Wells v. Price

• Court: Maryland Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MELVIN, Judge.
• Citation: Wells v. Price, 183 Md. 443, 37 A.2d 888 (Md. 1944)
• Decision Date: 14 June 1944
• Docket Number: 32.
• Parties: WELLS, State's Atty. of Baltimore City, v. PRICE.

37 A.2d 888

183 Md. 443

WELLS, State's Atty. of Baltimore City, v. PRICE.

No. 32.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 14, 1944

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; William L. Henderson Judge.

Proceeding by J. Bernard Wells, State's Attorney of Baltimore City against Charles P. Price, Warden of the Baltimore City Jail to restrain defendant from releasing prisoners in conformity with the state-wide law, rather than with the local law pertaining to the maximum period of confinement for the nonpayment of fines and costs. From an order dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.

Order reversed and cause remanded.

Thomas N. Biddison, Asst. State's Atty., of Baltimore, for appellant.

H. Clifton Owens, Asst. City Sol., of Baltimore (Simon E. Sobeloff, City Sol., of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Abram C. Joseph, of Baltimore, amicus curiae.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, MELVIN, BAILEY, and CAPPER, JJ.

MELVIN Judge.

In these proceedings the State's Attorney of Baltimore City, in his official capacity, is seeking the aid of a court of equity to restrain the Warden of the Baltimore City jail from releasing prisoners in conformity with the State-wide law, rather than with the local law, pertaining to the maximum period of confinement for the nonpayment of fines and costs. The former is Chapter 479 of the Acts of 1943, codified as Section 4, Article 38 of the Annotated Code of Maryland 1943 Supp., prescribing three months as the maximum period, and the latter is Section 533 of the City Charter (1938 Ed.), prescribing six months. According to the record, the issue would affect the cases of about one thousand prisoners during the course of a year, depending upon the applicability of the general or the local law to the subject of their release.

The case was presented to the Chancellor on bill of complaint, answer and testimony, and resulted in an 'Order' dismissing the bill, without an accompanying memorandum or opinion stating the grounds therefor.

The State's Attorney's appeal to this Court is encouraged by the City Solicitor, the appellee's legal advisor, whose attitude on this point is thus expressed in his answer to the bill of complaint: 'The respondent welcomes the filing of the bill of complaint; submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and joins with the complainant in requesting an adjudication which may be appropriately reviewed by the highest court of the State so that the law may be made certain.' This is likewise the reason given in appellee's brief for not questioning the right of the State's Attorney to bring this suit, or of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to entertain it. In the language of the brief: 'The ordinary conduct of the Baltimore City jail requires an authoritative adjudication of the principal question raised by the case, namely, whether the Act of 1943 or the Charter provision prevails. The appellee trusts that the Court will see fit, in its opinion, to settle this case regardless of technical procedural questions.'

However, these two questions are seriously raised on this appeal in the brief filed by a member of the Baltimore Bar, as amicus curiae, and must be considered by the Court, for they present the main difficulties in the case. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the members of this Court are unanimously of the opinion that the provisions of the Baltimore City Charter, rather than of the State statute, should govern the decision here, provided these jurisdictional difficulties can be overcome.

First, what right has the State's Attorney to bring this kind of a suit? While it has been expressly decided by this Court that he possesses no other powers than those prescribed by the Constitution or by statute (Hawkins v. State, 81 Md. 306, 310, 32 A. 278), nowhere are these powers enumerated or defined. All that the Constitution says on the subject is that 'The State's Attorney shall perform such duties * * * as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law.' Const. Art. 5, Sec. 9. An examination of the statutes shows no mention at all of either the powers or the duties of this official, nor is there any precedent laid down by this Court by way of interpretation of his rights, powers or duties in a case of this nature. The law is silent as to his authority to appear on behalf of the State and commence, prosecute or defend a cause in which the State, as a body politic, has a special interest, as in the case at bar.

