Welch v. Town of Ludlow

• Decision Date: 04 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. 163-77,163-77
• Citation: 385 A.2d 1105,136 Vt. 83
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: G. Harold WELCH, Jr. v. TOWN OF LUDLOW.

Page 1105

385 A.2d 1105

136 Vt. 83

G. Harold WELCH, Jr. v. TOWN OF LUDLOW.

No. 163-77.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

April 4, 1978.

Smith & Harlow, Rutland, for plaintiff.

Bruce M. Lawlor, Law Office of Douglas Richards, Springfield, for defendant.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and DALEY, LARROW, BILLINGS and HILL, JJ.

BILLINGS, Justice.

This is an appeal by taxpayer Welch from a decision of the Windsor Superior Court, which found that the property owned by appellant in the Town of Ludlow, consisting of 346 acres, a house, and various outbuildings, had a fair market value of $170,900.00 and a listed value of $85,450.00 as of April 1, 1975. The fair market value finding by the court matched the appraisal done by the listers for the year 1975, which appraisal was affirmed by the Board of Civil Authority on appeal pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 4404.

In May, 1974, the Town of Ludlow began a reappraisal of all properties within it to be effective as of April 1, 1975. To do the reappraisal, the Town contracted with the Commissioner of Taxes pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 3408, since repealed. The Vermont Tax Department started its reappraisal efforts by evaluating raw land sales in the Town of Ludlow for the years 1972 through 1974; thereafter each property was inspected by one or more members of the Tax Department or the Board of Listers, and a value was assigned as of April 1, 1975. Secondly, sales of improved land were evaluated for the same period, 1972 through 1974. From this base, it was determined that a fifty acre parcel of land in the Town, demonstrating average characteristics, would have a value of $675.00 per acre. It was against this standard, in conjunction with certain adjustments discussed below, that all properties in the Town were appraised.

Individual properties, including appellant's property, were appraised in two steps. First, a physical inspection was made of the land to determine its characteristics, which were then noted on "Knowles" cards. The cards contained information regarding the property including topography, view, accessibility, road frontage, location, size, the impact of structures, and so forth. The second step involved two adjustments made on the basis of the individual characteristics involved. The first adjustment was for size and was based on the number of acres contained in a given parcel; the second adjustment was for "grade" and reflected the characteristics of the particular parcel noted above. Both adjustments were made in terms of a decimal with 1.0 being the standard against which the characteristics were measured.

Appellant first charges that the method of appraisal used by the Listers and the Board of Civil Authority, which was apparently adopted by the trial court, is constitutionally invalid. The argument is twofold: first, appellant claims the method of appraisal is unconstitutional because the chairwoman of the Board of Listers was unable to fully explain it at trial; secondly, appellant alleges that the appraisal method is invalid under the holding of Bloomer v. Town of Danby, 135 Vt. 56, 370 A.2d 194 (1977).

In a de novo appeal to the superior court under 32 V.S.A. § 4467, a presumption of validity and legality attaches to the actions of the listers. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 507, 367 A.2d 1363, 1369 (1976). Once the town introduces the appraisal of the taxpayer's property into evidence, the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome the presumption resides with the moving party. Id. "The burden of producing evidence to overcome the presumption is satisfied by the introduction of credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the property was assessed at more than fair market value or that the listed value exceeded the percentage of listed value actually applied to the general mass of property in the community. When such evidence is presented, the presumption in favor of the Listers 'disappears and goes for naught.' " Id. Once such evidence is introduced, to prevail the town has the burden of producing evidence to justify the appraisal. It may meet this burden by introducing evidence demonstrating substantial compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements relative to fair market value and uniformity. Id., or by introducing independent evidence of the fair market value of the subject property and the listed value of comparable properties within the town sufficient to justify the appraisal. See Ames v. Town of Danby, No. 251-75, 385 A.2d 1075 (handed down this day, April 4, 1978). Of course, the burden of persuasion as to all contested issues remains on the taxpayer. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, supra, 134 Vt. at 507, 367 A.2d at 1369.

At trial, appellant presented two witnesses who testified as to the fair market value of the subject property. Appellant himself testified. After describing the characteristics of the land and the buildings, appellant stated that in his opinion the property as a whole had a fair market value of $115,000.00. A real estate appraiser also testified on behalf of appellant. The appraiser first inspected the property and examined the applicable zoning regulations. He next searched for comparable sales within Ludlow, and then when he could find no comparable sales in Ludlow within the recent past, he looked outside the Town. After finding comparable sales outside the Town, he adjusted them for location. Based on his investigation, and using the willing buyer, willing seller definition of fair market value, he testified that the subject property had a fair market value of $125,000.00 as of April 1, 1975.

Through these two witnesses, appellant clearly satisfied his burden of producing credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the property, assessed by the Town at $170,900.00, was assessed at more than fair market value. At trial, the Town sought to meet its resulting burden of producing evidence to justify the appraisal primarily by introducing evidence attempting to demonstrate that the method of appraisal used, which was the apparent basis of the trial court's decision on fair market value, substantially complied with the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. Essentially, appellant's first claim of error is that the Town's evidence was insufficient to meet this burden of production.

Appellant charges that appellee's method of appraisal is unconstitutional because the Town Board of Listers neither performed the actual appraisal nor understood the method used by the Vermont Tax Department to perform the appraisal. Essentially, he argues that by virtue of 32 V.S.A. § 3431 the Listers have a nondelegable duty to appraise property at fair market value and to list the property without discrimination. Even assuming that appellant's allegation that the Listers were ignorant of the method used is correct, which appellee disputes, we cannot agree with this contention.

In Vermont, where we have no home rule constitutional provision, a town has only those powers specifically authorized by the Legislature. Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Hinesburg, 135 Vt. ---, ---, 380 A.2d 64, 66 (1977). The Legislature,...