Wellar v. People
| Decision Date | 21 July 1874 |
| Citation | 30 Mich. 16 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | Alfred Wellar v. The People |
Heard April 22, 1874
Error to Saginaw Circuit.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted. Respondent remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Saginaw county.
William H. Sweet and William A. Clark, for plaintiff in error.
Isaac Marston, Attorney General, for the People.
Graves, Ch. J. did not sit in this case.
Plaintiff in error was convicted of the murder of Margaret Campbell by personal violence committed on July 25, 1873. They had lived together for several months, and on the occasion of her death she had been out on an errand of her own in the neighborhood, and on coming back into the house entered the front door of the bar-room, and fell, or was knocked down upon the floor. While on the floor there was evidence tending to show that Wellar ordered her to get up, and kicked her, and that he drew her from the bar-room through the dining-room into a bed room, where he left her, and where she afterwards died. The injury of which she died was inflicted on her left temple, and the evidence does not seem to have been clear how she received it or at what specific time. It was claimed by the prosecution to have been inflicted by a blow when she first came in, and if not, then by a blow or kick afterwards. All of the testimony is not returned, and the principal questions arise out of rulings which depend on the assumption that the jury might find that her death was caused by some violent act of Wellar's; which they must have done to convict him. There can be no question but that, if she so came to her death, he was guilty of either murder or manslaughter. The complaint made against the charge is, that a theory was put to the jury on which they were instructed to find as murder what would, or at least might be, manslaughter.
There was no proof tending to show the use of any weapon, and, if we may judge from the charge, the prosecution claimed the fatal injury came from a blow of Wellar's fist, given as she entered the house. The judge seems to have regarded it as shown by a preponderance of proof, that the injury was visible when she was in the bar-room, and that the principal dispute was as to how it was caused, whether by a blow, or kick, or by accident. It also appears that, if inflicted in that room, it did not produce insensibility at the time, if inflicted before the prisoner dragged her into the bed room. It does not appear from the case at what hour she died.
It may be proper to remark that while it is not desirable to introduce all the testimony into a bill of exceptions in a criminal case, it is important to indicate in some way the whole chain of facts which the evidence tends to prove. Without this we cannot fully appreciate the relations of many of the rulings, or know what instructions may be necessary to be sent down to the court below. The bill before us is full upon some things, but leaves out some things which it would have been better to include.
Upon any of the theories presented, there is no difficulty in seeing that if Wellar killed the deceased, and if he distinctly intended to kill her, his crime was murder. It is not claimed on his behalf that there was any proof which could reduce the act to manslaughter if there was a specific design to take life. Upon this the charge was full and pointed, and is not complained of. There was no claim that he had been provoked in such a way or to such an extent as to mitigate intentional slaying to anything below one of the degrees of murder.
But it is claimed that, although the injury given was fatal, yet, if not intended to produce any such results, it was of such a character that the jury might, and properly should, have considered it as resting on different grounds from those which determine responsibility for acts done with deadly weapons used in a way likely to produce dangerous consequences. But the charge of the court did not permit them to take that view.
It will be found by careful inspection of the charge, that the court specifically instructed the jury, that if Wellar committed the homicide at all, it would be murder, and not manslaughter, unless it was committed under such extreme provocation as is recognized in the authorities as sufficient to reduce intentional and voluntary homicide committed with a deadly weapon to that degree of crime. And in this connection the charge further given that if the intent of the respondent was to commit bodily harm, he was responsible for the result, because he acted willfully and maliciously in doing the injury necessarily led to a conviction of murder, because there was no pretense of any provocation of that kind.
Manslaughter is a very serious felony, and may be punished severely. The discretionary punishment for murder in the second degree comes considerably short of the maximum punishment for manslaughter. But the distinction is a vital one, resting chiefly on the greater disregard of human life shown in the higher crime. And in determining whether a person who has killed another without meaning to kill him is guilty of murder or manslaughter, the nature and extent of the injury or wrong which was actually intended, must usually be of controlling importance.
It is not necessary in all cases that one held for murder must have intended to take the life of the person he slays by his wrongful act. It is not always necessary that he must have intended a personal injury to such person. But it is necessary that the intent with which he acted shall be equivalent in legal character to a criminal purpose aimed against life. Generally the intent must have been to commit either a specific felony, or at least an act involving all the wickedness of a felony. And if the intent be directly to produce a bodily injury, it must be such an injury as may be expected to involve serious consequences, either periling life or leading to great bodily harm. There is no rule recognized as authority which will allow a conviction of murder where a fatal result was not intended, unless the injury intended was one of a very serious character which might naturally and commonly involve loss of life, or grievous mischief. Every assault involves bodily harm. But any doctrine which would hold every assailant as a murderer where death follows his act, would be barbarous and unreasonable.
The language used in most of the statutes on felonious assaults, is, an intent to do "grievous bodily harm:" Carr. Sup., p. 237. And even such an assault, though "unlawfully and maliciously" made, is recognized as one where, if death followed, the result would not necessarily have been murder: Ibid. Our own statutes have made no provision for rendering assaults felonious, unless committed with a dangerous weapon, or with an intent to commit some felony: Comp. L., ch. 244.
In general, it has been held that where the assault is not committed with a deadly weapon, the intent must be clearly felonious, or the death will subject only to the charge of manslaughter. The presumption arising from the character of the instrument of violence, is not conclusive in either way but where such weapons are used as do not usually kill, the deadly intent ought to be left in no doubt. There are cases on...
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