Wells v. J. E. Rountree & Co

• Decision Date: 27 June 1903
• Citation: 45 S.E. 215,117 Ga. 839
• Parties: WELLS. v. J. E. ROUNTREE & CO. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

117 Ga. 839

45 S.E. 215

WELLS.

v.J. E. ROUNTREE & CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 27, 1903.

117 Ga. 839

INJUNCTION—GRANT ON CONDITIONS—BOND— TRESPASS.

1.Where several parties are asserting conflicting rights in the same property, and two seek an injunction against one to prevent the exercise of acts of ownership resulting in irreparable injury, and to avoid a multiplicity of suits, and where the latter, in turn, asks for an injunction against one of the others, to restrain acts tending to irreparable injury, and the court finds that the status should be preserved, and grants an injunction, but allows one of the parties to dissolve the same by giving bond, held, that the order should be so modified as to strike the permission to give a bond and make the restraining order absolute against both.

2.Where the court finds that the status should be preserved, and orders an injunction accordingly, neither party should be allowed to change the status by giving a bond.

3.Where, under Civ. Code, § 4916, a trespass is enjoined in order to prevent circuity of actions and a multiplicity of suits, all parties to the circle of actions should be enjoined, and not one only.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Dooly County; Z. A. Littlejohn, Judge.

Suit by J. E. Rountree & Co. and others against A. Wells.From the decree, Wells brings error.Affirmed.

This was a triangular contest for injunctions.Wells claimed the land, with all thereon.Rountree & Co. claimed the sawmill timber.Peacock & Kelly claimed the turpentine privileges.Rountree & Co. began the litigation, asking for an injunction to prevent Wells from cutting the sawmill timber.Wells answered, setting up his title; denied any right in Rountree & Co. for an injunction; insisted that Peacock & Kelly, under an invalid assignment from Rountree & Co., were boxing the timber for turpentine purposes; and thereupon prayed that the latter firm be made partiesdefendant, and that the court would enjoin them from continuing their operations.It appeared that Harrold & Johnson on October 3, 1899, in consideration of $__cash, and notes maturing one, two, and three years thereafter, aggregating $7,-290, granted to S. J. Hill & Bro. the right to cut the timber for one year, with the privilege of continuing the same from year to year on paying the deferred notes; this right to cease if they failed to meet any note at maturity; agreeing, when all were paid, to make a deed to the land.S. J. Hill & Bro. entered, and shortly thereafter, on December 14, 1899, transferred to Wells all their interest in this land, but reserved the right to cut the timber thereon for ten years.On November 12, 1900, S. J. Hill individually sold the tim ber rights to Rountree & Co.Subsequently S. J. Hill & Bro., being unable to meet the purchase-money notes, transferred the bond for titles to Wells, and directed Harrold & Johnson to make him a deed upon the payment of their debt.Wells having complied with this condition, Harrold & Johnson made him a deed to the property, in usual form.In their petition Rountree & Co. claimed that, before buying the timber rights from S. J. Hill, they notified Wells of their intention to purchase; that he pointed out the timber, and told them that the title to the land was perfect, and that Hill & Bro. owed one note, but would pay the same out of the money to be received from them in case they bought.They also claimed that the transfer of the bond for titles from S. J. Hill & Bro. to Wells, and the deed in pursuance thereof from Harrold & Johnson, was...