Wel Cos. v. Haldex Brake Prods. Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:19-cv-912
• Parties: WEL COMPANIES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. HALDEX BRAKE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

467 F.Supp.3d 545

WEL COMPANIES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff,

v.HALDEX BRAKE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Case No. 2:19-cv-912

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed June 16, 2020

Filed June 17, 2020

Philip S. Heebsh, Toledo, OH, Nicholas Adair, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH, for Plaintiff.

Kelly E. Mulrane, Marc S. Blubaugh, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, LLP, Columbus, OH, Steven G. Emerson, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas H. Davis, Pro Hac Vice, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The following matters are before the Court: Plaintiff WEL Companies, Incorporated's ("Plaintiff" or "WEL") Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint Instanter (ECF No. 83), Defendant Haldex Brake Products Corporation's ("Defendant" or "Haldex") Motion in Limine (ECF No. 74), and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 47, 93).¹ The motions are ripe for review. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint Instanter (ECF No. 83) is GRANTED , Defendant's Motion in Limine (ECF No. 74) is DENIED , and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 47, 93) is GRANTED in part and DENTED in part .

I.

Plaintiff is a Wisconsin corporation that provides transportation, logistics, and warehousing services. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 70.) Defendant is a Missouri corporation that manufactures and sells brake systems and air suspension systems for heavy trucks and trailers. (Id. ¶ 2.) This case arises out of an incident that occurred on January 30, 2018 on I-70 Westbound in Columbus, Ohio. (Id. ¶ 5.)

On January 30, 2018, Plaintiff's driver, Christopher Cox, was driving a truck hauling a trailer of beer that he had picked up at a Budweiser distribution center in Columbus, Ohio. (Cox Dep. 21,23–27, ECF No. 94-1.) The trailer had a Haldex Gold Seal brake chamber that Defendant manufactured. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8, ECF No. 93.) While driving on I-70, Mr. Cox noticed that "the brake seemed like it was pushing back a little" and "dragging" and the "truck was not rolling like it normally does." (Cox Dep. 21, 23–27.) Mr. Cox stopped and called Plaintiff's night dispatcher Leo Martinez. (Id. ) Mr. Martinez recommended Mr. Cox drive to the Travel America truck stop about fifteen miles down I-70. (Id. )

Mr. Cox drove toward the truck stop but stopped when he heard a popping noise and saw smoke coming from the rear of the truck. (Id. ) Mr. Cox found the left rear inside of the tractor was on fire. (Id. ) He attempted to put the fire out with a fire extinguisher but was unsuccessful. (Id. ) The fire damaged the tractor, the trailer, and the cargo of beer. (Id. )

Plaintiff alleges, based on expert Hernan Mercado-Curujo's testimony, that the origin of the fire was a defective spring within the Gold Seal brake chamber. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 3, ECF No. 96, hereinafter "Pl.’s Resp." (citing Mercado Dep. 12–13, ECF No. 96-1 ("[T]he scope of my analysis is the fire origin and cause. And I have, of course, identified the spring as the one component that broke and started this whole thing.").)) Plaintiff also relies on Christopher Jamieson's testimony that "based on [his] background as an engineer in brake chamber design working for Haldex, working on these products, [he] know[s] there is a defect in the spring design." (Jamieson Dep. 16, No. 96-2.) Mr. Jamieson explained that "[t]he spring in its installed state is too highly stressed ... [a]nd during the normal course of its life, once the paint degrades because of the installed state it [has] the coil stack very close ..." (Id. ) Mr. Jamieson also stated Defendant knew about the defect but did not change it because of the cost. (Id. at 21.)

Plaintiff also provides Defendant's lab reports dating back to 2014 analyzing the brake chamber. (See Pl.’s Resp. at Ex 5.) The lab reports raise concerns about spring failures and propensity to "corrosion pitting leading to fatigue crack failure." (See id. ) Additionally, Plaintiff provides Haldex employees’ emails noting that other motor carriers were also experiencing issues with Haldex Gold Seal brake chambers. (See id. at Exs. 6–9.) The emails referred to "hot brakes," an "explosion," "potential chamber issues," "thermal events," and "destruction due to fire." (Id. )

