Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank
Decision Date | 23 September 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 41 Sept. Term 2002.,41 Sept. Term 2002. |
Citation | 832 A.2d 812,377 Md. 197 |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Parties | Dale WELLS, et al. v. CHEVY CHASE BANK, F.S.B., et al. |
F. Paul Bland, Jr. (Leslie Bruekner of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice of Washington, DC,; John T. Ward, Robert B. Kershaw of Ward Kershaw, P.A. of Baltimore; Michael P. Malakoff of Malakoff, Doyle & Finberg, P.C. of Pittsburgh, PA), on brief, for appellants.
David J. Cynamon (Erica S. Simpson of Shaw Pittman LLP, on brief), Washington, DC, for appellees.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
In this case, we are asked to resolve whether a credit-card agreement (the "Cardholder Agreement"), between Dale Wells, Sharon Goldenberg and John Dovel, the appellants, and Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. and U.S.A. Bank, N.A., the appellees, contractually bound the appellees to comply with provisions of Subtitle 9, which address the form of the notice required when a Cardholder Agreement is amended, where the Cardholder Agreement in the section captioned "Governing Law," references Subtitle 9 of the Commercial Law Article, Md.Code , §§ 12-901—12-924 of the Commercial Law Article ("Subtitle 9") and "applicable federal law." Although the parties agree that State laws purporting to regulate the appellees' lending activities have been preempted by § 5(a) of the Homeowners Loan Act ("HOLA") 12 U.S.C. 1464(a) and its implementing regulations, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 560, the appellants characterize the reference to Subtitle 9 in the Cardholder Agreement as a provision in a contract, which, notwithstanding federal preemption, defines a particular aspect of the relationship between the parties, the manner in which notice is to be given when the Cardholder Agreement is amended. Consequently, rather than because it was a failure to comply with state law, the appellants seek to recover damages from the appellees for breach of their contract with the appellants to comply with Subtitle 9 when amending the Cardholder Agreement. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City observed that it "seems both implausible and inconsistent with federal preemption to claim that a state regulatory scheme was agreed to between [the] parties by a mere reference to Subtitle 9" and, thus, rejected the appellants' argument. We do not agree. Accordingly, we shall reverse and remand the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings.
This is not the first occasion on which this case, the parties to it and the issues presented by it, have been before this Court. Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., et al., 363 Md. 232, 768 A.2d 620 (2001) ("Wells I") was an appeal taken from an order compelling arbitration. Preparatory to addressing the substantive issue that case presented, whether the appellants agreed to arbitrate, we summarized the factual and procedural history of the case:
Wells I, 363 Md. at 235-37, 768 A.2d at 621-22 (footnote omitted). This history applies as well to the case sub judice.
The Court identified the principal theory of the appellants' case as being that the Cardholder Agreement had not been effectively amended and elucidated the supporting rationale underlying it:
Wells I, 363 Md. at 237-38, 768 A.2d at 622-23.
We noted, that in addition to moving to compel arbitration, the appellees also argued in the trial court that § 12-912, on which the appellants principally relied, was preempted by 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a), a regulation of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) that undertakes to "occupy[] the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations." Id. As indicated, the motion to compel arbitration prevailed in the trial court, prompting the appellants' appeal.
In response, the appellees moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Maryland law permitting an appeal from an order compelling arbitration was, itself, preempted by 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act. This...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. And Loan Ass'n, Fa
...of their agreement state law directives that otherwise would be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 377 Md. 197, 224, 231, 832 A.2d 812 (2003) (construing credit card contract referring to state commercial law that had otherwise been preempted by HOLA and......
-
Brown v. Handgun Permit Review Bd.
...law, to the extent that "compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility." (Quoting Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 377 Md. 197, 209-10, 832 A.2d 812 (2003)). Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that Congress intended not to preempt state law. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g......
-
Pinnacle Grp., LLC v. Kelly
...that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.’ " Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. , 377 Md. 197, 229, 832 A.2d 812 (2003) (quoting Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc. , 201 Md. 115, 128, 93 A.2d 272 (1952) ).Section 5.3 of the Agre......
-
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Neal, No. 58, September Term, 2006 (Md. App. 3/13/2007)
...168 Md. App. at 752-53, 899 A.2d at 211-12. The Court of Special Appeals found support for its holding in Wells v. Chevy Chase Ban k, F.S.B., 377 Md. 197, 832 A.2d 812 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 983, 124 S. Ct. 1875, 158 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2004), and College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3......