifer Raab, Roberta Nord, and the current New York Attorney General in her official capacity and former New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman in his individual capacity, asserting myriad claims stemming from the denial of her application for admission to the Masters of Social Work Program (the "MSW Program") at the Silberman School. Before me is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
1. Background1
On February 1, 2015, Plaintiff—who was raised in the Satmar community of New York, a Hasidic Jewish Community—submitted an application for admission to the MSW Program. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58-59, 74.)2 In response to optional questions in the application regarding race and ethnicity, Plaintiff did not identify her race or ethnicity. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.) However, in her personal statement submitted as part of the application, Plaintiff identified herself as Jewish and "described her upbringing in the Satmar community." (Id. ¶ 79.) Elsewhere in her application, Plaintiff disclosed that she is a United States citizen and that her native language is Yiddish. (Id. ¶ 78.)
On March 23, 2015, the Silberman School invited Plaintiff to attend a group admissions interview. (Id. ¶ 81.) On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff attended the interview, along with seven other applicants "of different races and ethnicities, including African-American, Hispanic, Asian and white-skinned people." (Id. ¶¶ 83-84.) During the interview, an unidentified interviewer allegedly asked Plaintiff two questions that were not asked of the other applicants. (Id. ¶ 87.) The interviewer asked Plaintiff, "Why don't you apply to the special education school?" and "How would you handle people who are different to you?" (Id. ¶¶ 88-89.)
On April 28, 2015, Plaintiff was notified by letter that her application to the MSWProgram was denied. (Id. ¶ 93.) The letter did not include a reason for the denial. (Id.) Based on an email sent prior to the denial letter by Defendant Seals, the Director of Enrollment Services for the Silberman School ("Director Seals"), Plaintiff claims that Director Seals made the decision to deny Plaintiff's application. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 90.)
After receiving notification of the denial of her application, Plaintiff complained to certain CUNY officials about alleged discrimination in the admissions process. On December 7, 2015, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Rose, the Dean for Diversity and Compliance and Title IX Coordinator at Hunter College ("Dean Rose"), asserting that the MSW Program had discriminated against her on the basis of her religion and an unspecified disability. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 94.) Plaintiff subsequently met with Dean Rose on three separate occasions, on December 23, 2015, January 27, 2016, and February 1, 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 97, 101.) During the second meeting, Dean Rose purportedly told Plaintiff that (1) he "did not think the Silberman School had discriminated against [Plaintiff] on the basis of religion"; (2) "[t]he Silberman School conducted the group admission interviews to weed out conservatives, because Trumps and Cruzes can't be social workers"; (3) "Jews from religious backgrounds are too conservative to be social workers"; (4) "[t]he interviewer had asked [Plaintiff] additional questions to 'help' the [Plaintiff]"; and (5) Plaintiff "could take classes as a non-matriculating student, so that the Silberman School could assess how [she] would 'fit in'". (Id. ¶ 98.)
On March 2, 2016, Defendant Raab, the President of Hunter College ("President Raab"), notified Plaintiff by letter that Hunter College denied Plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory treatment. (Id. ¶ 106.) On April 6, 2016, Plaintiff appealed President Raab's decision to the Office of the CUNY Chancellor, who at all relevant times was Defendant Milliken. (Id. ¶ 107.) On April 28, 2016, Defendant Nord, the University Director of Student Advocacy ("DirectorNord"), sent Plaintiff a letter denying the claim of discriminatory treatment, stating that "the group interview 'follows uniform guidelines which have been in place for some time and were not altered or adjusted prior to your interview.'" (Id. ¶¶ 46, 108-11.) Director Nord's letter "reiterated the offer to [Plaintiff] that she could take classes as a non-matriculating student for free." (Id. ¶ 111.)
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 11, 2017 by filing a complaint and request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docs. 1, 2.) On June 6, 2017, I granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis but, pursuant to a review of the initial complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity Plaintiff's (1) § 1981 and § 1983 claims asserted against CUNY, the CUNY Board of Trustees, Hunter College, and the Silberman School, and (2) the § 1981 and § 1983 claims for money damages asserted against Defendants Rose, Raab, Seals, and Nord in their official capacities. (Doc. 5.) I also dismissed Plaintiff's Title VI claims against Defendants Rose, Raab, Seals, and Nord. (Id.)
In response to Defendants' proposed motion to dismiss the remaining claims, and following discussions with the parties during a pre-motion conference, I instructed Plaintiff to file her Amended Complaint by December 11, 2017. (Doc. 24.) On December 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a letter seeking an extension of the deadline to file her Amended Complaint until February 9, 2018, (Doc. 25), which I granted, (Doc. 26). On February 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a letter seeking a second extension of the deadline to file her Amended Complaint, until April 13, 2018, (Doc. 27), which I granted, (Doc. 29). On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 31.)
On May 3, 2018, I entered an order setting a briefing schedule for Defendants'anticipated motion to dismiss, directing Defendants to file their motion by June 19, 2018, Plaintiff to file her opposition by August 20, 2018, and Defendants to file any reply by September 11, 2018. (Doc. 33.) On June 19, 2018, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss and documents in support. (Docs. 36-38.) On June 27, 2018, I entered an Order of Service directing the U.S. Marshals Service to serve the newly-named Defendants—James Milliken, the CUNY Board of Trustees, and Eric T. Schneiderman—in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. 41.) On August 13, 2018, the newly-named Defendants filed a notice of motion indicating that they joined in the motion to dismiss filed by the original Defendants on June 19. (Doc. 47.) On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff requested an extension of time, until October 19, to file her opposition, (Doc. 50), which I granted, (Doc. 51). On October 17, 2018, Plaintiff requested a second extension of time to file her opposition, (Doc. 54), to which Defendants objected, (Doc. 55). In light of the multiple extensions previously granted, I denied Plaintiff's request for a 60-day extension of time and directed Plaintiff to file her opposition by November 16, 2018. (Doc. 56.) On November 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed her opposition. (Doc. 57.) On December 7, 2018, Defendants filed their reply and a declaration in support. (Docs. 60-61.)
III. Legal Standards
"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). "To survive a defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing, plaintiffs must allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that they have standing to sue." Kiryas Joel Alliance v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 495 F. App'x 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (internal quotation marks omitted). Inconsidering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Buday v. N.Y. Yankees P'ship, 486 F. App'x 894, 895-96 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). A plaintiff, as the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing standing as the proper party to bring the lawsuit. See Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine & Trading, Inc., 697 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2012). When a defendant "moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), as well as on other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined." United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))....
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