The allegations of the bill of complaint are, in substance, that the release of prisoners under the State-wide statute, instead of the Baltimore City Charter, would amount to a continuing violation of law, would be contrary to public interest, and could only be remedied through an injunction restraining the Warden from following the wrong statute.

These allegations are not disputed by the answer to the bill of complaint, the sole issue on the pleadings being the construction of statutes, and the only testimony in the record is that of the Warden, himself. The pertinent parts of his testimony are: that he has been connected with the Baltimore City jail for nineteen years and has held the position of Warden for nine years; that he is familiar with the administrative practice concerning the discharge of prisoners committed there in default of fines and costs during that time; that up to the present controversy 'the Baltimore City jail has always followed Section 533 of the Baltimore City Charter'; that if the State's Attorney had not taken the present action in Court the jail would have been following the public general law of 1943 (this to conform to a recent ruling of one of the Judges of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City in the habeas corpus case mentioned in the bill of complaint,--Poehlman); that according to the City Solicitor's advice, in view of the present Court proceedings the jail is continuing to operate under Section 533 of the City Charter, except in specific cases where the Judge would order otherwise; that in the course of a year more than one thousand prisoners would be affected by the difference between the operations under the one or the other of the two conflicting statutes.

The witness' testimony concludes with these sentences: 'That there have been questions raised as to which of the Acts controls prior to the passage of the Act of 1943.

It has been raised in four or five proceedings, cases of habeas corpus since the last ten years, and in each case the Judge ruled that Section 533 of the Baltimore City Charter prevailed.' In this connection the record also contains a reference to a letter dated November 17, 1943, from an Assistant City Solicitor to the Warden (appellee), advising that 'no legislation was passed at the 1943 session of the General Assembly which would affect the provisions of the Baltimore City Charter.' The present controversy, therefore, results directly from the ruling to the contrary in the habeas corpus case of Poehlman, above mentioned, rendered in the Baltimore City Court on February 11, 1944.

The aforegoing is substantially the case as it comes before this Court. Not only is the authority of the State's Attorney to bring this suit unquestioned by the parties to it but, because of their concurrence in the procedure for testing the point in controversy, they have offered no authority or precedent in law on any jurisdictional question. The only authorities mentioned in the brief of amicus curiae on his point of 'May a Maryland State's Attorney, as such, institute a proceeding of this character', are neither relevant nor helpful here.

The first authority cited is Hawkins v. State, 81 Md. 306, 32 A. 278. That case went no further in this connection than to decide, in effect, that a State's Attorney has no authority to institute proceedings in the nature of a quo warranto to oust an incumbent from a public office, and that he possesses no other powers than those prescribed by the Constitution or by statute, without pretending to define them. The other authority cited is that of Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 385, which has nothing to do at all with the office of State's Attorney. The mention of the Attorney General in the opinion is simply to the effect that the bringing of that particular suit (injunction to restrain the collection of taxes under an unconstitutional ordinance) did not come within the duties of the Attorney General and that he was not a necessary party to it.

In brief, no authority has been cited, nor has any been found, that would deny the State's Attorney the right to initiate this kind of a proceeding in the discharge of his official duties. If the issue be not raised by him it would necessarily, under the facts and circumstances prevailing here, have to remain unsettled,--at least, until the next session of the General Assembly,--and a situation would result in which hundreds of prisoners would be released every year contrary to the law. To permit such a situation to continue without allowing the State the right to even challenge it would amount to a confession of complete impotency in the administration of our system of criminal law which the Court does not feel justified in making.

Inherent in the office of State's Attorney are certain obligations to the public and to the criminal court which the incumbent is as fully bound to discharge as he is to perform his routine duties as prosecutor. He not only represents the State in the realm of law enforcement, but is also in a very special sense an officer of the court in which he serves, so that in this dual capacity he has, impliedly, both the right and the duty to help give effect to the law and the judgments under it as pronounced by the Court.

His obligations as a public...