Wellman v. Wellman

• Decision Date: 08 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 83-118,83-118
• Parties: Dalton E. WELLMAN and Anna Wellman, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Edgar G. WELLMAN and Josie Wellman, husband and wife, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1060

668 P.2d 1060

205 Mont. 504

Dalton E. WELLMAN and Anna Wellman, husband and wife Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Edgar G. WELLMAN and Josie Wellman, husband and wife Defendants and Respondents.

No. 83-118.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 30, 1983.

Decided Sept. 8, 1983.

E. Eugene Atherton, Kalispell, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg, Gary R. Christiansen, Kalispell, for defendants and respondents.

GULBRANDSON, Justice.

Plaintiffs, the son and daughter-in-law of defendant, Edgar G. Wellman (deceased) appeal from a judgment issued by the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, dismissing their action for an accounting of certain properties owned by both parties.

In Wellman v. Wellman (1982), Mont., 643 P.2d 573, 39 St.Rep. 752, we decided a similar action brought by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants. In the prior case, we decided that the plaintiffs' action was barred by res judicata from a 1971 default judgment. Likewise, the District Court in the case at bar decided res judicata barred the plaintiffs' present action. The District Court also held that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the statute of limitations.

In 1971, Edgar Wellman brought an action against his son and daughter-in-law to determine ownership of property held by two family corporations. Specifically, rights of ownership were determined to properties the parties refer to as (1) the Madhus property; (2) Isaac Walton Hotel; (3) Bearcreek Ranch; (4) air-strip property; and (5) Wellman Enterprises, Inc. property. A default judgment was entered against the son and daughter-in-law and a constructive trust was imposed upon the proceeds from the property until plaintiffs received the amounts due to them. The son and daughter-in-law brought a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside the default judgment, which was denied by the court.

The present action actually was commenced in Marion County, Oregon, on July 12, 1977. In that complaint the son and daughter-in-law sought an accounting of property interests that had been determined in the 1971 action in addition to several other alleged ownership rights. On March 2, 1981, it was dismissed from the Oregon court by agreement of the parties with the stipulation that the son and daughter-in-law could bring the proceeding to Montana within 90 days (by June 13, 1981). The complaint was refiled in Montana on July 2, 1981. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing the action was barred by res judicata.

Meanwhile, this Court was deciding a similar case between the same parties. Wellman v. Wellman, supra. In that action, the plaintiffs had attempted to attack the 1971 default judgment, claiming the District Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by granting more relief than was sought in the pleadings. We affirmed the District Court determination that res judicata barred the plaintiffs' action.

The case at bar was held in abeyance by the District Court pending our decision in the previous action between the parties. Upon the issuance of our decision in that action, defendants renewed their motion to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion stating that the plaintiffs' action was barred for four reasons: (1) the action was not filed within the time stipulated by the parties in dismissing the Oregon action; (2) the 1971 decision is res judicata to all matters claimed by the plaintiffs; (3) the time allowed for bringing the action under the statute of limitations has expired; and, (4) the doctrine of laches.

As a general proposition, we have held:

"The doctrine of res judicata states that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal or concurrent jurisdiction." Meagher Co. Water Dist. v. Walter (1976), 169 Mont. 358, 361, 547 P.2d 850, 852.

The doctrine bars consideration of an action if four elements are present: (1) the subject matter of the action must be the same; (2) the parties or their privies must be the same; (3) the issues must be the same and relate to the same subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons must be the same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues between them. Brannon v. Lewis and Clark County (1963), 143 Mont. 200, 207, 387 P.2d 706, 711. Appellants argue that the issues and subject matter of this action are different from the 1971 action because they are claiming rights to property not considered in the 1971 action. Specifically, counsel for appellants asserts in his brief that this action concerns an accounting of proceeds from the disputed properties that the respondents acquired after 1977 and, thus, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable.

We hold that the doctrine of res judicata applies and appellants are barred from asserting their claim. This action is clearly an attempt to relitigate issues that were originally considered in the 1971 action. Although appellants argue that the case before us involves an accounting action for events occurring subsequent to July 12, 1977, their complaint does not support that assertion. Indeed, such a cause of action could not have arisen in 1977 since the 1971 judgment had yet to be satisfied.

Moreover, the fact that appellants appear to name property not considered in the 1971 action does not preclude application of the doctrine of res judicata. The most important element in sustaining a plea of res judicata is identity of issues. Harris v. Harris (1980), Mont., 616 P.2d 1099, 37 St.Rep. 1696. The 1971 action was for an accounting of properties in dispute between the two parties. A...