Wellman v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 14 September 2010
• Docket Number: Civ. 05-279-SLR,Civ. Nos. 05-278-SLR
• Citation: 739 F.Supp.2d 665
• Parties: Debra-Ann WELLMAN, Plaintiff, v. DuPONT DOW ELASTOMERS L.L.C., Defendant. Debra-Ann Wellman, Plaintiff, v. The Dupont Company, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

739 F.Supp.2d 665

Debra-Ann WELLMAN, Plaintiff,

v.DuPONT DOW ELASTOMERS L.L.C., Defendant.

Debra-Ann Wellman, Plaintiff,

v.The Dupont Company, Defendant.

Civ. Nos. 05-278-SLR, 05-279-SLR.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

Sept. 14, 2010.

Bruce E. Jameson of Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for Plaintiff.

Barry M. Willoughby of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, DE, for Defendant Dupont Dow Elastomers L.L.C.

Kathleen Furey McDonough of Potter Anderson & Corroon, LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Defendant The DuPont Company.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Debra-Ann Wellman ("plaintiff"), filed two actions pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, one against DuPont Dow Elastomers, LLC ("DDE") and the second against DuPont Company/E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company ("DuPont") (collectively, "defendants"). Plaintiff asserts that defendants discriminated and retaliated against her and harassed her because of her gender and disability. Presently before the court are defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant defendants' motions for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Employment

DDE was formed on April 1, 1996 pursuant to the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act as a joint venture between DuPont and the Dow Chemical Company ("Dow").¹ (05-279, D.I. 37 at A9-A22)Upon its formation, DDE had its own employees and its own Human Resources Department; was responsible for its own labor relations; owned separate offices, buildings, plants, and facilities; and produced its own products. Wellman v. Dow Chemical Co., Civ. No. 05-280-SLR, 2007 WL 842084, at *1 (D.Del. Mar. 20, 2007). The formation agreement specifically provided that DDE was to control the services or functions unique to the elastomer business and be responsible for the salary and benefits of the transferred employees after the closing date. (05-279, D.I. 37 at A9-A22)

Plaintiff was employed as an administrative assistant by DuPont from 1978 to 1988 and again from 1992 to 1996 before accepting an offer of employment with DDE. (05-278, D.I. 89 at 5) Effective April 1, 1996, plaintiff became an employee of DDE, was paid by DDE, and was supervised by DDE employees. ( Id.)

In July 2001, plaintiff began working under the supervision of Paul Graves ("Graves"). (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Graves and an administrative assistant, Mary Ann Price ("Price"), harassed her until she left DDE on February 11, 2002. (05-278, D.I. 1) She alleges that the "hostile environment" caused by their harassment forced her to leave and go on disability. (Id.)

DDE's Human Resources investigated plaintiff's allegations of harassment by interviewing plaintiff, Graves, Price, and numerous DDE and DuPont employees. (05-278, D.I. 54 at A50) Human Resources determined that plaintiff had not been subject to "harassment and abuse or the creation of a 'toxic' work environment." (Id.) They, however, did warn Graves to avoid showing any favoritism toward Price and to "closely monitor [his] remarks." ( Id. at A51)

B. Plaintiff's Medical Evaluations

Plaintiff was first examined by Dr. Mary Louise Whitehill, a clinical psychologist, on February 11, 2002. ( Id. at A44) Dr. Whitehill diagnosed plaintiff with adjustment disorder and attributed her stress to work. (Id.) She indicated that plaintiff was capable of returning to work, but recommended she be relocated and have a different supervisor. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Whitehill weekly or bi-weekly until November 18, 2002. ( Id. at A154) She also was treated by Michael Glacken, M.D. who diagnosed that plaintiff had an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood. (Id.) He prescribed Ambien and Klonopin for her conditions. (Id.) During their last session on November 6, 2002, Dr. Glacken reported that plaintiff was "feeling great." (Id.)

At the request of plaintiff's Employee Assistance Counselor ("EAC"), Michael Sherman, plaintiff underwent an independent psychological and psychiatric evaluation with Daniel Kadish, Ph.D., J.D., and Sol Kadish, D.O., on May 9, 2002. (Id. at A62) Their evaluation concluded that plaintiff exhibited "traits of borderline, hysterical, and narcissistic personality," but that she was "not psychologically disabled." (Id. A68-69) Furthermore, Dr. Kadish "recommend[ed] that she should not be returned to her previous position at [DDE]." (Id. at A69)

On referral from Dr. Whitehill, plaintiff also underwent a neuropsychological evaluation with James Langan, Psy.D., in July 2002. ( Id. at A151) Dr. Langan's evaluation found "no evidence of any neuropsychological impairment." ( Id. at A154) He concluded that plaintiff did not have a "psychiatric disability and ... could return to work." (Id.)

C. Plaintiff's Termination

Once plaintiff was medically cleared to resume employment, a meeting was scheduledwith DDE's Human Resources on August 13, 2002. At that meeting, plaintiff was informed that she could continue her current position with DDE or apply for an incapability pension. ( Id. at A109) DDE extended plaintiff's short-term disability benefits by a week to allow her to consult her attorney and make a decision.²(Id.) On August 16, 2002, plaintiff faxed a request for an additional extension "until on or about August 23, 2002." ( Id. at A101) Human Resources responded that a return-to-work meeting would be scheduled for August 23, 2002, but indicated that plaintiffs paid leave had expired and would not be extended further. ( Id. at A109)

When plaintiff failed to attend the August 23 meeting without providing any cancellation notice, Human Resources rescheduled it for August 26, 2002. (Id. at A112) On August 24, 2002, plaintiff left a voicemail stating "[her] unwillingness to return to work." ( Id. at A113) She did not attend the August 26 meeting. (Id.) On August 26, 2002, DDE terminated plaintiffs employment "for job abandonment effective immediately." ³ (Id.)

D. EEOC Filings

On August 15, 2002, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination ("COD") with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against DDE, DuPont, and Dow alleging discrimination based on retaliation, gender, and disability. ( Id. at A102) In her charge, plaintiff provides a chronological list of alleged instances of harassment while employed with DDE. (Id.) She later amended the COD in October 2002 to extend the time of the alleged discrimination through August 26, 2002, the date of her termination. ( Id. at A121) The EEOC ultimately dismissed the charges on February 22, 2005 and sent plaintiff a notice of right to sue. ( Id. at A127)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court shall grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "Facts that could alter the outcome are 'material,' and disputes are 'genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct." Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n. 1 (3d Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted). If the moving party has demonstrated an absence of material fact, the nonmoving party then "must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court will "view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Pa. Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.1995). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party, however, will not be sufficient for denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable ajury reasonably to find for the nonmoving party on that issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The DuPont Company

DuPont contends that plaintiff has not offered any evidence that would suggest it had control over her workplace at DDE or was in any way responsible for any conduct that allegedly occurred at that company. Notably, plaintiff concedes that DDE was her employer and that her allegations stem from the actions of DDE employees. Plaintiff argues, however, that a parent entity may still be liable to the employees of its subsidiaries, relying on Johnson v. Cook Composites and Polymers, Inc., No. Civ.A.99-4916, 2000 WL 249251 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2000). Specifically, she claims the two companies were not strictly independent of each other and DuPont, through the EAC, initiated the conduct resulting in plaintiff's discharge.

Delaware courts have consistently held that, "[i]n the absence of fraud, the separate entity of a corporation is to be recognized." Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 178 A.2d 311, 316 (Del.Ch.1962). In an employment discrimination matter, a parent corporation will not be held accountable as an employer except in "extraordinary circumstances." Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 513 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Johnson v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 981 (...