Welborn v. Illinois Nat. Cas. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 May 1952 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 52F7 |
| Citation | 347 Ill.App. 65,106 N.E.2d 142 |
| Parties | WELBORN v. ILLINOIS NAT. CAS. CO. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Johnson & Johnson, Belleville, for appellant.
Goldenhersh & Goldenhersh, E. St. Louis, for appellee.
The plaintiff, Hugh Welborn, operates a garage in which automobiles are repaired. The defendant, Illinois National Casualty Company, insured him against liability for bodily injury (Coverage A) and property damage (Coverage B) arising out of operation of the garage. This court is called upon to decide whether the policy applies under the following facts:
Rufus Brown brought an automobile to plaintiff's garage, where it was destroyed by fire while undergoing repairs. In a suit against Hugh Welborn, he was held liable upon the ground that the damage was caused by the negligence of his agent and servant in repairing the car. The judgment was affirmed in this court, Brown v. Welborn, 338 Ill.App. 507, 88 N.E.2d 104.
The policy defines the operations covered and states the company will pay such sums as the insured may become liable to pay because of liability arising out of such operations. The definition follows, italics ours:
'The ownership, maintenance, occupation, or use of the premises herein designated, including the public ways immediately adjoining, for the purpose of an automobile dealer or repair shop, and all operations either on the premises or elsewhere which are necessary and incidental thereto, including repairs of automobiles or their parts, and ordinary repairs of buildings on the premises and the mechanical equipment thereof; and the ownership, maintenance, or use of any automobile for any purpose in connection with the above defined operations, and also for pleasure use.'
The policy also stated a list of 'Exclusions' of which the following is the basis of this controversy: 'This policy does not apply: Under Coverage B, to property owned by, rented to, in charge, of, or transported by the insured.'
The precise wording of the general exclusion provision appears to be in direct conflict with the specifically defined operations which are declared covered. For example, it excludes property owned by the insured, while the specific coverage includes ownership of an automobile, used in other operations and even for pleasure use.
Appellant relies upon the exclusion of property 'in charge of' the insured. We note that the policy purports to cover liability arising out of the repair of an automobile, and expressly includes operations on the premises. We agree with appellant that, when a car is on the premises undergoing repairs, it is in charge of the insured in some sense of the words. Thus, it again appears that the exclusion conflicts with defined coverage.
In a case of this kind, there are two well recognized principles of construction of contracts which are pertinent. First, if the literal interpretation of one provision of an insurance policy results in an unreasonable or absurd result, and substantially defeats the object and purpose of the entire contract, it will be rejected and treated as inoperative. 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, Sec. 163; 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 298.
Second, the same authorities, and many others, assert the general contract rule of construction that the court...
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