Wells-Yates v. People

• Decision Date: 04 November 2019
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 16SC592
• Citation: 454 P.3d 191
• Parties: Belinda May WELLS-YATES, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

454 P.3d 191

Belinda May WELLS-YATES, Petitioner,

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 16SC592

Supreme Court of Colorado.

November 4, 2019

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing December 16, 2019

Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Dayna Vise, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Michael D. McMaster, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Our General Assembly long ago adopted the Habitual Criminal Act for the purpose of punishing more severely "those individuals who show a propensity toward repeated criminal conduct." People v. Dist. Ct. , 711 P.2d 666, 670 (Colo. 1985). But the legislature's authority to prescribe harsher punishment for habitual criminals is not without constitutional contours. It is limited by the principle of proportionality that is embedded in the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Very generally, proportionality is a foundational "precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." Weems v. United States , 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). Simply put, the concept of proportionality dictates that the punishment should fit the crime.

¶2 In this case and the two companion cases we announce today, Melton v. People , 2019 CO 89, 451 P.3d 415, and People v. McRae , 2019 CO 91, 451 P.3d 835, we consider multiple issues that lie at the intersection of proportionality review and habitual criminal punishment. We hold that: (1) during an abbreviated proportionality review of a habitual criminal sentence, the court must consider each triggering offense and the predicate offenses together and determine whether, in combination, they are so lacking in gravity or seriousness as to raise an inference that the sentence imposed on that triggering offense is grossly disproportionate;¹ (2) in determining the gravity or seriousness of the triggering offense and the predicate offenses, the court should consider any relevant legislative amendments enacted after the dates of those offenses, even if the amendments do not apply retroactively; (3) not all narcotic offenses are per se grave or serious; and (4) the narcotic offenses of possession and possession with intent are not per se grave or serious. Because the court of appeals' decision is at odds with the conclusions we reach today, we reverse its judgment.² Accordingly, we remand with instructions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶3 In order to place this appeal in context, we begin with a primer on proportionality review and a synopsis of habitual criminal punishment (focusing on proportionality review of a habitual criminal sentence). In the process, we endeavor to shed light on these areas of the law and to correct a few misstatements that appear in our caselaw. After setting forth the pertinent legal principles, we discuss the factual and procedural history of this case and identify the controlling standard of review. We then proceed to analyze the issues before us.

I. Proportionality Review

¶4 The concept of proportionality is rooted in both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. Therefore, our discussion is informed by both federal and Colorado law. We examine each in turn.

A. Federal Authority

¶5 The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the Supreme Court construed the last clause in this amendment as prohibiting "not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed." However, the Court has since narrowed the guarantee of proportionality: "The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence"; instead, "it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime." Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem , 463 U.S. at 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001 ).³ It is "exceedingly rare" for a sentence to be deemed so extreme that it is grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id.

¶6 Harmelin distilled the following four principles from the Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence:

• "[T]he fixing of prison terms ... involves a substantive penological judgment" that belongs to the legislature and should be given substantial deference by reviewing courts.

• There are a number of legitimate penological schemes based on concerns related to "retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation," and the Eighth Amendment does not require the adoption of any particular scheme.

• Significant differences in sentencing philosophies and in the length of prescribed prison terms are inevitable; even assuming consistency in philosophies, "differing attitudes and perceptions of local conditions" may lead to different, though rational, determinations related to sentencing.

• Proportionality review should be guided "by objective factors to the maximum possible extent"; the relative absence of objective factors to differentiate between sentences has meant that succeeding on a proportionality challenge is an infrequent occurrence.

Id. at 998–1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (internal quotation marks omitted). These principles are what led Harmelin to cabin the holding in Solem as barring only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate. See id. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680.

¶7 But how does a court ascertain whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment? In Solem , the Court adopted an objective, two-step approach for undertaking a proportionality review.⁴

463 U.S. at 290–91, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Step one includes two subparts: The trial court should consider (1) the gravity or seriousness of the offense and (2) the harshness of the penalty. Id. In step two, the trial court may compare the challenged sentence to sentences for other crimes in the same jurisdiction and sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 291–92, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Harmelin clarified that this is not a wooden test requiring consideration of step two in every case. 501 U.S. at 1004, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Instead, step two's comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions is appropriate "only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." Id. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Viewed through the prism of Harmelin , then, the purpose of any comparative analysis of sentences in step two "is to validate an initial judgment" in step one "that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime." Id.

¶8 Thus, under Solem , as construed in Harmelin , when a defendant makes a timely request for a proportionality review, the court must compare the gravity or seriousness of the offense to the harshness of the penalty (step one). If that analysis gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court must proceed to step two and conduct intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons. But if the analysis in step one does not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, the proportionality challenge fails and the sentence must be upheld.

¶9 A dozen years after Harmelin , the Supreme Court revisited the Eighth Amendment's narrow proportionality principle in Ewing v. California , 538 U.S. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). Unfortunately, the Court remained fractured.⁵ But the three-justice plurality opinion in Ewing did not alter the analytical framework ushered in by the rule of Harmelin . To the contrary, it expressly acknowledged that "[t]he proportionality principles ... distilled in Justice Kennedy's concurrence [in Harmelin ] guide[d] [its] application of the Eighth Amendment" to Ewing's recidivist sentence. Id. at 23–24, 123 S.Ct. 1179. Thus, in rejecting Ewing's claim that his three-strikes sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his offense of felony grand theft, the plurality followed Harmelin and "address[ed] the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty." Id. at 28, 123 S.Ct. 1179.

B. Colorado Law

¶10 Article II, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution is identical to the Eighth Amendment. Colo. Const. art. II, § 20. As such, we have generally embraced the Supreme Court's approach to proportionality challenges. See Close v. People , 48 P.3d 528, 538 (Colo. 2002). However, our analysis does not mirror the Supreme Court's. We explore the differences next, starting with step one, which in Colorado legal parlance has become known as an "abbreviated proportionality review," followed by step two, which in Colorado legal parlance has become known as an "extended proportionality review."

1. Abbreviated Proportionality Review (Step One)

¶11 In line with Supreme Court precedent, at step one, Colorado courts consider the gravity or seriousness of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. But our precedent has carved out two additional principles with respect to this initial step. One of them pertains to the gravity or seriousness of the offense (the first subpart of step one), while the other relates to the harshness of the penalty (the second subpart of step one). We discuss each before moving on to step two.

a. Gravity or Seriousness of the Offense

¶12 We acknowledged in People v. Gaskins , 825 P.2d 30, 36 (Colo. 1992), that the determination regarding the gravity or seriousness of the offense is "somewhat imprecise," notwithstanding the guidance provided in Solem . The Court in Solem explained that trial courts should consider "the harm...