Wells v. State
Decision Date | 16 October 1979 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 973 |
Citation | 378 So.2d 747 |
Parties | Arthur Lee WELLS, alias v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Michael C. Cornwell, Asst. Public Defender, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Sarah Kathryn Farnell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant was charged in a two count indictment, to which no demurrer was interposed, with credit card theft. Count One charged theft by taking or retaining possession of credit cards taken in violation of § 13-4-32(a), Code of Alabama 1975, and Count Two charged theft of credit cards lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake in violation of § 13-4-32(b), Code of Alabama 1975. At the close of the evidence the state dismissed and struck Count Two of the indictment, and the case went to the jury on Count One only. The jury found the appellant "guilty as charged," and the trial court set punishment at ten years imprisonment.
The appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled following a hearing thereon. From the judgment of the court, sentencing the appellant, and the overruling of his motion for new trial, the appellant prosecutes this appeal.
Orland M. Free of 1900 Rice Mine Road in Tuscaloosa testified that on September 5, 1978, at approximately 6:30 p. m. or 7:00 p. m., he discovered his billfold and checkbook missing from his automobile. The billfold contained a driver's license and three credit cards: BankAmericard, Exxon, and Visa, all belonging to Mr. Free. Mr. Free's automobile was parked unattended in a loading zone in front of his place of business, Office Products, Inc. The billfold and checkbook were on the front seat of the automobile under some papers. Mr. Free had seen his credit cards earlier that day when he stopped to get gas. Mr. Free testified that he did not give the appellant or anyone else permission to take or use the credit cards. There were never any unauthorized charges made on the cards.
On September 6, 1978, Investigator Ken Swindle of the Tuscaloosa Police Department arrested the appellant on an unrelated charge. The appellant was advised of his Miranda 1 rights by Investigator Swindle and he indicated that he understood those rights. On that occasion, Investigator Swindle asked the appellant for some identification. The appellant pulled out from his person a billfold and handed it to Investigator Swindle. Inside the billfold were the driver's license identification of Orland M. Free and the three previously mentioned credit cards. At this point Investigator Swindle took the appellant to police headquarters where he again read the appellant his Miranda rights. After the appellant indicated that he understood his rights, a statement was taken from him by Investigator Swindle. In the statement the appellant admitted taking from an automobile the billfold "with Orland Free's identification and BankAmericard and other items in it."
At the close of the state's case, the appellant's attorney made a motion to exclude the evidence. This motion was overruled by the trial court.
The appellant's first contention of error is that § 13-4-32(a), Code of Alabama 1975, under which he was tried and convicted, is unconstitutional. This issue was raised at lower court by motion for new trial. 2
Section 13-4-32(a), supra, is as follows:
The appellant specifically contends that the second paragraph of § 13-4-32(a) is an unconstitutional violation of due process of law. He claims that this section of the Code removed his presumption of innocence at trial and shifted the burden of proof from the state to him under a "statutorily created presumption of guilt based on mere possession."
In the case of State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, 272 (1906), we find the following:
Accord: Mobile, J, & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42, 31 S.Ct. 136, 55 L.Ed. 78 (1910).
It is further stated in the case of Griggs v. State, 37 Ala.App. 605, 73 So.2d 382, 386 (1954) that:
(Citations omitted).
As we read the presumption contained in § 13-4-32(a), it is a legislatively created aid to the prosecution in proving a prima facie case. It does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, nor does it nullify the presumption of innocence that stays with a defendant throughout the trial. In fact the trial court charged the jury on these principles of law. The trial court also charged the jury that the presumption set forth in § 13-4-32(a) was a rebuttable presumption that could be overcome by the evidence.
Before the prosecution is entitled to the presumption that § 13-4-32(a) has been violated, certain elements must be proven: A person must (1) have in his possession or control, (2) a credit card or the information therefrom, (3) issued in the name of another, and (4) without the cardholder's consent. Once this presumption is shown, it is incumbent upon the defendant to explain his possession consistent with honesty, or rest under the assumption that he had stolen it. "It is consistent with all the constitutional protections of accused men to throw on them the burden of proving facts peculiarly within their knowledge and hidden from discovery by the Government." Casey v. United States, 276 U.S 413, 48 S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632 (1928); Buckles v. State, 291 Ala. 359, 280 So.2d 823 (1973).
The statutory presumption in § 13-4-32(a) does not operate to preclude a defendant from an opportunity to submit to a jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue. We believe the presumption to be constitutionally permissible since there is a rational connection between the facts proved: i. e., the appellant's unexplained possession of credit cards of another without the owner's consent; and the presumption based upon proven facts: i. e., a violation of the crime of credit card theft. See: Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965); Ingram v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 356 So.2d 761 (1978).
The appellant next contends that a fatal variance exists between the charge contained in the indictment and the proof at trial. As stated earlier the appellant was convicted under Count One of the indictment, Count Two having been dismissed on motion of the district attorney.
The charge of credit card theft contained in Count One of the indictment tracked the language of § 13-4-32(a), supra. The indictment 3 charged that the appellant Took credit cards from another without the cardholder's consent, Or, received credit cards of another knowing they were stolen with intent to convert them to his own use. (Emphasis added). Count One charged in the alternative two offenses of the same character and subject to the same punishment. This is permissible under §§ 15-8-50 and 15-8-52, Code of Alabama 1975. The disjunctive...
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Ballard v. State
...of these remedies, if proper and applicable to the case, is a waiver of a review by this court as to the matters in question." Wells v. State, 378 So.2d 747 (Ala.Crim.App.), writ denied, 378 So.2d 756 The record reveals that appellant's counsel properly excepted to the court's oral charge, ......