MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following the Entry of Default against defendants, Time Well Spent Express [TWS] and Willie James Crawford, II, (doc. 6),1 the court allowed plaintiff, Grady L. Welch, the opportunity to submit evidence supporting his claim for damages; the court also held a hearing on damages, at which Welch testified. Based on the Complaint, plaintiff's submissions, his hearing testimony, and the relevant law, the court finds Welch is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $123,886.31 from defendants Crawford and TWS.
I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT STANDARDS Defendants' default is deemed their "admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which [facts] by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant's liability." Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Edmonds, Civil Action No. 09-0089-WS-B, 2010WL 761332, *3 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2010)(internal quotations and citations omitted). "Stated differently, a default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim." Id. (quoting Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997))(internal quotations omitted). "The law is quite clear that a plaintiff seeking a default judgment is confined to the specific factual allegations and demands delineated in the Complaint. A default judgment does not give the plaintiff a blank check to recover from the defaulting defendant any losses it had ever suffered from whatever source. Rather, recovery is limited to the kind and amounts of losses set forth in the pleadings." Id. at *6 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Therefore, "a plaintiff seeking default judgment must show the Court what [his] damages are, how they are calculated, and where they come from." Patterson v. Walden, Civil Action No. 13-0109-WS-B, 2014 WL 852410, *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2014)(quoting PNCEF, LLC v. Hendricks Bldg. Supply LLC, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (S.D. Ala. 2010)). This court may not award damages without an evidentiary hearing or "demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts." Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1985)(quoting United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)). "Even in the default judgment context, '[a] court has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters.'" Chartis Aerospace Ins. Services, Inc. v. AUA, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-1087-JHH, 2013 WL 2249095, *6 (N.D. Ala. May 21, 2013)(quoting Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003), other citations omitted).
In his Complaint, plaintiff, Grady L. Welch, alleges the following facts:
6. In the early morning hours on January 12, 2012, Plaintiff Grady L. Welch was traveling North on U.S. Interstate 65 in Shelby County, Alabama[,] driving a tractor and tanker-trailer for Quality Carriers, Inc.[,] when he experienced a blowout of one of the rear exterior passenger[-]side tires on his tanker-trailer.
7. Mr. Welch pulled over to the right side of the interstate and into the emergency lane/shoulder where he parked his vehicle near mile marker 236.
8. Mr. Welch turned on all of the flashers on his vehicle and then exited his vehicle to place reflective triangles around his vehicle running from the rear of the tanker-trailer toward the front of his vehicle in accordance with the applicable policies and procedures governing such roadside situations for commercial drivers.
. . .
10. After determining that he could not repair the blown[-]out tire on his tanker-trailer by himself, Mr. Welch contacted Quality Carriers, Inc.[,] dispatch to request roadside assistance to repair the blown out tire so he could continue his delivery route. Quality Carriers, Inc.[,] dispatch informed Mr. Welch that it was sending a mechanic to his location to help him repair the blown[-]out tire and instructed Mr. Welch to wait for the mechanic to arrive. Mr. Welch got back into the tractor cab of his vehicle and sat in the driver's seat waiting for the mechanic to arrive.
11. Mr. Welch had locked down the wheels and had set/engaged the brakes on his vehicle as his vehicle and tanker-trailer sat in the emergency lane/shoulder on the right side of the interstate.
12. While Mr. Welch was waiting for the mechanic to arrive . . . in the cab of his tractor . . . with all of his flashers on and the reflective triangles properly placed around his vehicle, Defendant Willie James Crawford, II[,] .. . was driving a tractor and semi-trailer heading North on U.S. Interstate 65 in Shelby County, Alabama, just South of Mr. Welch's location.
13. Defendant Crawford was driving a commercial delivery route for Defendant Time Well Spent Express, LLC d/b/a TWS Express . . . at [that] time . . . .
14. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Crawford was an agent, employee, servant, representative, and/or affiliate of Defendant TWS Express and was acting and/or operating within the line and scope of said agency, employment, servitude, representation, and/or affiliation on the morning of January 12, 2012.
15. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Crawford had traveling with him in the TWS Express vehicle four (4) passengers: a twenty-two (22) year-old woman; a two and one-half (2 and ½) year-old boy; a one (1) year-old girl; and a three (3) month-old girl.
16. As Defendant Crawford and the TWS Express vehicle approached Mr. Welch and the Quality Carriers vehicle from the South on U.S. Interstate 65, Defendant Crawford fell asleep, and the TWS Express vehicle drifted into the emergency lane/shoulder on the right side of the interstate where Mr. Welch and the Quality Carriers vehicle were parked . . . .
17. Shortly before 6:00 a.m. on January 12, 2012, Defendant Crawford and the TWS Express tractor and semi-trailer struck and collided with the rear of the Quality Carriers tanker-trailer . . . .
18. The impact and collision also severely injured Mr. Welch's neck, back, shoulders, hips, legs, and other parts of his body to such an extent that he has not been able to work as a commercial driver/hauler since the date of the accident and is limited to light[-]duty office work.
19. Upon information and belief, when Defendant Crawford and the TWS Express vehicle struck Mr. Welch and the Quality Carriers vehicle, Defendant Crawford and the TWS Express vehicle were traveling approximately 65 to 70 miles-per-hour, with no evidence of speed reduction or application of brakes on the TWS Express vehicle prior to impact.
20. Despite the fact that Mr. Welch had locked down the wheels and had set/engaged the brakes on his vehicle, the collision and impact propelledthe Quality Carriers tractor and tanker-trailer, with Mr. Welch trapped inside the tractor cab, approximately 30 to 40 feet forward.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6-20.) Crawford and TWS are deemed to have admitted these facts by virtue of their default. See Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975),2 cited in Cotton v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005).
Welch alleges claims of negligence, wantonness, and/or recklessness against Crawford and vicarious liability against TWS with regard to the motor vehicle accident. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22-25.) He also alleges negligent and/or wanton hiring, supervision, retention, and /or entrustment against TWS. (Id. ¶¶ 27-31.) Welch seeks compensatory damages, including pain and suffering, as well as punitive damages against defendants. (See doc. 17.) He filed a Summary of Damages, in which he claims the following:
(1) Trover Solutions, Inc.[,] Worker's Compensation Subrogation Lien (as of August 5, 2014): Medical - $43,888.35; Wages - $47,842.23;
(2) Blue Cross Blue Shield Worker's Compensation Subrogation Lien (as of July 17, 2014): Medical - $60.73;
(3) MedChex: Medical Subrogation Lien (as of December 5, 2013): [Medical -] $2,095.00;
(4) [L]ost wages and earning capacity in an amount ranging from $468,700 to $688,000;
(5) Pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress;(6) Punitive damages in an amount to be determined in the Court's discretion to the Defendants for their wrongful conduct and to deter similar individuals and entities from committing the same or similar wrongful acts.
(Id.) He filed evidence of medical treatment and worker's compensation payments following the accident, as well as the Affidavit of John W. McKinney, III, in support of his claim for lost future wages and earning capacity, the Affidavit of John Dory Curtis, M.D., a treating physician, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, finding Welch disabled. (See generally docs. 14, 19-22, 24-3, and 24-4.) He also testified in open court. The court has reviewed all of the evidence submitted by Welch.
This court has jurisdiction over this case based on diversity of citizenship among the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between - (1) citizens of different States . . . ."). Plaintiff is a citizen of Alabama; defendants are alleged to be citizens of Georgia. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1-3.)
"[A] federal court in a diversity case is required to apply the laws, including principles of conflict of laws, of the state in which the federal court sits." Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)); see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in anycase is the law of...
