Welch v. Mandeville
| Citation | 4 L.Ed. 79,1 Wheat. 233,14 U.S. 233 |
| Parties | WELCH v. MANDEVILLE |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1816 |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
ERROR to the circuit court for the district of Columbia for Alexandria county. This was an action of covenant brought in the name of Welch (for the use of Prior) against Mandeville and Jamieson. The suit abated as to Jamieson by a return of no inhabitant. The defendant, Mandeville, filed two pleas. The second plea, upon which the question in this court arises, states, that, on the 5th of July, 1806, James Welch impleaded Mandeville and Jamieson, in the circuit court of the district of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria, in an action of covenant, in which suit such proceedings were had, that, afterwards, to wit, at a session of the circuit court, on the 31st day of December, 1807, 'the said James Welch came into court and acknowledged that he would not farther prosecute his said suit, and from thence altogether withdraw himself.' The plea then avers, that the said James Welch, in the plea mentioned, is the same person in whose name the present suit is brought, and that the said Mandeville and Jamieson, in the former suit, are the same persons who are defendants in this suit, and that the cause of action is the same in both suits. To this plea the plaintiff filed a special replication, protesting that the said James Welch did not some into court and acknowledge that he would not farther prosecute the said suit and from thence altogether withdraw himself; and avers that James Welch, being indebted to Prior, in more than 8,707 dollars and 9 cents, and Mandeville and Jamieson being indebted, by virtue of the covenant in the declaration mentioned, in 8,707 dollars and 9 cents, to Welch, he, Welch, on the 7th of September, 1799, by an equitable assignment, assigned to Prior, for a full and valuable consideration, the said 8,707 dollars and 9 cents, in discharge of the said debt, of which assignment the replication avers Mandeville and Jamieson had notice. The replication farther avers, that the suit in the plea mentioned was brought in the name of Welch, as the nominal plaintiff for the use of Prior, and that the defendant, Mandeville, knew that the said suit was brought, and was depending for the use and benefit of the said Prior; and that the said suit in the plea mentioned, without the authority, consent, or knowledge of the said Prior, or of the attorney prosecuting the said suit, and without any previous application to the court, was 'dismissed, agreed.' The replication farther avers, that the said James Welch was not authorized by the said Prior to agree or dismiss the said suit in the plea mentioned; and that the said Joseph Mandeville, with whom the supposed agreement for the dismissal of the said suit was made, knew, at the time of making the said supposed agreement that the said James Welch had no authority from Prior to agree or dismiss said suit. The replication farther avers, that the said agreement and dismissal of the said suit were made and procured by the said Joseph Mandeville, with the intent to injure and defraud the said Prior, and deprive him of the benefit of the said suit in the plea mentioned. The replication also avers, that the said Prior did not know that the said suit was dismissed until after the adjournment of the court at which it was dismissed; and, farther, that the supposed entry upon the record of the court in said suit, that the plaintiff voluntarily came into court and acknowledged that he would not farther prosecute his said suit, and from thence altogether withdraw himself, and the judgment thereupon was made and entered by covin, collusion, and fraud; and that the said judgment was, and is,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
F.T.C. v. Ifc Credit Corp.
...that payments on the ERAs were for telecommunications services. (Complaint, ¶ 33). What Justice Story said in Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233, 14 U.S. 233, 236, 4 L.Ed. 79 (1816) fairly expresses the FTC's underlying theory about the ERAs: "It would be strange, indeed, if parties could be......
-
Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of Am. Corp.
...Law Pleading 731 n.77 (Callaghan & Co., 1914) (commenting, in reference to the Supreme Court's decision in Welch v. Mandeville , 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 233, 4 L.Ed. 79 (1816), that the "[r]ecord need not disclose real plaintiff" (italics omitted)).Eventually, jurisdictions began to abandon this......
-
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc.
...now take notice of assignments of choses in action, and exert themselves to afford them every support and protection.” Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233, 236, 4 L.Ed. 79. He added that courts of equity have “disregarded the rigid strictness of the common law, and protected the rights of the......
-
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, Docket No. 15-1134
...concerning the general assignment of causes of action is congruent with unusually well-established law. In Welch v. Mandeville , 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 233, 4 L.Ed. 79 (1816) (Story, J.), for example, the Supreme Court held that "[c]ourts of law, following ... the rules of equity, now take noti......