Wells v. Auberry
Decision Date | 11 January 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 1-581A182,1-581A182 |
Citation | 429 N.E.2d 679 |
Parties | James L. WELLS, Sheriff of Marion County, Indiana; John R. Weliever, President of Marion County Sheriff's Merit Board; and Marvin E. Ferguson, Gene E. Sease, and Fred W. Morley, Members of the Marion County Sheriff's Merit Board, Defendants-Appellants, v. Bernard J. AUBERRY, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Joseph W. Hammes, John H. Stanley, Indianapolis, for defendants-appellants.
R. Scott Hayes, Scotten & Hinshaw, New Castle, A. David Stippler, Byrum, Gagnon, Diehl & Stippler, Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
James L. Wells, Sheriff of Marion County, (Wells) and members of the Marion County Sheriff's Merit Board (Board) bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief which restored Bernard J. Auberry (Auberry) to his former rank pending resolution of his complaint against Wells and the Board. We reverse.
On March 11, 1975, Auberry was appointed to serve civil process by Sheriff Broderick, Marion County Sheriff at that time. On January 16, 1976, Auberry was transferred to the security detachment at Eagle Creek Park and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant. He was subsequently promoted to Captain on May 22, 1976, and to Major only four months later. Auberry supervised about fifteen employees at Eagle Creek Park. On June 13, 1980, Sheriff Wells orally demoted Auberry to Sergeant allegedly because of a morale problem among park employees. Auberry felt that the reason for his demotion was purely political: he had devoted extensive time to working for one Democratic gubernatorial nominee, while Sheriff Wells supported another. Auberry admitted, however, that he was a patronage employee, serving at the will and pleasure of the Sheriff. According to his own testimony Auberry has never applied for a merit position with the Marion County Sheriff's Department and has neither appeared before the Merit Board nor requested a hearing of any type before it. Auberry also testified that he has never made a contribution and that a deduction has never been taken from his pay check for the Marion County Sheriff's pension fund. However, on July 7, 1980, Auberry filed an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief together with damages as a result of his demotion without written notice and a hearing before the Board. He requested preliminary relief of reinstatement to the rank of Major claiming protection under § 501 of the Rules and Regulations of the Marion County Sheriff's Department and under the merit law, Ind.Code 17-3-14-1 et seq. As set forth in the Record at 362(35), § 501 of those Rules and Regulations states:
Indiana Code 17-3-14-7, referred to in § 501, provides:
After extensive legal peregrinations the Henry County Circuit Court heard evidence on Auberry's request for the preliminary injunction on February 26, 1981. After entering extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law which it supplemented on May 8, 1981, the court granted the requested relief reinstating Auberry to the rank of Major pending full resolution of his complaint.
Because we have decided that the granting of a preliminary injunction in this cause was contrary to law, we limit our discussion to that single issue.
It is true that a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests within the equitable discretion of the trial court. Elder v. City of Jeffersonville, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 422, 329 N.E.2d 654, trans. denied. In determining whether or not the trial court abused that discretion we do not weigh conflicting evidence, but consider only that evidence which supports the trial court's findings, conclusions, and order. Rees v. Panhandle Pipeline Co., (1978) Ind.App., 377 N.E.2d 640; Peters v. Davidson, Inc., (1977) 172 Ind.App. 39, 359 N.E.2d 556, trans. denied. The trial court's order will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, Rees v. Panhandle Pipeline, supra, or "is the result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion." 7-Pt.2 Moore's Federal Practice P 65.04(1) at 65-36 (1980). Nevertheless, "(w)hile an application for preliminary injunction is addressed to the Court's discretion, the power to issue such an interlocutory injunction should be used sparingly and such relief should not be granted except in rare instances in which the law and facts are clearly in the moving parties' favor." Indiana State Employees Association, Inc. v. Negley, (S.D.Ind.1973) 357 F.Supp. 38, 40. See also, 7-Pt.2 Moore's Federal Practice, supra. Injunctive relief has been referred to as "the strong arm of the court," Laughlin v. Lamasco City, (1855) 6 Ind. 223, 228, and Indiana courts have long required that "(o)ne who seeks injunctive relief should show very clearly that he is entitled to it." Hurd v. Walters, (1874) 48 Ind. 148, 150, cited in Craig v. School City of Gary, (1965) 138 Ind.App. 261, 211 N.E.2d 616, trans. denied (1966).
Auberry contends that the trial court properly granted injunctive relief in his favor because he established a prima facie case on his principal claim that it is contrary to the equal protection provisions of both the Indiana and the Federal Constitutions to deny him and his class merit employee status and because he would suffer irreparable harm if the relief were not granted. Sheriff Wells and the Board, on the other hand, disagree, arguing that the trial court's order was contrary to law because Auberry failed to establish any of the elements necessary to sustain a complaint for injuctive relief. Both parties agree that there are four elements which must be shown by a petitioner seeking injunctive relief: (1) that petitioner will post sufficient security to cover the costs and damages which the opposing party may suffer if he or she is wrongfully enjoined; (2) that public interest will not be harmed in balancing the hardships to the parties if an injunction is granted; and (3) that petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not granted. About the fourth, and in essence, threshold requirement, however, the parties disagree. Auberry asserts that a prima facie case on the merits is all that he need show, citing Rees v. Panhandle Pipeline, supra. Wells and the Board contend that a more stringent standard is applied when injunctive relief is sought against a public entity, citing Craig v. School City of Gary, supra, and that the test becomes one of establishing clearly the probability that petitioner will prevail on the merits, citing, Indiana State Employees v. Negley, supra.
Cases which examine the factors a court must consider in awarding or denying injunctive relief are, quite naturally, distinguishable by the...
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