Wells v. Jones
| Decision Date | 30 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:14cv1222-MHT (WO) |
| Parties | JIMMY WELLS, # 210728, Petitioner, v. KARLA JONES, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This matter is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Alabama inmate Jimmy Wells ("Wells"). See Doc. Nos. 1 and 3.1
On January 27, 2010, in the Geneva County Circuit Court, Wells pled guilty to first-degree rape, in violation of § 13A-6-61, Ala. Code 1975. On May 26, 2010, the trial court sentenced Wells to life imprisonment under Alabama's habitual felony offender statute. Wells took no appeal.
On September 21, 2010, Wells filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Doc. No. 10-4 at 43-55. In that petition, Wells presented various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and contended that he was mentally incompetent when he entered his guilty plea and that his plea was therefore unknowing and involuntary. Id. The trial court conducted a hearing on the Rule 32 petition and subsequently denied the petition by order entered on August 9, 2011. Id. at 81-85, 111-32. The trial courtrejected Wells's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and found that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 82-84. However, the trial court's order did not specifically address Wells's mental incompetency claim. Wells took no appeal from the trial court's judgment.
On June 12, 2012, Wells filed a second Rule 32 petition with the trial court. See Doc. No. 10-4 at 3-34. Among various claims in the petition, Wells argued that he was mentally incompetent to enter his May 2010 guilty plea; that he was denied due process when the trial court failed to conduct a hearing regarding his mental competency before he entered his guilty plea; and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In addition, Wells argued that the Rule 32 petition was not procedurally barred by the rule prohibiting successive petitions, because his new claims were jurisdictional claims not addressed on the merits during the proceedings on his first Rule 32 petition. Id.
Answering Wells's Rule 32 petition, the State argued that his claims were precluded from review under Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a), (b), and (c) and that Wells had not met his pleading burden under Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b).2 Doc. No. 10-4 at 35. On September 26,2012, the trial court entered an order denying Wells's Rule 32 petition as successive, finding that his claims were raised, or could have been raised, in his prior petition. Id. at 80.
Wells appealed, reasserting his claims that (1) he was mentally incompetent to enter his guilty plea and (2) he was denied due process when the trial court failed to conduct a hearing regarding his mental competency before he entered his guilty plea. Doc. No. 10-5. On August 22, 2014, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a memorandum opinion affirming the trial court's judgment. Doc. No. 10-7. Wells applied for rehearing, which was overruled by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Doc. Nos. 10-8 and 10-9. He then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that court denied on November 14, 2014, the same date on which the court entered its certificate of judgment. Doc. Nos. 10-10 and 10-11.
On December 6, 2014, Wells initiated this federal habeas action by filing a § 2254 petition asserting these claims:
Doc. No. 1 at 4-5; Doc. No. 3 at 5-8.
The respondents contend that Wells's claims are procedurally defaulted or meritless. Doc. Nos. 10 and 16. After careful review of Wells's petition, the undersigned finds that Wells is notentitled to habeas relief and that his petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.
Before a § 2254 petitioner may obtain federal habeas corpus review, he must "exhaust" his federal claims by raising them in the appropriate court, giving the state courts an opportunity to decide the merits of the constitutional issue raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001). To exhaust a claim fully, a petitioner must "invok[e] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In Alabama, a complete round of the established appellate review process includes an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that court, and a petition for discretionary review - a petition for a writ of certiorari - filed in the Alabama Supreme Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 2001); Ala. R. App. P. 39 and 40. The exhaustion requirement applies to state post-conviction proceedings and to direct appeals. See Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003).
Habeas claims not properly exhausted in the state courts are procedurally defaulted if presentation of the claims in state court would be barred by state procedural rules. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). "[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred[,] . . . there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas."Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (citations omitted); see Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003).
Federal habeas review may also be unavailable for claims that a state appellate court has rejected on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. When a state prisoner fails to follow state procedural rules, procedurally defaulting on a claim, the authority of federal courts to review the prisoner's state court criminal conviction is "severely restricted." Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173 (11th Cir. 1991). "Federal review of a petitioner's claim is barred by the procedural-default doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, and that bar provides an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief." Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1992).
By its very definition, the adequate and independent state-ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). Thus, by applying this doctrine to habeas cases, [Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)] curtails reconsideration of the federal issue on federal habeas as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for decision. In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.
A habeas petitioner can escape the procedural-default doctrine either through showing cause for the default and resulting prejudice, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), or establishing a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," which requires a colorable showing of actual innocence, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1995). Cause for a procedural default mustordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded efforts to comply with the state's procedural rules or that the procedural default resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, "infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Frady, 456 U.S. at 170; see Murray, 477 U.S. at 494. Prisoners asserting actual innocence as a gateway to review of defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
In his § 2254 petition, Wells argues that he was denied due process when the trial court failed to conduct a hearing regarding his mental competency before he entered his guilty plea. Doc. No. 1 at 4-5; Doc. No. 3 at 5. Wells presented this claim in his second Rule 32 petition and pursued it on appeal from the denial of that petition.
Addressing this claim in its opinion affirming the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:
Wells contends that the trial court, i.e., the guilty plea court, erred when it did not conduct a hearing to determine Wells's mental competency. Failure to conduct a competency hearing is a procedural due process claim, and as such, is subject to the procedural bars set forth in Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. See Nicks v. State, 783 So. 2d 895, 907-09 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995), citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966)). Therefore, as pleaded by the State, this claim is precluded by Rules 32.2(a), (b) and (c) Ala....
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