Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heath
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY; HONORABLE DAMAN CANTRELL |
| Citation | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heath, 2012 OK 54, 280 P.3d 328 (Okla. 2012) |
| Decision Date | 12 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 108,383.,108,383. |
| Parties | WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005–4 Asset–Backed Certificates, Series 2005–4, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Robert HEATH and Shelly Heath, Defendants/Appellants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY; HONORABLE DAMAN CANTRELL, DISTRICT JUDGE
¶ 0 Appeal of an order denying Robert and Shelly Heath's petition and motion to vacate in favor of Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005–4 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005–4, heard on April 13, 2010, and memorialized on February 21, 2012. The Heaths appeal this order arguing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005–4 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005–4, failed to demonstrate standing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
A. Grant Schwabe, Kivell, Rayment & Francis, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Phillip A. Taylor, Taylor & Associates, Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants.
¶ 1 On August 11, 2005, Robert Heath, executed a promissory note in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) which was secured by a mortgage executed the same day by Robert Heath and his wife Shelly Heath (Appellants). Default on the note is alleged to have occurred in September 2008. The Plaintiff/Appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005–4 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005–4 (Appellee), filed its petition to foreclose on December 22, 2008. Attached to the Petition is a copy of the note, mortgage and assignment of the mortgage. The note contains neither an indorsement nor an attached allonge. The assignment of mortgage was made by Option One Mortgage Corporation to Appellee and is dated February 28, 2008. It does not purport to transfer the note. The Appellants, then represented by Ron Brown, filed an answer on February 3, 2009, generally denying all allegations.
¶ 2 Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment and Appellant did not respond. A final journal entry of judgment was filed on June 16, 2009, granting Appellee a judgment in rem and in personam against Appellants. The property was sold at sheriff's sale on July 28, 2009, and a motion to confirm the sale was filed the same day.1 The hearing for the motion to confirm was set for August 18, 2009. A day before the hearing, Appellants filed an Advice of Bankruptcy. Appellants were later discharged from bankruptcy and appellee filed a “Notice of Alias Hearing Motion to Confirm Sale” on January 26, 2010. The hearing was set for February 16, 2010.
¶ 3 On February 12, 2010, Appellant's new counsel, Phillip A. Taylor, filed a petition and motion to vacate the June 12, 2009, journal entry of judgment and a motion to suspend all execution proceedings. Appellants also requested alternatively for leave to file an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of prohibition. Appellee answered and argued it was the holder of the note and mortgage pursuant to an assignment filed of record with the county clerk. Appellee cites Everhome Mortgage Company v. Dick Robey et al., 2006 OK CIV APP 64, 136 P.3d 1066, for the purpose of showing constructive possession of a note can be establishedby an assignment of the note. Appellee further argued Appellants' personal liability had been discharged in the bankruptcy and Appellants had surrendered the property to the lien holder and thus have no interest in the property.
¶ 4 A hearing was held on April 13, 2010, wherein the court denied the petition and motion to vacate. According to the transcript of the record, Appellee's counsel presented the original note at the hearing with an undated allonge attached. The allonge was made by “Option One Mortgage Corporation, A California Corporation” and signed by Amber Satterfield, Assistant Secretary. It was a blank indorsement made “[p]ay to the order of.” 2 At the hearing, Appellee's counsel states an allonge can be executed at any time, even at the hearing.
¶ 5 The trial court also issued an order on May 5, 2010, denying Appellants' motion for order suspending execution proceedings but granted Appellants request for leave of court to file a writ of prohibition with the this Court. On June 3, 2010, Appellants filed an “Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and for Writ or (sic) Prohibition.” This was later recast as an appeal by order of this Court.
¶ 6 Appellants filed a petition in error on November 24, 2010, appealing the “April 13, 2010, order denying Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment entered in Appellee's favor on June 15, 2009.” 3 This Court then ordered Appellants to file a second amended petition in error because Appellants wrongly designated the appeal as an accelerated appeal under Rule 1.36. In their second amended petition in error, the Appellants identified the order being appealed as the December 20, 2010, order reflecting the trial court's order of May 5, 2010.4 On January 24, 2012, this Court again asked Appellants to file a supplemental petition in error to include a proper memorialization of the court minute posted on April 13, 2010, concerning the hearing on Appellants' petition and motion to vacate. On February 22, 2012, Appellants filed a supplemental petition in error wherein they state the orders they are appealing are the December 21, 2010, order which reflects the trial court's May 5, 2010, order, and the February 21, 2012, order finally memorializing the trial court's order to deny Appellants' motion to vacate final journal entry of judgment.5
¶ 7 The standard of review for a trial court's ruling either vacating or refusing to vacate a judgment is abuse of discretion. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. v. Webb Enterprises, Inc., 2000 OK 78, ¶ 5, 13 P.3d 480, 482;Hassell v. Texaco, Inc., 1962 OK 136, 372 P.2d 233. A clear abuse-of-discretion standard includes appellate review of both fact and law issues. Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d 591, 608. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law, or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling. Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 2001 OK 35, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d 477, 481. The dispositive issue presented to this Court is standing. This Court has previously held:
Standing, as a jurisdictional question, may be correctly raised at any level of the judicial process or by the Court on its own motion. This Court has consistently held that standing to raise issues in a proceeding must be predicated on interest that is “direct, immediate and substantial.” Standing determines whether the person is the proper party to request adjudication of a certain issue and does not decide the issue itself. The key element is whether the party whose standing is challenged has sufficient interest or stake in the outcome.
Matter of the Estate of Doan, 1986 OK 15, ¶ 7, 727 P.2d 574, 576. In Hendrick v. Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 4, 865 P.2d 1232, 1234, this Court also held:
Respondent challenges Petitioner's standing to bring the tendered issue. Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. It may be raised as an issue at any stage of the judicial process by any party or by the court sua sponte. (emphasis original)
Furthermore, in Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, footnote 19, 163 P.3d 512, 519, this Court stated “[s]tanding may be raised at any stage of the judicial process or by the court on its own motion.” Additionally in Fent, this Court found:
Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. The three threshold criteria of standing are (1) a legally protected interest which must have been injured in fact- i.e., suffered an injury which is actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) a causal nexus between the injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision. The doctrine of standing ensures a party has a personal stake in the outcome of a case and the parties are truly adverse.
Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d 512, 519–520. In essence, a plaintiff who has not suffered an injury attributable to the defendant lacks standing to bring a suit. And, thus, “standing [must] be determined as of the commencement of suit; ...” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570, n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
¶ 8 The Appellants challenged Appellee's standing in its petition and motion to vacate. Because standing may be challenged at any stage of the judicial process it was proper to bring up the issue in Appellants' petition and motion to vacate. Appellee cites Kordis v. Kordis, 2001 OK 99, ¶ 6, 37 P.3d 866, 869, for the standard of review on a motion to vacate. Kordis held “[t]he reviewing court does not look to the original judgment but rather the correctness of the trial court's response to the motion to vacate” and “[a]s a result, we apply the abuse of discretion standard.” Kordis was not a case challenging standing. The issue of standing was presented in the motion to vacate and at the hearing on such motion. Standing may be brought up at any time in the judicial procedure and an abuse of discretion occurs when a court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. From the record, there was no proof Appellee was the holder of the note at the time of commencement of the suit. Standing was not established by the materials attached to Appellee's petition or motion for summary judgment because there was no attached indorsed note nor was there an assignment of the note. Therefore, we find the trial court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. There existed a substantial issue of material fact that needed to be addressed at trial. Even though the...
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