Wells v. Lafler

Decision Date28 February 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:10-cv-10191
PartiesJODY WELLS, Petitioner, v. BLAINE LAFLER, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HON. ARTHUR J. TARNOW

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
BUT GRANTING PERMISSION TO FILE AN APPLICATION
FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
I. INTRODUCTION

This is a habeas case filed by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Jody Wells is incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections, currently housed at the Lakeland Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan, where he is serving a life sentence for the murder of his wife, Nanette Lynn Wells, in April 2000. Petitioner's conviction occurred in the Circuit Court in Genesee County, Michigan, on September 22, 2000. He was sentenced on November 9, 2000.

Petitioner filed his Habeas Petition, pro se, raising claims concerning his rights under the Fifth Amendment, the prosecutor's failure to disclose favorable evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. For the reasons stated, the Court will deny the petition. The Court also will decline to issue Petitioner a certificate of appealability but will grant him permission to file an application for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Substantive Facts

On April 13, 2000, Nanette Lynn Wells' body was found by her thirteen-year-old daughter. Nanette Lynn Wells was killed by strangulation.

Several witnesses testified that, prior to her murder, Nanette Lynn Wells complained to them that Petitioner was too controlling. She told them that she asked him for a divorce, but he said he did not want a divorce and threatened to kill her.

One of Petitioner's neighbors, Donald Fugate testified that, on the night in question, he heard Petitioner's truck leave Nanette Lynn Wells' driveway. Another neighbor, Lori Anderson, also testified that she heard Petitioner's truck starting up and backing out of the driveway on the night of the murder.

The police found no signs of forced entry. While at the scene, they discovered a note from Petitioner indicating that he was at his mother's house. Evidence from the scene was collected. DNA analysis revealed that the bloodstains found on the victim's pillow matched that of Petitioner's.

Petitioner was subsequently arrested. He had fresh scratch marks on his upper right forearm. While in the holding facility, he spontaneously confessed to the killing.

Darcie Burch, who was employed at the Flint City lock up, was making her routine rounds, when she heard a man causing a disturbance in cellblock G, where Petitioner was being held. Petitioner was not the man causing the disturbance. Burch testified that she recognized Petitioner because they previously lived in the same neighborhood. She said to Petitioner,"hey," and Petitioner "blurted out that he [] killed his wife." Trial Tr. vol. VI 152-56, Sept. 20, 2000, ECF No. 12-12. Burch walked away. She did not ask Petitioner any questions.

Witnesses for the defense stated that they saw Petitioner at his mother's house between 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., on the day of the murder. One of the witnesses testified that he saw Petitioner's truck in the driveway around 10:30 p.m. Petitioner's mother testified that he was at her house on the night of April 12, 2000. She said she saw him sleeping in one of the bedrooms when she woke to use the bathroom. She said she woke him up around 4:45 a.m. Another witness, who worked with Petitioner, testified that he did not notice anything unusual about him that day.

Petitioner did not testify. The jury convicted him and he was sentenced to life in prison.

B. Procedural Facts

Following his sentencing, Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claims: (1) the admission of his alleged confession to a guard at the holding facility was improper; (2) the prosecutor failed to provide timely discovery; (3) the trial court erred in admitting character evidence; (4) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a personal protection order against the victim's former husband; (5) the trial court erred in prohibiting him from presenting an expert witness on police investigations; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (7) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. People v. Wells, No. 23634, 2003 WL 21079864, at *1, 5 (Mich. Ct. App. May 13, 2003). Petitioner never appealed that decision to the Michigan Supreme Court.

Rather, on October 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment, with the state trial court, raising the following claims: (1) his conviction is invalid because of the improper analysis of evidence presented by the prosecution; (2) the trial court erred in failing to admit certain exculpatory evidence; (3) the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors denied him a fair trial; and (4) he has established cause and prejudice for his failure to raise these claims in his direct appeal. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion on August 20, 2007. People v. Wells, No. 00-06041-FC (Genesee Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2007). Both state appellate courts denied his applications for leave to appeal that decision because he failed to "meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D)." People v. Wells, No. 285455 (Mich. Ct. App. July 25, 2008); People v. Wells, 483 Mich. 893, 760 N.W.2d 488 (2009).

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on January 15, 2010. It was signed and dated January 7, 2010.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law,or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when a state court has applied clearly established federal law in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not issue a writ if it concludes the state court applied clearly-established federal law merely erroneously or incorrectly. Id. at 411.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ---, ---, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ---, ---, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[i]t bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citation omitted). Indeed, "[s]ection 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner isrequired to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ---, ---, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

With those standards in mind, the Court proceeds to address Petitioner's claims.

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner's Claims Are Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted

Petitioner is required to fairly present all of his claims outlined in this petition to the state courts before he presents them to this Court in a habeas action. Under section 2254(b)(1), Petitioner cannot be granted habeas relief unless the following has occurred:

(A) [he has] exhausted the remedies in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of [Petitioner].

In this case, the Court finds that Petitioner's claims, as outlined in his...

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