Wells v. Wells
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-DR-990 |
| Decision Date | 12 March 2024 |
| Citation | 230 N.E.3d 954 |
| Parties | Brooke WELLS, Appellant-Intervenor, v. Joseph Todd WELLS, Appellee-Petitioner, and Kimberly Renay Wells, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, The Honorable Danielle Gaughan, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 49D15-0904-DR-18395
Attorney for Appellant: Alexander N. Moseley, Julie C. Dixon, Dixon & Moseley, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee Joseph todd wells: Jonathan R. Deenik, Deenik Lowe, LLC, Greenwood, Indiana
[1] Brooke Wells ("Daughter") challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that she repudiated her father, Joseph Todd Wells ("Father"), and therefore Father was relieved of his obligation to pay for her to attend college. Concluding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Daughter repudiated Father, we affirm the trial court.
[2] Daughter is the child of Father and Kimberly Renay Wells ("Mother"),1 whose marriage was dissolved in 2010. Under the dissolution decree, which incorporated the terms of a marital settlement agreement, Father was obligated to pay for Daughter to attend college. In July 2021, Father initiated the instant litigation by filing a petition for the emancipation of Daughter, who turned eighteen earlier that year. Daughter intervened, filing a motion to enforce the provisions of the dissolution decree that required Father to pay for her college education. Father then filed a petition alleging that Daughter had repudiated him, asking the trial court to either (1) relieve him of the obligation to pay for Daughter’s college education or (2) modify the dissolution decree.
[3] A fact-finding hearing was held in December 2022. Evidence was presented that Daughter—who was born on March 5, 2003—was completing her senior year of high school in the spring of 2021. As of her junior year, Daughter’s plan was to join the Air Force. Before spring break of her senior year, Daughter had taken a physical and received a special assignment. Daughter went on spring break with her boyfriend, Bryce Bowen, and his family. During the trip, she confided in Bryce’s mother, telling her she did not want to go into the Air Force.
[4] Before spring break, Daughter generally had a positive relationship with Father and his wife ("Stepmother"), with whom Daughter lived. When Daughter re- turned from spring break, she informed Father by text message that she no longer wished to go into the Air Force. Father and Stepmother then attempted to speak with Daughter about her options. At that point, Father was under the impression that Daughter had not submitted college applications. However, Daughter had in fact submitted college applications, but she did not tell Father because she thought he would be upset due to having other plans for Daughter.
[5] The issue of Daughter’s post-secondary plans resulted in family conflict and the deterioration of Daughter’s relationships with Father, Stepmother, and Daughter’s older brother ("Brother"). In May 2021—by which point Daughter was eighteen years old, but still in high school—Daughter abruptly moved out of Father’s home and moved in with the Bowens. Daughter did not discuss this decision with Father. Father wanted Daughter to move back into his home, where Daughter’s clothing, bedding, and other personal belongings were available to her. Although Father thought Daughter might move back within a week or so, Daughter continued living with the Bowens, who purchased clothing, bedding, and other items for her. When Daughter began attending community college at Ivy Tech, it was the Bowens who paid the tuition. Since moving out in May 2021, Daughter returned twice to gather personal belongings. In the ensuing months, Father and Stepmother invited Daughter to attend family events and sit for a family portrait. Daughter did not attend events where Father was present, and she did not come for the family portrait.
[6] Since May 2021, Father has physically seen Daughter on three occasions: (1) her high school graduation; (2) an appointment for the extraction of Daughter’s wisdom teeth, where Father paid for the procedure; and (3) a brief luncheon. In November 2021, Father became seriously ill and was hospitalized. Daughter did not visit Father, and she engaged in only minimal communications about his health. As Daughter attended community college and later enrolled at Indiana University, Daughter did not provide Father with specific information regarding the costs of attendance, the classes she was taking, or her grades. Although Father would periodically send Daughter text messages, and Daughter would sometimes respond—at times expressing well-wishes and telling Father she loved and missed him—Father testified that Daughter’s actions belied her words. Father ultimately testified that he believes Daughter "doesn't have the desire to have a relationship" with him. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 14.
[7] The trial court took the matter under advisement. It later entered sua sponte findings and conclusions, writing that Daughter "repudiated her relationship with Father and Father is therefore relieved of his obligation to contribute to [Daughter’s] college expenses." Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 27. Daughter moved to correct error, claiming the judgment was "contrary to relevant case law on repudiation and post-secondary educational support orders." Id. at 131. Daughter challenged several of the court’s findings, and she sought relief due to the alleged "misinterpretation of relevant case law, or a mistake having been made[.]" Id. at 147. The trial court denied the motion. Daughter now appeals.
[1–7] [8] Daughter appeals the denial of her motion to correct error. That motion challenged the trial court’s determination that Daughter repudiated Father and, therefore, Father was relieved of his obligation to pay for her college expenses. We review the denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021). Under this standard, we "only reverse ‘where the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a matter of law.’ " Id. (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ind. 2013)). However, to the extent the ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de novo, Id. Furthermore, where—as here—the trial court entered sua sponte findings, those findings control only "the issues or matters covered thereby[.]" Ind. Trial Rule 52(D). As to other issues, "the judgment or general finding … shall control[.]" Id. Under Trial Rule 52(A), we "shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." A finding is clearly erroneous only if the record contains no facts to support the finding, either directly or by inference. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). "A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts." Id. We ultimately look to whether the evidence supports the findings and the findings support the judgment. Id. In doing so, "we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment." Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We will affirm unless our review leaves us "with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262.
[8, 9] [9] "[W]here a child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent, that parent must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her contribution to college expenses for that child." Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). Repudiation is the "complete refusal to participate in a relationship with the parent" after the child turns eighteen. Lovold, 988 N.E.2d at 1150. In relieving a parent of the obligation to pay for college expenses upon the child’s repudiation, we emphasized that, Messner v. Messner, 118 N.E.3d 64, 68-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 166), trans. denied. Thus, "[w]hatever their biases and resentments"—even if "one can understand how they got that way"—"when they become adults it is no longer appropriate to allow them to stay that way without consequence." Id. (emphasis removed).
[10–12] [10] Although not raised by the parties, the dissent would hold that the doctrine of repudiation is not available to Father because Father’s obligation to contribute to Daughter’s educational expenses was included in a marital settlement agreement. Critically, however, a parent’s obligation to contribute to the educational expenses of a child is not found at common law but, instead, arises solely from our dissolution of marriage statutes. See I.C. § 31-16-6-2. And, similar to a child support order, an educational support order is subject to modification. See generally Svenstrup v. Svenstrup, 981 N.E.2d 138, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (); see also Panfil v. Fell, 19 N.E.3d 772, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (...
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