Plaintiff sued Defendant alleging three claims: (1) negligent design, manufacture, inspection, and/or construction of the brake chamber that malfunctioned in the WEL truck; (2) breach of express or implied warranty that the brakes would be free of defects, merchantable, and fit for the ordinary purpose for which brake systems are used; and (3) strict liability for a defective product and failure to conform to express or implied warranties. (See First Am. Compl.) On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint which withdrew an allegation about the spring and also withdrew Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut ("Travelers") from the lawsuit. (See Mot. Leave File First Am. Compl. Instanter, ECF No. 64, hereinafter "Mot. Am.") Plaintiff originally included Travelers as a plaintiff because Plaintiff believed Travelers would be required to reimburse Plaintiff for some of the damage. (See id. ) Plaintiff subsequently discovered, however, that it had incurred the damages directly and Travelers would not be required to reimburse it. (See id. )

Plaintiff states:

WEL is seeking recovery of economic damages in several forms: (1) WEL's lost earnings which resulted from the destruction of the trailer and significant damage to the tractor, (2) costs incurred in cleaning up the scene, (3) costs incurred for towing the destroyed trailer and damaged tractor away from the scene, (4) storage costs incurred following the incident, and (5) disposal costs. WEL also seeks recovery of compensatory damages which arise from (1) physical damage to the tractor, (2) physical destruction of the WEL trailer, and (3) destruction of the cargo of Anheuser Busch contained therein.

(Pl.’s Resp. at 6.)

The Court will first address Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, then Defendant's motion in limine, and finally, Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

II.

Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding motions for leave to amend a complaint. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy , 916 F.2d 1119, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990). A party can amend their pleading once "as a matter of course" within "21 days after serving it" or if the pleading requires a response, "21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1). After this time has passed, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's consent or by leave of court. Id. at 15(a)(2). "[L]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Id. Rule 15 maintains a "liberal standard of permitting amendments to ensure the determination of claims on their merits." Mahdy v. Mason Sch. Dist. , No. 1:16-cv-845, 2017 WL 25504, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2017) (citing Marks v. Shell Oil Co., 830 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1987) ).

Additionally, when a case has a scheduling order, Rule 16 provides that, "[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. Pro 16(b)(4). In determining whether good cause exists, the primary consideration is the moving party's diligence in attempting to meet the scheduling order's requirements. Commerce Benefits Grp., Inc. v. McKesson Corp. , 326 F. App'x 369, 377 (6th Cir. 2009).

Here, the time has passed for an amendment as a matter of course and Defendant has not consented to the amendment. Thus, Plaintiff must obtain leave of this Court. Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the complaint to add a claim under the Ohio Products Liability Act ("OPLA") and to include punitive damages in its relief sought. (See Mot. Am.)

Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion arguing: (1) there has been undue delay; (2) the amendment causes undue prejudice; and (3) Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure the deficiencies in its complaint. (Def.’s Mem. Opp'n Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Second Am. Compl. Instanter, ECF No. 91, hereinafter "Def.’s Resp. Mot. Am.")

1. Delay

"Denial of a motion to amend a complaint may be appropriate where there is: undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant." Morse v. McWhorter , 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) ). "Ordinarily, [however,] delay alone, does not justify denial of leave to amend." Id. ; see also Moore v. Paducah , 790 F.2d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversing the district court's denial of a motion for leave to amend, concluding that while there was undue delay, the prejudice was so slight that "rejection of the amendment would preclude [the] plaintiff's opportunity to be heard on the merits on facts which [were] well known to the parties and which were pleaded at the outset"); Shy v. Navistar Int'l Corp. , 781 F.3d 820, 830 (6th Cir. 2015) ("In the context of a motion to amend a complaint, delay alone, ... without any specifically resulting prejudice, or any obvious design by dilatoriness to harass the opponent, should not suffice as reason for denial." (internal citations omitted)).

Defendant argues Plaintiff unduly delayed amending its complaint. (See Def.’s Resp. Mot. Am. at 2–7.) Defendant contends Plaintiff was aware of two previous lawsuits against Haldex raising similar claims, and thus, should have included punitive damages in its first complaint. (Id. at 2.) Additionally, Defendant contends the discovery Plaintiff relies on to support amending the complaint occurred well before the motion was filed. (Id. ) Finally, Defendant argues good cause has not been shown to modify the scheduling order. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff, in contrast, argues it has not unduly delayed seeking this...