Wells v. Wells
Decision Date | 25 March 2011 |
Docket Number | 2091021. |
Citation | 69 So.3d 192 |
Parties | Howard WELLSv.Roger WELLS, as administrator of the estate of Sarah Frances Wells. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Misty S. Ledbetter, Legal Services Alabama, Inc., Anniston, for appellant.Dani V. Bone, Gadsden, for appellee.THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Howard Wells (“Howard”) appeals from the judgment of the Etowah Circuit Court in favor of his brother, Roger Wells (“Roger”), the administrator of the estate of Sarah Frances Wells (“the estate”); Sarah Frances Wells (“the mother”) was the parties' mother. This is the second time this case has been before this court. With minor exceptions, the facts pertinent to this appeal are set forth in this court's prior opinion, Wells v. Wells, 49 So.3d 216, 217 (Ala.Civ.App.2010).1
In the prior appeal, this court considered whether the evidence supported the trial court's final judgment in favor of Roger, as administrator of the estate, that set aside a September 2007 deed transferring property containing the mother's house to Howard on the basis of the trial court's finding that the mother had suffered from a chronic mental incapacity and that, because of her diagnosis of chronic dementia, she had been incapable of experiencing a lucid moment at the time she signed the September 2007 deed. This court reversed that judgment. Although we concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the mother suffered from a chronic mental incapacity, we concluded that the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that she was incapable of experiencing a lucid interval solely because she had been diagnosed with dementia. We remanded the case to the trial court to consider all the evidence that had been presented to it and to determine, based on that evidence, whether the mother had experienced a lucid interval at the time she signed the September 2007 deed. Wells, supra.
Following remand, the trial court entered a new judgment in which it concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that the mother had experienced a lucid interval at the time she executed the September 2007 deed. In its judgment, the trial court wrote, in pertinent part:
“The testimony [on behalf of the estate] on the subject came from Roger (the administrator of his mother's estate) and wife Sherry Wells, who spent a substantial amount of time with the [mother] and knew her both before and after her hospitalization and assisted living placement became necessary in August of 2007 ( [the mother] died on October 6, 2007).
“After the hospitalization in August of 2007, Sherry testified [that the mother] was unremittingly confused and unable to handle her affairs until her death in early October.
“Sherry testified that once [the mother] was placed in the hospital and then assisted living following her August 2007 episode, she and Roger would come up almost every evening and found [the mother] persistently mentally confused about her personal and business affairs on every occasion.
“Based on this extensive, almost daily contact with [the mother] from August 2007 to her death in October 2007, Sherry concluded [that the mother] was not in her right mind to make decisions or handle her affairs.
“....
Howard filed a timely appeal from that judgment to this court, which transferred the appeal to the supreme court for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The supreme court transferred the appeal back to this court pursuant to § 12–2–7(6), Ala.Code 1975.
The standard by which this court is required to review the trial court's judgment in this case is well settled. Because the trial court's decision is based on ore tenus evidence, we will presume that its factual findings are correct, and we will not set them aside unless they are plainly and palpably wrong or unjust. See Tyler v. Tyler, 990 So.2d 423, 428 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). We do not extend this presumption of correctness to the trial court's application of the law to the facts, however. See Hinds v. Hinds, 887 So.2d 267, 271 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). Instead, we review a trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. See Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253, 1255–56 (Ala.2004).
Howard contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the mother was not experiencing a lucid interval at the time she executed the September 2007 deed. He argues that Roger did not introduce any evidence concerning the capacity of the mother at the time she executed the deed or even during the weeks before her execution of the deed. He argues, in effect, that the medical evidence that was presented at trial did not indicate that the mother was not experiencing a lucid interval at the time she executed the deed. Howard points out that five witnesses testified at the hearing that it had been the mother's intent to convey her property to him, and he points out that both Gary Burns, the attorney who prepared the deed, and Linda Gattis, Burns's legal secretary, testified that the mother was competent when she executed the deed. He points to Gattis's testimony that she met with the mother, explained the deed to her, and was fully satisfied that the mother was competent to execute the deed. He argues that Gattis's testimony was the only evidence of what occurred at the exact time the mother signed the deed and that the trial court should not have given any weight to the testimony of Roger and his wife, Sherry Wells (“Sherry”), because they were not present at the time the mother executed the deed.
As previously stated, when this case was first on appeal, this court determined that evidence of record sustained the trial court's conclusion that the mother had suffered from mental incompetence that was permanent in nature. As a result of that finding, the burden shifted to Howard to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that, despite the mother's permanent incompetence, she was experiencing a lucid interval at the time she executed the September 2007 deed, see Ex parte Chris Langley Timber & Mgmt., Inc., 923 So.2d 1100, 1105 (Ala.2005); Abbott v....
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