Weiss v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor

• Decision Date: 24 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–CV–2603 (JFB)(ETB).,10–CV–2603 (JFB)(ETB).
• Citation: 762 F.Supp.2d 560
• Parties: Patricia WEISS, Plaintiff,v.INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF SAG HARBOR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

762 F.Supp.2d 560

Patricia WEISS, Plaintiff,

v.INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF SAG HARBOR, et al., Defendants.

No. 10–CV–2603 (JFB)(ETB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Jan. 24, 2011.

Patricia A. Weiss, Patricia Weiss, Esq., Sag Harbor, NY, pro se.Maureen T. Liccione, Christopher D. Palmieri, Laurel R. Kretzing, Jaspan Schesinger Hoffman, LLP, Garden City, NY, for Defendants.

memorandum and order

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Patricia Weiss (“plaintiff” or “Weiss”) commenced this action on June 8, 2010, against defendants Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor (“Village” or “Sag Harbor”), Sag Harbor Village Board of Trustees (“Board of Trustees”), Mayor Brian Gilbride (“Gilbride”), Trustee Edward J. Gregory, Trustee Robby Stein, Trustee Timothy Culver, Trustee Tiffany Scarlato (“Scarlato”) and Does 1–5 (collectively, “defendants”), alleging various violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the gravaman of plaintiff's complaint is that defendants have violated her rights by allowing non-lawyers to serve as justices, with the power to incarcerate individuals appearing before them, in the newly-created Sag Harbor Village Justice Court. Plaintiff also contends that her rights have been violated through a number of defendants' actions that were incidental to the creation of the Village Justice Court. Plaintiff seeks both injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants. Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she lacks standing to bring the action, that her claims are not ripe for adjudication, and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety as it relates to plaintiff's federal claims. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff's complaint seeks to assert state-law claims, the Court declines in its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims, given that none of the federal claims survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, the Court also dismisses plaintiff's state-law claims (without prejudice to re-filing such claims in state court).

I. Background

A. Facts ¹

Plaintiff Patricia Weiss is an attorney who resides in the Village of Sag Harbor, located in Suffolk County, New York. (Compl. ¶ 1.) According to the complaint, in or about 2005, the Village began taking steps to establish a Justice Court for Sag Harbor. ( Id. ¶¶ 17–20.) Specifically, in May 2005, defendants Gilbride and Scarlato, both members of the Sag Harbor Board of Trustees, circulated a nominating petition that, inter alia, included the name for a judicial candidate, Roger Walker, who was not a lawyer. ( Id. ¶ 20.) In addition, in December 2005, the Village entered into a $50,000 contract with a company that would “ ‘coordinate and provide [various enumerated] products and services to establish, organize and implement a Justice Court for [the] Village of Sag Harbor and to integrate the Judiciary Branch into the Village and Village Government.’ ” ( Id. ¶ 17.) However, because the nominating petition was circulated before the Village passed any resolution creating the office of Village Justice ( id. ¶ 19), plaintiff brought an Article 78 petition challenging the Village's actions. ( Id. ¶ 21.) In June 2006, prior to the general election, a Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice “effectively cancelled the election for Village Justice,” after concluding that “ ‘the office of village justice for the Village of Sag Harbor was never ‘established’ as contemplated by Village Law § 3–301(2)(a).' ” ( Id.)

Subsequently, on June 27, 2006, the Village held a special meeting and passed a resolution that, inter alia, approved the creation of the Office of Village Justice. ( Id. ¶ 22.) At that time, the Board of Trustees “stated an intention to operate out of the [Village] Municipal Building,” but, according to the complaint, did not obtain an appropriate Environmental Assessment Form, as required by the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”). ( Id.) Plaintiff attempted to collect a sufficient number of voter signatures in order to petition for a public vote but was hampered from doing so by a Village law that “prohibited Plaintiff from leaving any ‘unsolicited print material’ on the doorstep of any resident of the Village.” ( Id. ¶ 23.) After the Village amended the law to make it a misdemeanor to leave any such unsolicited written documents on a home's doorstep, plaintiff brought a second Article 78 action in October 2006, this time challenging the Village's “unconstitutional interference with Plaintiff's ability to collect signatures for a referendum.” ( Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) However, plaintiff's action was ultimately dismissed as moot after the Village informed the state court that it had “abandoned the idea of a Village Justice Court and would not be pursuing it.” ( Id. ¶ 26.)

Several years later, in October 2009, the Board of Trustees revisited the idea of creating a Village Justice Court. ( Id. ¶ 27.) The Village prepared a proposed resolution to create the office of Village Justice and scheduled a public hearing on the matter for February 6, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 30.) At the hearing, which carried over to a second day on March 9, 2010 ( id.), defendant Gilbride explained what he envisioned the responsibilities of the Justice Court would be and where the Court would be housed. ( Id. ¶¶ 33–42.) In particular, Gilbride noted that the Justice Court would handle “lower level” tickets and offenses, rather than felonies, and would operate on a part-time basis. ( Id. ¶ ¶ 38–41.) Additionally, he explained that the courtroom would be located at the Village Municipal Building in the same meeting room used by all of the Village Boards, with the Mayor's office available to the Justices and the Trustee's room available to the court clerk. ( Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) Defendant Culver also added that no physical alterations were needed to the room or the building in order to begin the operation of the court. ( Id. ¶ 35.)

On May 11, 2010, the Board of Trustees passed the resolution authorizing the enactment of Local Law # 5 and creating the offices of Village Justice and Acting Village Justice. ( Id. ¶¶ 49, 51.) At the time the complaint was filed, no Village Justices had yet been elected or appointed and the Justice Court had not begun operations.²

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on June 8, 2010. On September 13, 2010, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff filed her opposition to defendants' motion on October 11, 2010, and defendants filed their reply on October 25, 2010. The Court heard oral argument on December 20, 2010. This motion is fully submitted, and the Court has considered all of the submissions and arguments of the parties.

II. Standard of Review

Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court “must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, but we are not to draw inferences from the complaint favorable to plaintiffs.” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Moreover, the court “may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue, but we may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements contained in the affidavits.” Id. (citations omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir.2005).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court instructed district courts to first “identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal...