Weldy v. Northbrook Condominium Ass'n

• Decision Date: 05 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17503.,17503.
• Citation: 904 A.2d 188,279 Conn. 728
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Thomas P. WELDY et al. v. NORTHBROOK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Inc., et al.

Page 188

904 A.2d 188

279 Conn. 728

Thomas P. WELDY et al. v. NORTHBROOK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Inc., et al.

No. 17503.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 8, 2006.

Decided September 5, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ari J. Hoffman, Bridgrport, for the appellants (defendants).

Thomas P. Weldy, pro se, the appellees (plaintiffs).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.^*

ZARELLA, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether a resolution adopted by the board of directors of a condominium association providing that leashes or restraints for household pets shall not exceed twenty feet in length constitutes an illegal amendment of the condominium declaration, which provides that all household pets shall be restrained by leash or other comparable means. The plaintiffs, Thomas P. Weldy and Elizabeth C. Weldy, brought an action to enjoin the defendants, Northbrook Condominium Association, Inc. (association), and the association's five member board of directors (board), from enforcing the resolution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment. Weldy v. Northbrook Condominium Assn., Inc., 89 Conn.App. 581, 589, 874 A.2d 296 (2005). On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the board did not act beyond the scope of its authority in adopting the resolution because it constituted a clarification of, rather than an amendment to, the pet restraint provision in the declaration and thus did not require approval by a two-thirds vote of the unit owners and mortgagees. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The plaintiffs own a unit in a development known as Northbrook of Monroe, an Expandable Condominium (condominium)....

"Article nine of the condominium's declaration governs `use, purposes and restrictions' of the condominium property. [Article] 9(e) addresses pet ownership and provides in relevant part that all `dogs, cats or household pets shall be restrained by leash or other comparable means and shall be accompanied by an owner at all times....' [Article] 9 (l) confers on the board `the power to make such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the intent of [the] use restrictions....' Pursuant to § 4(b)(5) of the condominium's bylaws, the board possesses the power to adopt and amend `rules and regulations covering the details of the operation and use of the property, provided, however, that those rules and regulations contained in the [d]eclaration shall be amended in the manner provided for amending the [d]eclaration.' Article eighteen of the declaration provides that the declaration may be amended only on the vote of two thirds of the unit owners and mortgagees of the condominium.

"On June 27, 2003, the board, by letter, informed the condominium's owners and residents of `new regulations to the pet rules.' The board cited the previously quoted language from [article] 9(e) of the declaration and stated that the word `leash' was not defined. It further noted `instances where pets have caused injury to other pets' and the board's `opinion [that] leashes that exceed twenty feet in length do not permit owners to control their dogs sufficiently to ensure the safety of other pets and/or unit owners.' According to the letter, the board, therefore, had adopted an `additional clarification pertaining to pets.' The `clarification' provided in relevant part that `[l]eashes or comparable restraints for dogs, cats or household pets shall not exceed [twenty] feet in length.'

"The plaintiffs own a nine and one-half year old black Labrador retriever. Prior to June 27, 2003, the plaintiffs played ball and Frisbee with and otherwise exercised their dog in a common area behind their unit. To do so, they used a leash that was seventy-five feet in length.

"On July 28, 2003, the plaintiffs filed this action, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the purported clarification and requesting a finding that the clarification was made without legal authority, is illegal and is of no force or effect. After the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunction was denied, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the court . . . granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs' motion. The court agreed with the defendants that the twenty foot leash requirement constituted a clarification of an existing rule in the declaration rather than an amendment to the rules and, therefore, that the board had not exceeded its authority. It considered the board's action to have been taken properly pursuant to [article] 9(l) of the declaration, insofar as it `implement[ed] the intent contained in [article 9(e)] that animals be "restrained animals." '" Id., at 582-84, 874 A.2d 296.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case with direction to render judgment for the plaintiffs, concluding that the twenty foot limitation constituted an improper amendment to the condominium declaration in violation of General Statutes § 47-245(b) of the Common Interest Ownership Act; see generally General Statutes § 47-200 et seq.; and in violation of the provision in the condominium declaration permitting amendments only upon approval by two thirds of all unit owners and mortgagees. See Weldy v. Northbrook Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 89 Conn. App. at 589, 874 A.2d 296. The Appellate Court determined that the twenty foot restriction was an amendment to, rather than a clarification of, an ambiguous declaration provision because it added "more particular restrictions" to the leash provision in the declaration defining the rights of condominium owners to have their pets in a common area. Id., at 587, 874 A.2d 296. We granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court properly determined that the board did not exceed the scope of its authority in adopting the leash restriction. The defendants contend that the intent of the policy in article 9(e) of the declaration is to promote a safe and nonintimidating environment for unit owners and their guests,² and that a dog on an excessively long leash cannot be restrained properly in the physically restricted context of a condominium development. Accordingly, the leash restriction gives meaning to, and acts in concert with, the declaration provision. The plaintiffs respond that, because leashes are commonly sold in lengths of thirty to fifty feet, the board in effect illegally amended the declaration by prohibiting leashes more than twenty feet in length. The plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the leash restriction cannot be enforced. We agree with the defendants that the board acted within the scope of its authority in adopting the restriction.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review. Practice Book § 17-49 provides in relevant part that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the moving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leisure Resort Technology, Inc. v. Trading Cove Associates, 277 Conn. 21, 30-31, 889 A.2d 785 (2006). "On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aselton v. East Hartford, 277 Conn. 120, 130, 890 A.2d 1250 (2006). "[O]ur review of the trial court's decision to grant the . . . motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ace Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 273 Conn. 217, 227, 869 A.2d 626 (2005).

"When a court is called upon to assess the validity of [an action taken] by a board of directors, it first determines whether the board acted within its scope of authority and, second, whether the [action] reflects reasoned or arbitrary and capricious decision making." Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So.2d 1143, 1144 (Fla.App.1984); cf. Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn., 21 Cal.4th 249, 256, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 980 P.2d 940 (1999). Because the plaintiffs do not contend that the leash restriction itself is unreasonable, the only issue before the court is whether the board exceeded the scope of its authority in adopting the restriction. We therefore turn to an examination of the relevant statutory provisions.

Condominium developments are of relatively recent origin and provide a unique type of shelter that affords some of the benefits of property ownership without the corresponding burdens. Gentry v. Norwalk, 196 Conn. 596, 603, 494 A.2d 1206 (1985). The statutory scheme in Connecticut governing condominium developments is the Common Interest Ownership Act (act).³ See generally General Statutes § 47-200 et seq. The act "is a comprehensive legislative scheme regulating all forms of common interest ownership that is largely modeled on the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act." Nicotra Wieler Investment Management, Inc. v. Grower, 207 Conn. 441, 447, 541 A.2d 1226 (1988). See generally Unif. Common Interest Ownership Act of 1994, 7 U.L.A. 835...