Weiss v. Musical Mut. Protective Union
Decision Date | 03 January 1899 |
Docket Number | 183 |
Citation | 189 Pa. 446,42 A. 118 |
Parties | Andrew G. Weiss and Charles A. Young v. The Musical Mutual Protective Union and J. M. Allen, Thomas J. Welsh, Charles Gernert, Gustav Espy, Chas. W. Gaston, James Holley, Joseph Pannella, J. V. Yost, John M. Muller, John Hoffman, John S. Brecht, Wm. P. Schwartz and Jacob Sauerwein, constituting the Board of Directors |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued November 9, 1898 [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal, No. 183, Oct. T., 1898, by defendants, from order of C.P. No. 3, Allegheny Co., May T., 1898, No. 382, issuing writ of peremptory mandamus. Affirmed.
Petition for mandamus.
The case was tried by the court without a jury. KENNEDY, P.J filed the following opinion:
This is an application to compel by writ of mandamus the restoration of plaintiffs to membership in the Musical Mutual Protective Union, defendant, which is a corporation under the laws of Pennsylvania, organized for the "promotion of music and to unite the instrumental portion of the musical profession for the better protection of its interests in general," of which corporation the plaintiffs were members in good standing up to the time of their expulsion complained of in these proceedings. At the time of the expulsion of plaintiffs the membership of the organization was over four hundred, and it had a surplus fund of over $5,000.
It seems to be well settled that courts have power to supervise the acts of corporations, the principle being thus stated in Burt v. Grand Lodge, 66 Mich. 85: "The only ground on which this court can interfere with organized bodies by mandamus in aid of a member is that, as corporations, they are subject to our judicial oversight, to prevent their depriving members of corporate privileges." This principle certainly obtains where, as in this case, property rights are involved. Let us see whether such a case is presented here as justifies the court in interfering. It must be stated here, that by agreement filed, counsel for both parties waived the right of trial by jury, and also the question raised in the answer filed as to the right of plaintiffs to jointly maintain this proceeding.
At a meeting of the respondent corporation held December 5, 1897, the following preamble and resolution were adopted, viz:
A copy of the manifesto referred to in the foregoing preamble and resolution is as follows, viz:
At a meeting of the board of directors of respondent, held January 23, 1898, the secretary was instructed to prefer charges against plaintiffs, and on February 14, 1898, each of the plaintiffs received notice to appear before the board on Sunday, February 20, 1898, to answer charges preferred by the secretary, of violation of article 2 of the constitution of the corporation, but no copy of the charges accompanied the notice. Plaintiffs appeared in response to said notice, and at the meeting the charges were read to plaintiffs, the same being as follows:
At this meeting one witness was called, who stated he had received a copy of the manifesto. No other testimony was taken, and no action was taken, the plaintiffs protesting that they had not received any proper notice. On February 28, the plaintiffs each received another notice to appear before the board on Sunday, March 20, to answer charges preferred by Thomas J. Welsh, secretary, of violation of article 2 of the constitution, inclosing a copy of the charges, as given last above, signed by the secretary, but the notice was not accompanied by copy of the manifesto. Plaintiffs appeared in response to this notice. At this meeting a copy of the manifesto was produced, which the petitioners admitted they had signed, but no testimony was taken, nor was there any effort made to show that the manifesto was circulated by plaintiffs, or that it tended to disrupt or destroy the union, or cause the withdrawal of members, nor, indeed, was there anything tending to sustain the charges against plaintiffs, and they, after protesting as before, withdrew from the meeting. The matter was then dropped, but subsequently at the same meeting, and without passing upon the guilt or innocence of the plaintiffs of the offense charged, a resolution was passed erasing the names of the plaintiffs from the roll of membership of the union. At this meeting there were present eight of the members of the board, and while no votes were cast against the resolution of erasure, it is very doubtful that the requisite two thirds of those present were cast in its favor. Brecht, one of those present, says he did not vote; Welsh, the secretary, and nominally the prosecutor, says he did not vote. Allen, the president, says he only voted when there was a tie -- and it also appears plainly that he had prejudged the case and was disqualified to vote.
Can the proceeding here recited be properly called a trial in which were involved the rights and privileges of the plaintiffs? And can it be said that...
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...or effective trial or appeal. See Heasley v. Operative P. & C. F. I. Ass'n, 1936, 324 Pa. 257, 188 A. 206; Weiss v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 1899, 189 Pa. 446, 42 A. 118. This includes those situations in which a member is not given due notice, right of hearing or review (See e.g. Lab......
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