Wells v. State
| Docket Number | 05-21-00855-CR |
| Decision Date | 23 August 2023 |
| Parties | AARON RAYSHAN WELLS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
1
AARON RAYSHAN WELLS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-21-00855-CR
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
August 23, 2023
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F19-75986
Before Justices Reichek and Goldstein[1]
OPINION
AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE.
Aaron Rayshan Wells appeals his conviction for capital murder. Bringing six issues, appellant contends (1) he was not brought to trial timely under the Interstate Agreed Detainer Act (IADA), (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a geofence warrant, (3) the State failed to show the Google data used as a basis for its expert's testimony was reliable, (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance, (5) the
evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction, and (6) the submission of a jury instruction on conspirator liability constituted harmful error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
We begin with a brief overview of the facts concerning the offense and investigation. In the early morning hours of June 24, 2018, Nikita Dickerson engaged in her nightly routine of meeting her boyfriend, Jimmy Giddings, in the driveway of their house to escort him inside. Giddings was a drug dealer, and Dickerson brought a gun with her for their protection. Dickerson stated she was not aware of any particular threats to Giddings, but the neighborhood was unsafe.
On this occasion, as Giddings was getting out of his car, a group of men rushed toward him from the vicinity of a church across the street. One of the men shot at Dickerson multiple times, and she sustained non-fatal injuries. As Dickerson collapsed to the ground, she dropped her gun, which was picked up by the man who shot her. Security camera recordings show Giddings running into the house and closing a metal gate in the entryway behind him. The men followed, kicking open the gate to gain entry. Three men are clearly visible in the recording with the lower parts of their faces covered. The men entered the house, forcing Dickerson to get up and walk inside with them at gunpoint. A short time later, a fourth man, later identified as appellant, ran past the camera into the house.
Once in the house, the men demanded money. During the course of the robbery, Giddings was shot and killed. One of Dickerson's children, who was in a bedroom of the house during the offense, called 911. The men fled before police arrived.
A homicide detective, Jeffrey Loeb, released still pictures of the three men who could be seen clearly in the security camera footage. A public tip line was opened to try to identify them. Although the lower portions of the men's faces were covered, the pictures showed distinctive tattoos.
When no productive leads were generated by the tip line, Detective Loeb requested a geofence search warrant to obtain information from Google about cellular devices located in the area at the time of the offense. Based on the security camera recording timestamp and footage showing that the men were in the area of the church immediately before and after the offense, Loeb obtained a warrant to search Google's records for information on devices located within a rectangular geofence encompassing Giddings's house and the portion of the church directly across the street between 2:45 a.m. and 3:10 a.m. on June 24. Ultimately, a cellular phone associated with appellant was identified as being at the scene. Through appellant's phone records and a search of social media, police were able to identify Milton Prentice, Brian Groom, and Kiante Watkins as the other three men involved in the offense.
Appellant was found incarcerated for a different offense in a federal prison in Tennessee. After being transferred to Dallas County, he was tried for and convicted of capital murder. This appeal followed.
Analysis
I. IADA
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss under the IADA because the State of Texas failed to bring him to trial within 180 days after he requested disposition of his case. The IADA is a congressionally sanctioned compact between the United States and the states that have adopted it, including Texas. See Kirvin v. State, 394 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). The Act outlines a cooperative procedure to be used when a state is seeking to try a prisoner who is being held in a penal or correctional institution of another state. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14. The state with the untried indictment, information, or complaint must file a detainer with the institution that is holding the prisoner. State v. Votta, 299 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).[2] The institution must then promptly inform the prisoner the detainer has been filed and that he has the right to request final disposition of the charges made the subject of the detainer. Id. The prisoner may make such a request
by giving written notice to the warden of the facility in which he is being held who is then required to forward the request to the appropriate court and prosecuting officer. Id. Once the request for final disposition has been received by the court and prosecuting officer, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days unless a continuance is granted under the Act. Id.
A continuance granted under the Act must be (1) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) in open court, (3) with the defendant or his counsel present, (4) for good cause, and (5) be necessary or reasonable. Kirvin, 394 S.W.3d at 556. The "open court" requirement does not mandate a formal proceeding, but is intended to prevent ex parte or sua sponte continuances. Id. Where a continuance is agreed to by both sides, it is deemed to be reasonable, necessary, and granted for good cause. Id. at 556-57. The defendant's personal consent to the continuance is not required; his counsel's signature is sufficient. Id. at 556. Agreed continuances toll the statutory period within which the defendant must be tried. Id.
The record in this case shows the State of Texas filed its detainer with the Tennessee prison and, on April 8, 2020, appellant signed his request for final disposition. Appellant's request was received by the trial court on May 8. The State asserts the district attorney did not receive the disposition request until May 29. Appellant was transferred to a Dallas County jail on June 30.
On July 15 and August 7, both the district attorney and appellant's defense counsel signed agreed requests for continuance, otherwise known as "pass slips,"
resulting in a trial setting in September. On September 23, the parties filed a joint motion for continuance stating that, although the IADA required appellant to be tried within 180 days, the postponement of jury trials due to the pandemic constituted good cause to continue the trial date in this case. Based on the joint motion, the trial court reset the trial date to March 1, 2021.
Between February 11, 2021 and April 15, 2021, the district attorney and defense counsel jointly requested five more continuances resulting in a trial setting of August 19. On June 25, the court conducted a pre-trial conference at which the State, appellant, and his counsel appeared. The State announced at the hearing that it was ready to proceed to trial. Defense counsel, however, stated she had a conflict and requested the trial be moved to the next available date on the court's jury calendar, which was September 21.
Appellant spoke on his own behalf and stated he had two concerns. His first concern was that he felt there had been a lack of communication between him and his counsel, resulting in her failure to file motions or "come up with a defense" despite the fact the case was set for trial. Because of this, appellant requested he be appointed new counsel. Appellant's second concern was the delay in his case going to trial, and he requested the charges against him be dismissed under the IADA.
The trial court denied appellant's request for new counsel and appellant does not challenge the denial on appeal or assert he received ineffective assistance. In response to appellant's IADA complaint, the court agreed appellant "certainly
need[ed] to have this case tried." The court went on to find good cause existed to extend the trial date to September 21, but cautioned that it would be the final continuance granted. Jury selection began on September 21, and trial commenced on September 23.
As stated above, agreed continuances toll the statutory period within which a defendant must be brought to trial under the IADA. Id. at 557. The record here shows the State and defense agreed to multiple continuances of the trial date covering a period of 379 days between July 15, 2020 and August 19, 2021. During a large portion of this time, jury trials were not being conducted due to the global pandemic. Defense counsel then requested an additional continuance which tolled the statutory period for a further 35 days. See id. at 556 (reasonable delays caused by defense motions toll statutory period). Appellant's trial commenced 482 days after his request for disposition was received by the district attorney and 503 days after his request was received by the trial court. Even assuming the latter date controls, 414 of the 503 days were tolled, meaning that only 89 days of the 180-day period ran from the date of the request to the beginning of trial. Appellant's trial was, therefore, timely under the IADA. Id. at 558. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
II. Geofence Search
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to suppress location history data obtained from Google with a geofence
search warrant. A geofence warrant allows police investigators to...
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