Welch v. The State, 12,460
| Citation | 3 N.E. 850, 104 Ind. 347 |
| Case Date | December 15, 1885 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
3 N.E. 850
104 Ind. 347
Welch
v.
The State
No. 12,460
Supreme Court of Indiana
December 15, 1885
From the Monroe Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed.
J. H. Louden and R. W. Miers, for appellant.
J. E. Henley, Prosecuting Attorney, and W. P. Rogers, for the State.
OPINION
[104 Ind. 348] Mitchell, J.
The indictment in this record charges, with proper formality, that on the 4th day of January, 1885, William Welch did feloniously, etc., kill and murder one Louis Fedder, by then and there feloniously, etc., "striking him, the said Louis Fedder, upon his head, with a dangerous and deadly weapon, to wit, a large, heavy club, which he, the said William Welch, had and held in his hands."
The only objection made to the indictment is that by the omission of the words "then and there," after the name of the accused as last above set out, it fails to allege that the defendant had the club in his hand at the time of the beating and striking. Within the ruling in Dennis v. State, 103 Ind. 142, 2 N.E. 349, there is no force in this objection.
The accused was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and his punishment fixed at imprisonment for life. His conviction rests largely, if not entirely, upon the testimony of one Matthew James, whose evidence relates wholly to alleged confessions or admissions made by the defendant to him.
[104 Ind. 349] Besides the testimony of James and some criminating circumstances of more or less weight, the evidence of the alleged confession, as detailed by this witness, is not altogether free from suspicion, and the circumstances under which it is said to have been made, and the not altogether unblemished reputation of the witness, as it is made to appear in the record, detract somewhat from the force and reasonableness of the confession as related by [3 N.E. 851] him. Notwithstanding this, considering the other circumstances which appear since the jury have passed upon it, we should hesitate to disturb their finding on the evidence.
The witness testified that the defendant made admissions to him indicative of his guilt, in the presence of Andrew Cooper and Charles Young. Both of these persons were called as witnesses for the defence, and both denied having heard anything of the kind testified to by James.
Cooper having testified on his direct examination that he heard no confession made by the defendant to James, and no talk between them about the murder of Fedder, was asked on cross-examination by counsel for the State this question: "I will ask you if, in the barber shop of William Profit, here in Bloomington, you did not say there that morning that you knew Bill Welch was the man that killed Louis Fedder."
To this question the appellant objected, for the reason that it was asking the witness for an opinion expressed by him out of hearing of defendant, and was not asking for a fact, and was not a cross-examination, which objection was overruled, and defendant excepted, and the witness answered, "I did not."
The State then asked the witness: "And if you did not say there that you were willing to bet $ 250 that Bill Welch was the guilty man?"
To this question the appellant again objected, for the reason stated. The objection was again overruled, and the witness answered, "I did not."
The State then called Wm. Profit, and asked him the following [104 Ind. 350] question: "State to the jury whether you heard him (Andy Cooper) make the remark that 'William Welch, or Bill Welch, is the man who murdered old man Fedder; I am not guessing at it, I know it.'"
To this the appellant objected, for the reason that the question was illegal and incompetent, and was hearsay evidence, and was an effort to impeach a witness on irrelevant and immaterial matter, and that the question referred to the opinion of an outside party, which objection the court overruled, and appellant excepted, and the witness answered, "Yes; he said that."
The State then asked the witness the following question: "I will ask you if he said then at the same time and place, 'I will bet,' or 'I am willing to bet $ 250 that he is the man.'"
To which question the appellant again objected, for the same reasons, which objection was again overruled, and defendant excepted, and the...
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State v. Kent, 6731
...and also to disprove defendants denials. Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 469; Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527; Ford v. State, 112 Ind. 373; Welch v. State, 104 Ind. 347; Whart Cr. 484. Whether as to time, evidence offered to show motive is too remote, depends entirely upon the nature of the evidence.......
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Dotterer v. State, 21,369
...... collateral, the test being, would the cross-examining party. be entitled to go into such matter in chief? If not, it is. collateral. Welch v. State (1885), 104 Ind. 347, 3 N.E. 850; Staser v. Hogan (1889),. 120 Ind. 207, 21 N.E. 911; George v. State. (1884), 16 Neb. 318, 20 N.W. 311. ......
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Dotterrer v. State, 21,369.
...the test being: Would the cross–examining party be entitled to go into such matter in chief? If not, it is collateral. Welch v. State, 104 Ind. 347, 3 N. E. 850; Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207, 21 N. E. 911, 22 N. E. 990; George v. State, 16 Neb. 318, 20 N. W. 311. The rule for requiring a r......
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Lane v. State
...1057]appellant's acts, as alleged in the indictment. Wood v. State, 92 Ind. 269, 270;Meiers v. State, 56 Ind. 336, 342;Welch v. State, 104 Ind. 347, 348, 3 N. E. 850. The offense charged, “murder in the first degree,” is clearly set forth in plain and concise language, without unnecessary r......